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to Adam 
. .  . a present death 
Had been more merciful. Come on, poor babe: 
Some powerful spirit instruct the kites and ravens 
to be thy nurses! Wolves and bears, they say, 
Casting their savageness aside, have done 
Like offices of pity. 
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Preface to the Second Edition 
A Vision for the Future or a Memoir? 
I  t has been seven years since I wrote the first edition of Last One over 
the Wall. I wrote it to memorialize a personal journey and a radical 
experiment in juvenile justice reform from two decades earlier. For 
whatever reasons, the book has developed a following around the 
country, and it continues to be read by those interested in alternative 
approaches to dealing with juvenile offenders. 
Ohio State University Press has therefore decided to reissue the 
book. Aside from this new introduction, I have made no changes or 
edits. Indeed, the experiences I described cannot be changed, and the 
policy implications of the reforms are as obvious and valid today as 
they were then. But really, that doesn't matter much. Results have never 
driven juvenile justice policy, nor has decency. It is therefore a matter 
of whether the "Massachusetts Experiment" will be studied and emu­
lated as another way of handling troublesome and troubled young­
sters, or whether it will fade into obscurity—an isolated fluke from a 
time long past. 
This year, thirty years will have passed since I was invited by Re­
publican governor Frank Sargent of Massachusetts to join his cabinet 
as commissioner of the newly created Department of Youth Services. 
Over the next 3V2 years, we closed all of the state's reform schools— 
scattering the kids and dispersing the budget to an array of humane 
options, both cautious and quirky, for the truly delinquent. 
Nationally, rehabilitation in juvenile justice has now been pretty 
much replaced by retribution. Whatever vestiges of treatment remain 
are hidden in the doublespeak of "alternative punishment," "conse-
IX 
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quences," and "discipline." Winning sound bites shape the facts, and 
political rhetoric prescribes the solutions. 
Lessons 
Would I do things differently today were I confronted with a similar 
juvenile correctional system with its attendant array of reform schools? 
Definitely. But not in the way the reader might surmise. Given the 
times, I'd attempt to close the reform schools more quickly and defini­
tively and I'd shy away from involving many credentialed profession­
als (particularly M.S.W. social workers) in the process. 
In Last One over the Wall I noted that as the department became more 
professionalized, there emerged "the hurtful side effects" that inevita­
bly accompany certain behavioral and medical models when practiced 
on delinquents. They showed up in the reintroduction of isolation cells 
in some of the small secure settings (this time in order to "set limits") 
and the pandemic use of psychotropic drugs to control the recalcitrant. 
It was a reiteration of the role professional helpers continually play 
in brutalizing settings: providing a means to avoid dealing with the 
profound personal, social, or institutional sources of the "unreason­
able" demands of the delinquent. Having since run similar agencies in 
other jurisdictions—Illinois, Pennsylvania, the District of Columbia— 
I am convinced that the bars to substantive change in these systems 
grow exponentially with the number of human service professionals 
involved. 
This is not surprising. It has always been the case in agencies with 
captive (e.g., juvenile corrections) or semicaptive clientele (e.g., child 
welfare). A dependence upon traditional models of help inevitably 
dulls the reform impulse, seeing it as a threat to the status quo. 
In Last One over the Wall I cited Erving Goffman's description of the 
role of the helping professional in these kinds of agencies as being 
similar to that of a con artist's confederate. He or she is expected to 
"cool out the mark/' Goffman's analysis has become even more com­
pelling as we have entered a more punitive era. When I wrote Last One 
over the Wall in 1991, the country was already well down this road. 
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The Punitive Society 
In the adult systems, lengthy and mandatory prison sentences have 
become the rule. The death penalty is being administered more effi­
ciently and liberally The narrative is increasingly being expelled from 
our courts—both adult and juvenile. It is now routinely characterized 
as "the abuse excuse/' and its exclusion has robbed lives of meaning 
and deprived all of us of social instruction. The transfer of thousands 
of adolescents into the nation's adult courts and prisons is symptom­
atic of this trend. Most significant, in relation to the thesis of this book, 
reform schools have made a comeback. Overflowing this time with 
black and Latino teenagers, they are the vanguard of juvenile justice 
in America—proudly trumpeting discipline, punishment, and "conse­
quences." 
A new sense of one-upmanship drives juvenile justice planners and 
administrators. Who can label their young charges as the most preda­
tory? Who can be the most detached in administering punishment? 
How can we disguise viciousness as treatment? How can we couch 
inhumane policies in moralistic terms? For obvious reasons, the "Mas­
sachusetts Experience" stands more isolated today than it did a quarter 
century ago. 
But won't this pass? Criminal justice prescriptions for handling ob­
streperous or dangerous juvenile offenders have waxed and waned 
greatly over the years. In the past, however, each new cycle tended 
toward a certain progressivism. It suggests that if we can wait out this 
unusually neglectful period, we can anticipate a swing toward more 
humane and decent juvenile justice policies and practices. Sadly, I 
think not. I fear that this time things will be different, primarily be­
cause of the changed racial makeup of the system's clientele. 
A Familiar Dilemma 
I wonder not when but whether we will emerge from this dark period 
in juvenile justice history. The untamed punitive impulses of those who 
run American juvenile justice systems stem less from concern over in­
creased crime and violence than from a realization regarding those 
who are likely to be the beneficiaries of retribution. The juvenile justice 
system has succeeded in resurrecting that great "American Dilemma" 
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described by the Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal fifty years ago, 
one that has plagued us for two centuries.1 
As the destructive "drug war" defined crime and increasingly filled 
the prisons and reform schools, race came to define the criminal. He is 
likely to have a black or brown face. We are now at a point where, 
when we hear predictions of a coming explosion of "superpredator" 
youths, we all know who they are. We've learned the code. 
Fear of the Young 
A second contributor to the culture of retribution in juvenile justice is 
related to a renewed fear of young people in general—a contempt 
unequaled in recent years. It was reflected in a 1997 national poll that 
showed that the American public had the lowest opinion of teenagers 
and children ever measured in national polls. 
A symbol for this emerged for a few weeks in 1995 when the nation 
seemed transfixed by the flogging of an American teenager in Singa­
pore. Most supported the practice, often described in exquisite detail. 
Although the ostensible purpose of the debate was to consider whether 
we should use similar corporal punishment for recalcitrant teenagers, 
sadistic titillation was never far from the agenda, the kind Emile Durk­
heim no doubt had in mind when he described "moral indignation" 
as a kind of "disguised envy." The prospect of publicly flogging our 
teenagers tapped a flood of previously unexpressed possibilities— 
whippings, stocks, solitary lockups, shackles, handcuffs, and assorted 
paramilitary rituals—largely indistinguishable from sadomasochistic 
fantasy. 
How Many Kid Killers? 
Perhaps the most controversial chapter of Last One over the Wall was 
chapter 14, "The Myth of 'Violent' Teenagers." I wrote, "Of the 20,000 
persons arrested for [homicide], approximately 2,000 were juveniles. 
Even this figure is inflated, however, since juveniles tend to get in­
volved in such incidents in groups and with peers. A single offense 
often yields multiple arrests of teenagers. In addition, due to police 
overcharging, charges made at the time of arrest are often lowered 
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later, if not completely dismissed. That leaves something like 1,200 
juveniles across the United States who are tried annually for murder 
or manslaughter. Of these probably no more than 500 will be convicted 
of murder in a court of law" (192-93). The reviewer in the New York 
Times found these comments informative and recommended the chap­
ter to his readers. Conversely, a reviewer for the conservative journal 
The Public Interest saw my comments as wrongheaded and certainly in­
accurate. 
I wrote this chapter to address the inflated fears of the public and 
the media over the numbers of homicidal juveniles abroad in the na­
tion. In 1990 I had written an op-ed piece for USA Today on violent 
juveniles for a "point/counterpoint" column. The opposing view was 
put forth by a representative of the Washington Legal Foundation—a 
conservative "think tank" in the District of Columbia. His lead 
screamed that juveniles kill 20,000 Americans each year. This outra­
geous and inaccurate number passed editorial muster with no ques­
tions asked. It gives some indication as to how easily otherwise intelli­
gent and informed persons can be misled on a major issue of crucial 
importance. 
I tried to address this issue as best I could in "The Myth of 'Violent' 
Teenagers," using what I could glean from the studies then available 
on juvenile homicide. I concluded that there were about 1,200 arrests 
annually of juveniles who were accused of killing another human be­
ing. Of these, about 500 would eventually be convicted in a court of 
law. 
Since then, researcher Eric Lotke has looked more closely at the 
issue.2 He sought out figures on the number of youthful perpetrators 
of homicide in 1992. His purpose was to identify exactly how many 
teenagers under the age of eighteen were convicted for personally kill­
ing another human being that year. Lotke concluded that across the 
nation 940 youngsters fit that category. Of these, nearly 100 killed their 
parents, often in the context of abusive relationships. Half of the origi­
nal 940 killed acquaintances, including abusive parental substitutes 
(e.g., a mother's boyfriend). Less than one-third killed strangers. Lotke 
summarized his findings by noting that across the United States in 
1992, only about 290 children personally killed a stranger. 
Though we hear that the times have changed dramatically with re­
gard to juvenile violence and that we are seeing a previously unknown 
psychopathic "breed" of juvenile offenders, the facts indicate other­
xiv / Preface to the Second Edition 
wise. Whatever rises there were in juvenile homicide rates in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, they had less to do with a "new breed7' than 
with the epidemic availability of handguns in four major cities—Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, and New York. 
Prospects 
It is my view that the model outlined in the Massachusetts Experiment 
is probably more appropriate than ever for dealing with contemporary 
delinquents. Despite its demonstrated success, however, it has not 
grown or developed as a philosophy of correctional treatment and 
practice. This is hardly surprising in an era when we must hide any 
intention of treating young offenders with compassion or understand­
ing. In this situation, the Massachusetts Experiment stands as both a 
beacon and an irritant. If matters continue along their present path, it 
seems likely that the life will surely be sucked from the Massachusetts 
Experiment. In the final analysis, however, the survival of any model 
in this politicized field will not be based on results. It will, as I stated 
in the final chapter of this book, be "a matter of chance, of happen­
stance, of politics and mood/7 The same can be said of the current 
destructive juvenile justice system. 
Notes 
1. Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern De­
mocracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944). 
2. Eric Lotke, "Youth Homicide: Keeping Perspective on How Many Chil­
dren Kill/' Valparaiso University Law Review 31, no. 2 (1996): 395-418. 
Prefiice 
It's easy to recall what doesn't heal, 
more difficult to call back what leaves no mark. 
Carl Dennis 
lh  e failed products of a century and a half's dependence on the custo­
dial institution haunt us daily. The homeless person who embarrasses, 
the mental patient who shocks, the chronic offender who threatens, the 
teenage delinquent who elicits both fear and pity—-each reflects our so-
ciety's bizarre skills in sequestering marginal members of our com­
munities.
 r 
There are some who say that we routinely institutionalize a given 
percentage of the population in our society. Inmates of tuberculosis 
sanatoria are replaced by mental patients, by prisoners, and by youth­
ful offenders. As we close one type of institution, we fill another. Stud­
ies suggest we fill prisons to occupy empty cells, regardless of crime 
rates.1 Those states that build more prisons have more prisoners, those 
that do not have fewer. Hard on the heels of a massive "dumping" of 
mental patients into the general society, we began incarcerating the 
largest number of prisoners in our history. This is not to suggest that 
former mental patients filled the prisons (though some patients did end 
up in prison). Other social and political dynamics were at work. 
Most of those who seriously jar, bother, confront, or threaten us are 
the alumni of our systems of exile—mental hospitals, prisons, jails, and 
children's institutions. The institution has been the exemplar of treat­
ment, asylum, or supervision for certain groups from among the men­
tally ill, offenders, neglected children, and delinquents. We have la­
beled such groups with any handy legal or psychiatric nosology as 
falling at the "deep end" of the mental health, corrections, or child 
welfare bureaucracies—the most "psychotic" patient, the most "vio­
lent" offender, the most "serious" delinquent, the most "emotionally 
damaged" youngster. The institution was created to deal—albeit ne­
glectfully, incompetently, and often violently—with these categories of 
xv 
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persons. For these, the institution is likely to be the first, as it is the last, 
resort. 
Our misplaced reliance on institutions has served only to sap our 
imagination. The political and the professional relationships it has en­
gendered ensure that alternative programs are seldom considered. We 
cannot conceive of certain groups of our fellow citizens being safely 
dealt with in anything other than institutions or quasi-institutions. As 
a result, alternatives are seldom what they claim to be. They are quasi-
institutional additions to an unassailable institutional tradition. 
Alternative programs are not meant for those who would otherwise 
fill our mental hospitals, prisons, reform schools, and children's insti­
tutions. Alternatives are for whole new populations—the tractable 
mental patient, the interesting offender, the verbal neurotic, the com­
pliant homeless person, the white middle-class delinquent—those who 
promise unusual rates of success in treatment and probably would not 
be otherwise institutionalized. We allow these alternatives only so long 
as they don't threaten institutions. In the disastrous dumping of men­
tal patients over the past two decades, for example, patients left the 
institutions, but the staff, resources, and monies stayed on the hospital 
grounds. Resources were never allowed to follow the patients to the 
community. In New York and Pennsylvania, even as thousands of pa­
tients were methodically and massively dumped into the streets or 
crammed into welfare hotels, budgets for the depopulated state hospi­
tals actually increased.2 
What follows is about a different kind of deinstitutionalization— 
different in two crucial ways: (1) the resources followed the inmates to 
the community, and (2) the alternatives were reserved for the most 
difficult inmates in the system. Though this is the story of a distinct 
group of inmates (youthful offenders) in a particular kind of institution 
(reform schools), the issues differ only slightly from those involved in 
dealing with mental patients, dependent children, retarded clients, 
and adult offenders. The parameters of debate may shift, but the same 
dilemmas remain. Successful deinstitutionalization has more to do 
with manipulating labels than with diagnosis; more to do with deflat­
ing stereotypes than with management techniques; more to do with 
mitigating immediate harm than with proper rehabilitative models; 
more to do with smarmy politics than with human service planning. 
The real world of deinstitutionalization is seldom discussed in the 
polite literature of social work, psychiatry, and psychology. 
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Fifteen years ago, as commissioner of the Massachusetts Department 
of Youth Services, I closed that state's "training schools" for delinquents, 
beginning with the maximum-security walled institutions for violent 
juveniles, and sent the inmates home or into alternative programs. My 
action was more than just another reform in a traditionally unreform­
able system. Rumors abounded—the inmates had been dumped; we 
would set off an explosion of crime in the state; the inmates had been 
shipped out of the state; the reform schools had quietly reopened; ju­
veniles were being sent to adult prisons in record numbers; other juve­
niles were committing violent crimes in equally record numbers; ju­
venile corrections in Massachusetts was in chaos; deaths among the 
juveniles in state care had increased dramatically; funds had been mis­
used; I had been run out of the state—and too many more to list here. 
Toward the end, someone showed up in my office with a gun, appar­
ently to kill me. A melange of fantastic tales, distortions, and death 
threats suggested we had touched something complex. 
Young offenders in the reform schools were considered the most 
recalcitrant and dangerous in the state. As a Boston juvenile court 
judge told me, "Forget the alternatives. These are the bottom of the 
barrel/' Reform schools (an old-fashioned but honest name) had domi­
nated youth corrections in Massachusetts for 140 years. Although re­
form schools now come disguised as youth development centers or 
learning centers, they remain the backbone of youth corrections 
throughout the United States. 
The "Massachusetts Experiment/' as it came to be called, is complet­
ing its second decade. One would presume that by now, if it had not 
been dismissed as a wild experiment that failed, it would be on the 
cutting edge of correctional reform. Neither has happened. The reforms 
have been successful, but in the inane world of corrections, nothing 
fails like success or succeeds like failure. The United States has just 
gone on locking up ever greater percentages of its young offenders— 
with no evidence of success.3 The deinstitutionalized Massachusetts 
youth corrections system has stayed in place even as its rationale is 
slowly worn away by current political rhetoric. The fact that it might be 
effective to treat young offenders with individual concern and decency 
is, sadly, beside the point. We seem forever mired in the sticky policies 
born of our worst impulses. 
Rumors about Massachusetts youth corrections have never ceased,4 
and they won't while the most serious delinquents in Massachusetts 
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remain outside state institutions. That fact is an abiding irritant to a 
field grounded in mythology. It's not that those troubled and troubling 
teenagers present a greater risk to the community. Rather, their pres­
ence challenges not only our perception of them, but of ourselves. I've 
come to the view of the American criminal justice researcher Eugene 
Doleshal—"There is a dynamic equilibrium in criminal justice which 
prevents those attempting to reform criminal justice by reducing pen­
alties or incarceration rates from succeeding."5 
The Massachusetts Experiment was neither the "chaotic sixties coun­
tercultural event" portrayed by some nor the management-focused 
"planned change" we've come to expect of state human service agen­
cies. It was anathema to most of my fellow human service professionals 
(at one point the publicist for my alma mater requested that I not list the 
university on my resume). It fit even less easily into the neat models of 
contemporary consensus liberal politics. 
Since 1975, the Kennedy School of Government and Politics at Har­
vard University has used the Massachusetts deinstitutionalization ex­
periment as a teaching case for its graduate students—an amalgam of 
bright academics, temporarily out-of-work politicians, and govern­
ment bureaucrats.6 Ten years after I left Massachusetts, I was invited to 
sit in on a class in which the Massachusetts Experiment was being 
dissected. I was afforded an opportunity few have—of hearing an in­
tensely personal time of one's life laid out in the rationalizing argot of 
management, tinged ever so slightly with neoconservative ideology. 
The professor (ironically, a protege of the conservative criminologist 
James Q. Wilson, who opposed virtually everything I did) did his best 
within the narrow constraints academics allow themselves when ap­
proaching the workings of government. In the classroom exposition of 
our battling for deinstitutionalization, I recognized very little. In the 
translation, reality had left Harvard Yard. 
As I listened to the seminar students assiduously culling the experi­
ment for models, tools, and methods, I knew why change is so elusive 
in human services. These would-be managers and their proctors were 
neither attuned to nor interested in the factors that must mark every 
authentic reform in this field: a commitment to individual clientele, 
personal responsibility, case-by-case involvement, the ability to re­
bound from unanticipated crises and to exploit vulnerabilities while 
adhering to values beyond smoothness. For this class effective reform 
lay in modern management techniques. 
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The Massachusetts experiment was something quite different. It was 
as well planned and executed as any reform in state-operated human 
service. But it was also a human passage—raucous, fitful, threatening, 
exhilarating, at times impulsive, often unpredictable, changing direc­
tion as we took advantage of unexpected opportunities—and always 
difficult. We lived for a time on the edge of bureaucracy, professional 
ethics, legality, and politics. But our small deinstitutionalization chal­
lenged many of the preconceptions that sustain most state institutions 
and provide the rationale for the mishandling of many of the mentally 
ill, the homeless, the delinquent, and the criminal. 
In writing this book, I have had to pluck discrete experiences from 
among memories and images that jogged loose in conversation or 
jumped out at me from yellowed news clippings. Finally, I chose the 
most personal, those that shook or changed me and cling to me still, too 
often intruding into my dreams and reveries. In the process, I am sure I 
have overlooked important events and slighted friends, associates, 
and others who were integral to what happened. For this I apologize. 
It has been unusually hard for me to find the words which best 
express the personal aspects of those years. Suffice it to say that the 
experience does not lend itself easily to the discourse of management. 
The reader will perhaps forgive me for an analogy from music. From 
time to time when listening to Bach's St. Matthew Passion, the Four Last 
Songs of Richard Strauss, or perhaps Mahler's Second Symphony, I 
have occasionally found myself unable to absorb the experience. I re­
member blacking out, while I was seated in the Royal Albert Hall, at the 
thunderous C-major chord in the "Libera me" near the end of Benjamin 
Britten's War Requiem. Similar things had happened two or three times 
before, though it was a rare accident to lose hold of time and place. 
Perhaps this all has to do with some unresolved adolescent repression I 
find impossible to relinquish. I mention these experiences because in a 
sense, they come closest to describing those that overtook me during 
particularly difficult times in trying to deal with a relatively insignifi­
cant state youth corrections agency. They rose in my consciousness 
tied to a face, a family, a particular youngster, or a haunting story that 
made forgetfulness fitful, demanded attention beyond my capacity, 
occasionally transported me, and always gave matters meaning. 
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Going to Massachusetts

A man's work is nothing but this slow trek to rediscover, through the 
detours of art, those two or three great and simple images in whose 
presence his heart first opened. 
Albert Camus 

1 Juvenile Justice Rhetoric 
l h  e comment (variously attributed to Dostoevsky or Churchill) that 
the degree of civilization of a society can be judged by the condition of 
its prisons applies a fortiori to juvenile justice. Youths, by their youth­
fulness, tend to offend us most. One might surmise that a system 
designed to correct errant adolescents would be characterized by care 
and concern. Not so. In this respect we are not unlike some disturbed 
families. When problems arise, all fault comes to rest on that member 
most visible through his or her aberrant behavior and least able to raise 
a credible defense. When law supports this ritual, the possibilities for 
harming the adolescent multiply. 
Juvenile justice reform has always been more rhetoric than anything 
else. Some think we are caught up in cycles. The pendulum swings 
from toughness to permissiveness, from rehabilitation to incapacita­
tion, and back again. In reality, however, the cycles exist only in the 
rhetoric. We have never had a period of permissiveness or authentic 
rehabilitation in juvenile justice in the United States. Juvenile justice 
has always been, and continues to be, neglectful, demeaning, fre­
quently violent, and largely ineffective. Permissive treatment of delin­
quents is reserved for middle- and upper-class adolescents who are not 
likely to enter the juvenile justice system, which is reserved for the 
children of the poor. Nearly 90 percent of the inmates of juvenile deten­
tion homes and reform schools come from fragmented and damaged 
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families which live at or below the poverty line. Even the meager 
rehabilitative efforts directed at these youngsters have been twisted to 
meet the demands of political expediency. 
Twenty years ago, the Supreme Court recognized this and held in In 
re Gault that the juvenile justice system actually subjected offenders to 
more severe punishment while depriving them of the minimum legal 
protections given adult offenders.1 Despite the plethora of lawyers in 
juvenile courts joined with the myriad of helping professionals, little 
has changed. A recent study showed that a larger percentage of juve­
niles was being institutionalized than ever before. Recidivism rates 
remain high, and institutional abuse is rampant. 
Community-based programs sprout up occasionally but are seldom 
what they claim to be. They are ersatz alternatives unwilling to take 
youngsters who would otherwise be institutionalized. In this sense, 
they are not so much alternative as they are additional. This kind of 
community-based program extends the net of social control by whisk­
ing more youngsters away from their families into residential care. 
New language emerges to cover old realities. Youth prisons have 
changed from reform schools to industrial schools, youth guidance 
institutes, youth development centers, learning centers, and ther­
apeutic communities. More recently they've moved proudly back to 
juvenile jails and engines of deterrence. To use Ivan Mich's term, a kind 
of "uniquack" pervades the field, giving validity to authoritarian, psy­
chological bullying techniques aimed at conformity and blind obe­
dience. I have seen professionally designed programs where at the 
beginning the youngsters have had to earn the right to wear clothes or 
be let out of isolation, where the floors of the "intensive care" cells 
(formerly called "holes") must be washed to flush away fecal waste left 
by teenagers locked in with no toilet, where "psychotherapeutic" ses­
sions are conducted with polygraphs, where delinquents are hog-tied 
and left to rock on their stomachs for "calming" or because of "attitude" 
problems (and who, while trussed, are interviewed by a psychiatrist to 
assess suicidal potential). 
Why is juvenile justice so impervious to reform? Is it because the 
clientele is so intractable? Hardly. It's something much deeper—an 
abiding need to see some offenders as qualitatively different from the 
rest of us. This compulsion colors, distorts, and eventually under­
mines all reform. I say "some offenders" because destructive labels are 
restricted to those who come into the juvenile justice system. The 
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offense is of relatively minor importance in this process. The overrid­
ing determinants are class, race, and family composition. 
An invariable theme in detention centers and reform schools is that 
the inmates cannot conceivably be our own. Few middle- or upper-
class youngsters enter such places. When they do, they are truly the ex­
ceptions that prove the rule. In the heyday of the youth counterculture of 
the sixties a few middle-class juveniles briefly ran afoul of the juvenile 
justice system. But they were quickly diverted into the mental health 
system or other systems of less extreme social control (private coun­
seling, outpatient therapy, private military schools, or prep schools). 
With the current national hysteria about drugs, one might have antici­
pated a few more middle-class youths' appearance in the youth correc­
tions system, but it has not happened. 
A two-tiered system of residential care has grown up across the 
country with a dramatic surge in short-term hospitalizations in pri­
vate psychiatric hospitals for recalcitrant, disobedient, or drug-abus-
ing suburban adolescents. Whether or not this approach works, the 
effect is to spare these youngsters the correctional diagnoses and the 
labels which undermine hope—"psychopath," "sociopath," "unsocial­
ized aggressive/' Such terms apply only to the children of the poor 
and of the racial minorities who populate our youth correctional in-
stitutions.2 
A Brief History of Reform 
The establishment of the juvenile court in 1899 obscured the fact that 
another revolution in juvenile justice had occurred in the early 1800s. 
The earlier movement had resulted in increased institutionalization of 
juveniles, albeit in facilities different from adult jails and prisons. The 
practice was firmly entrenched fifty years before the creation of juve­
nile courts. Long before Dorothea Dix sought better institutional care 
for the mentally ill, Samuel Howe of Massachusetts was pointing out 
the unconscionable conditions which had already arisen in these new 
juvenile institutions.3 
In their report to the French government on the corrections system 
in the United States, de Tocqueville and Beaumont approvingly de­
scribed these juvenile institutions, with their inmate self-government 
and exclusion of corporal punishment. 
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In Boston, corporal chastisements are excluded from the House of Ref­
uge; the discipline of this establishment is entirely of a moral character 
and rests on principles which belong to the highest philosophy. 
Everything there tends to elevate the soul of the young prisoners, and 
to render them jealous of their own esteem and that of their comrades; to 
arrive at this end they are treated as if they were men and members of a 
free society. . . . 
The early use of liberty contribute^], perhaps, at a later period, to 
make the young delinquents more obedient to the laws. And without 
considering this possible political result, it is certain that such a system is 
powerful as a means of moral education.4 
The founder of the Boston House of Reformation, the Reverend 
E. M. P. Wells, had ideas about ''juvenile wickedness" which differed 
considerably from those accepted at the time. 
Wells believed that bad boys were no worse by nature than others and 
was convinced that a boy "can always be reformed while he is under 15 
years old, and very often after that age/' He became superintendent in 
1828 and first drew attention to himself by introducing an educational 
curriculum that was wholly unlike anything that the staid overseers of 
delinquents at that time had ever seen. Regulated play and gymnastics 
figured prominently in the program and Wells frankly admitted that the 
"mechanical'' parts of education such as arithmetic, writing and spell­
ing, held a low place in his opinion.5 
Contrast this description of a Massachusetts training school in 1828 
with a report made on the St. Charles School for Boys by the Illinois 
Crime Commission in 1928, a century later. 
All whippings were administered by a disciplinary officer who went. . . 
to each cottage each evening after supper and whipped any boys who 
had been reported earlier by the house father, or for whom the house 
father requested punishment at that time. Some boys were punished by 
being locked up in the "hole" for up to thirty-two days with no shoes and 
no mattress. They slept on wooden boards nailed to the concrete floor. 
Some were handcuffed to iron pipes and kept manacled day and night.6 
Juvenile Court Reform 
The invention of the juvenile court was hailed as signaling a new era in 
the treatment of children. Separate juvenile courts were established in 
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all but three states by 1917. In Massachusetts Julian Mack, citing two 
centuries of parens patriae philosophy in English law, saw the juvenile 
court as a logical outgrowth of that tradition. Pointing to the inade­
quacies of criminal procedure in the handling of youth, Mack noted: 
It did not aim to find out what the accused's history was, what his 
heredity, his environment, his associations, it did not ask how he had 
come to do the particular act which had brought him before the court. It 
put but one question, "Has he committed this crime?'' It did not inquire, 
"What is the best thing to do for this lad?" It did not even punish him in a 
manner that would tend to improve him; the punishment was visited in 
proportion to the degree of wrongdoing evidenced by the single act; not 
by the needs of the boy, not by the needs of the state. 
Today, however, the thinking public is putting another sort of ques­
tion. Why is it not just and proper to treat these juvenile offenders, as we 
deal with the neglected children, as a wise and merciful father handles 
his own child whose errors are not discovered by the authorities?7 
By 1932 there were more than six hundred independent juvenile 
courts across the land. Yet from the outset they failed to change the 
pattern of confining juveniles in unspeakable institutions. Rather, they 
added to their numbers. 
In 1925 the reformer Louise Bowen noted that the Cook County 
Juvenile Detention Home had "every appearance of being a jail, with 
its barred windows and locked doors—the children have fewer com­
forts than do criminals confined in the county jail. They are not kept 
sufficiently occupied and have very little fresh air/' These comments 
were made seven years after a report to the Cook County Civil Service 
Commission on the juvenile detention home. That commission called 
upon people like Mrs. Bowen, Jane Addams, Amelia Sears, Dr. William 
Healey, Judge Franklin Chase Hoyt of the Children's Court of New 
York, Judge Edward E Waite of Minneapolis, and others of the "child-
saver" movement to assess matters and make recommendations for 
reform. Its report concluded: 
Children are not now detained in jail with criminal adults. . . . Neither is 
our juvenile detention home a home. For the dependents and the minor 
delinquents it has some of the qualities of a jail. 
Can the County protect its children by a better separation of the 
dependents and the tractable from the incorrigible, the immoral, the 
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confirmed juvenile delinquents? Can the Home give to its children or a 
deserving portion thereof a little more of a real home during their 
detention period?8 
The commission recommended reclassification so that some juveniles 
could be placed in more homelike surroundings. 
The report, however, ended on an ambivalent note: "For the remain­
ing children, the immoral girls, the incorrigible and unruly boys and 
girls, the present juvenile detention home and the present custodial 
care are none too severe. In Detroit individual separation rooms are 
installed to be occupied by the incorrigibles who deserve complete 
isolation, which we also recommend/'9 The distinction was clear. Hu­
mane reforms were for the "deserving/' while the "undeserving" 
should receive stringent discipline. This was the hallmark of progres­
sive reform thought: reforms were not meant for the undeserving. 
Roscoe Pound's famous statement that the juvenile court repre­
sented the most significant advance in the administration of justice 
since Magna Charta reflected his awareness of the gravity of the issues 
facing the juvenile justice system.10 As George Herbert Mead in his 
classic 1918 article "The Psychology of Punitive Justice" saw it, the 
juvenile court forced a breach in the wall of the criminal justice sys-
tem.11 The question was whether to treat or to punish. The dilemma 
was complicated by the existence of reform schools, which had been 
around for most of the century before the juvenile court was invented. 
Their presence ensured that juvenile offenders would receive the worst 
the system could offer—punishment labeled as treatment. 
Rather than putting an end to questionable child-care institutions, 
the juvenile court nourished them. Labels were broadened in meaning 
to justify a proliferation of programs by which the juvenile court could 
increase its power. Under banners like "delinquency prevention," the 
juvenile justice system involved itself with ever-larger numbers of 
"deserving" offenders. Progressive reforms were reserved for these. 
The undeserving went off to reform schools or adult prisons. 
The Growth of the Helping Professions 
The helping professions developed and grew through ties to institu-
tions—prisons, reform schools and state schools for the retarded, and 
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state mental hospitals. After the turn of the twentieth century, how­
ever, professionalism became increasingly academic and gained a mea­
sure of independence from such institutions through its ties to univer­
sities. Take social work, for example—the preeminent profession in 
juvenile corrections. The consequences of developments in profes­
sionalism are dramatically demonstrated by comparing the themes 
around which social workers' 1893 and 1928 national conferences were 
organized. There was a marked shift from a concern for administering 
institutions to a concern with a broader set of issues.12 
National Conference National Conference 
of Charities and Corrections of Social Work 
1893 1928 
1. State Boards of Charities 1. Children 
2. Charity Organizations 2. Delinquents and Correction 
3. Indoor and Outdoor Relief 3. Health 
4. Immigration 4. The Family 
5. Child-Saving 5. Industrial and Economic 
6. Reformatories Problems 
7. The Prison Question 6. Neighborhood and 
8. The Feeble-Minded Community Life 
9. The Insane 7. Mental Hygiene 
8. Organization of Social Forces 
9. Public Officials and 
Administration 
10. The Immigrant 
11. Professional Standards in 
Education 
12. Educational Publicity 
Concomitant with the change in focus was the development of stan­
dardized professional methodologies such as those put forward in 
Mary Richmond's book Social Diagnosis, first published in 1917.13 And 
as Willard stated in 1925: "Social work no longer attends chiefly to the 
confinement and management of state wards, but derives its problems 
from community processes far beyond state institutions. . . . On ac­
count of the necessary reference to social ends involved in social work 
thus broadly conceived, those ends must be fixed through appreciation 
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of the social processes themselves in any state, and their merits defined 
in terms of social values/'14 Though social work joined psychiatry and 
clinical psychology in fostering the rehabilitative ethic, institutional 
bureaucracies heavily influenced the on-the-job training of profes­
sionals. The theories, categories, labels, and techniques all dovetailed 
with the traditions of institutionalization. 
Because most of the clients were, in a sense, captive, a seductive 
tendency to justify the coercion grew. In an essay written in 1947, 
Lionel Trilling argued, "Some paradox in our nature leads us, once we 
have made our fellow men the objects of our enlightened interest, to go 
on to make them the objects of our pity, then of our wisdom, ultimately 
of our coercion/'15 Although the helping professions these days enthu­
siastically embrace coercive methods, they have developed rather com­
plex ways to diminish the conflict between their progressive goals and 
their coercive practice. Diagnostic labels are readjusted so as to remove 
the need for the professional to coerce clients personally. Less deserv­
ing clients are defined as being outside professional expertise and 
responsibility. These are left to nonprofessionals—primarily lower-
level staff in mental hospitals, prisons, and reform schools. To justify 
receiving treatment, one must show some promise. It is a world in 
which professionals characteristically treat only those who are likely to 
succeed and leave the difficult clients, who aren't expected to succeed 
anyway, to nonprofessionals. 
This tradition dominates current professional practice with offend­
ers. Psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers get involved with 
serious delinquents only when clients with lesser problems are un­
available. It is a system in which captives are redefined and reassigned 
by those who, having failed, persistently claim the expertise for dealing 
with the problem. But if helping professionals won't deal with serious 
offenders, will they leave the field (and the budget) to others willing 
to try? Hardly. Rather than engaging in self-appraisal, they switch 
focus and identify more felicitous targets—"status" offenders, "pre­
delinquents," or youngsters with the kinds of angst available only to 
the privileged. The major effect has been the creation of an inverse 
system whereby those most likely to present major problems to society 
in terms of violence or repeated crimes are systematically excluded 
from professional care. Conversely, those least likely to be involved in 
serious crimes are the most likely to receive the care of professional 
helpers. 
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Later Reforms in Juvenile Justice 
Later reforms concentrated on such things as prevention, diversion, 
and deinstitutionalization. With millions of federal dollars from the 
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) available, pro­
grams proliferated in the 1970s and into the 1980s. 
Prevention. Richard J. Lundman and Frank R. Scarpitti estimated 
that, between 1965 and 1978, more than sixty-five hundred different 
attempts at delinquency prevention had been launched. The authors 
found a thousand citations in the literature about delinquency preven­
tion programs and examined 127 of them in careful detail. They con­
cluded: "Most projects reported in the professional literature did not 
permit reliable assessment of results. And those projects with experi­
mental designs and objective measurement of delinquent behavior had 
not successfully prevented delinquency. . . . We found little reason to 
believe that a major breakthrough in delinquency prevention is forth-
coming/'16 Probably the premier preventive program was advanced in 
1972 by the Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention Admin­
istration (YDPA) of the then Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare.17 The YDPA recommended a national strategy of establishing youth 
services systems to divert youth from juvenile justice handling. 
The YDPA projected a 25 percent decrease in youth being brought to 
juvenile courts. If enough services were supplied, it was argued, the 
numbers going into the juvenile justice system would inevitably de­
cline. The opposite happened. The number of youth service bureaus 
increased, yet more youngsters were brought into the juvenile justice 
system. In no case was there any effect on reform school and detention 
populations. 
Diversion. Diverting young offenders from the juvenile courts was 
another strategy. The idea was to refer them for counseling, mediation, 
or other measures short of the formal court process. The concept is 
interesting, since it implies that there is an inherently destructive as­
pect to the juvenile court. What researchers found, however, was that 
the children being "diverted" were youngsters who ordinarily would 
not have been brought to court anyway. The usual cases continued to 
parade through the courts. As Paul Nejelski concluded, "These projects 
may be useful in themselves because they aid juveniles, but they in­
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crease state intervention without reducing the workload of the courts. 
They are supplemental, but they are not diversionary/'18 While some 
local communities were successful in diverting middle-class youth who 
generally don't penetrate the system anyway they were notably unsuc­
cessful with youth in the urban ghettos. 
Deinstitutionalization. Deinstitutionalization was another catch­
word. It referred to the practice of removing juvenile offenders from 
institutional settings (detention centers, training schools, and jails). 
Although it would be difficult to find another juvenile justice issue over 
which so much has been said, there is precious little evidence for any 
effective deinstitutionalization in juvenile justice. 
Whenever the number of inmates in state reform schools has 
dropped, there has been an equivalent rise in youth populations in 
other institutions (child welfare and psychiatric). But curiously, though 
some were simply relabeled, a significant number were not the same 
kids. This speaks less to the pathology of the youth than to the other 
social and political mechanisms which sustain institutions. It suggests 
that institutions have a life of their own, unrelated to their stated task. 
Should the requisite number of youngsters from one group or class be 
unavailable, others will be found to fill the void. 
When consensus-driven deinstitutionalization was allowed, it was 
aimed at groups like status offenders. Status offender refers to runaways, 
truants, or disobedient children. Were it not for their status as children, 
these offenders would not be brought to court. The removal of status 
offenders from reform schools and detention centers didn't lower the 
total numbers of juveniles in institutions. It simply culled the most 
tractable for the community-based ministrations of social workers, psy­
chiatrists, psychologists, and educators. 
In those few cases where removing status offenders actually lowered 
reform school populations, other youth were soon taken in to fill the 
void. Labels and diagnoses were escalated to justify filling the beds in 
training schools and detention centers which might have been vacated. 
For example, a juvenile judge might order a truant to go to school every 
day. If he missed a day, he violated a court order and became a bona fide 
delinquent fit for institutionalization. This common practice was up­
held by the California Supreme Court.19 In cases where it was too risky 
to relabel the juvenile, the institutions were renamed to justify their 
continued usage. For example, when it might draw too much attention 
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to send nondelinquent youth to reform schools, the schools became 
treatment centers for PINS (persons in need of supervision). 
A telling example of the politics underlying such euphemistic ma­
nipulation occurred in Ohio. Following a drop in population at the 
Fairfield School for Boys, the legislature inserted a budget amendment 
requiring the Ohio Youth Commission to keep a minimum number of 
boys (300) in that reform school whether or not they were appropriately 
assigned. The chairman of the Ohio Youth Commission stated he had 
to " practically kidnap" boys and incarcerate them long past their re­
lease dates in order to obey the law.20 
The amendment was attached by a legislator in whose district the 
reform school was located. He denied it had anything to do with jobs 
for his constituents, insisting he wished to ensure quality vocational 
programs. To do so, Fairfield's population had to be kept at a given 
level. One seldom sees the issue so well defined. The school was even­
tually closed to juveniles when it was renamed an adult correctional 
facility. The number of juvenile inmates in reform schools statewide 
grew. 
An example of a similar dynamic occurred under California's Proba­
tion Subsidy Program. Initially the program caused a dramatic drop in 
the numbers of youth committed to state institutions, as the state reim­
bursed counties for not sending youngsters to state institutions. The 
purpose was to stimulate local alternative programs. The counties soon 
realized, however, that they could use state probation subsidy dollars 
to staff county institutions if they were run by local probation depart­
ments. By the mid-1970s, California was harboring the largest per cap­
ita youth population of any state in the Union in its county-run deten­
tion facilities. Ironically, by 1988, the California Youth Authority also 
had the largest number of youngsters in its state reform schools in 
history.21 Probation subsidy had created a county reform school system 
as an addition to the state reform school system. 
Some say that we routinely institutionalize a given percentage of the 
population in our society. As we close one type of institution, we fill 
another.22 Inmates of tuberculosis sanatoria were replaced by mental 
patients, by prisoners, and by youthful offenders. Other studies sug­
gest that we fill prisons to occupy empty cells.23 The states that build 
more prisons have more prisoners. Those that do not build have fewer 
prisoners. Numbers of prisoners in both cases are unrelated to crime 
rates. If this analysis is accurate, it is no more than logical that, fol­
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lowing the massive dumping of mental patients, we incarcerated the 
largest number of prisoners in our history. The former patients did not 
just all transfer themselves to the prisons (though some did). The crite­
ria for becoming a member of the new prison population included a 
person's vulnerability and political usability for institutionalization. 
Recent calls for the return of the large orphanage can be viewed in this 
context. 
Reforming the Juvenile Court 
Some reformers walk a tightrope between abolishing the juvenile court 
and totally supporting it. This was the tack taken by the Twentieth 
Century Fund's task force on sentencing policies toward young offend­
ers. The report put it bluntly: 
The theory behind the juvenile court is not merely obsolete; it is a fairy 
tale that never came true. The court has helped some young offenders, 
but it has punished others. From the beginning, juvenile court judges 
have considered the interests of the state as well as those of the offender. 
It is pointless to pretend that social policy toward youth crime is based 
solely on the best interests of the young offender or that the best interests 
of the offender and those of the state are always the same. But the juvenile 
court need not rely on hypocritical rhetoric to justify its jurisdiction over 
youths charged with crime.24 
The task force then went on to justify a discrete policy toward youth 
crime which included the principles of culpability, diminished respon­
sibility resulting from immaturity, and proportionality. It recom­
mended sentencing parameters dictated primarily by the level of the 
offense and supported custodial confinement and waiver to adult court 
of selected cases. The task force also recommended reforming the man­
agement of institutions and criticized the attitudes, actions, and profes­
sional inadequacies of certain judges, police and corrections officers, 
and magistrates. 
The task force's conclusions just moved the chairs about on the deck. 
Issues were realigned on a continuum between the juvenile court sys­
tem and the adult correctional system. In many ways it was a retreat 
from reform—a rearguard action against what was perceived as a law­
Juvenile Justice Rhetoric I 15 
and-order backlash. The state of Washington eventually used this 
model, ostensibly as a way to bring reason and consistency into the 
juvenile justice system. State planners anticipated it would lead to 
fewer youngsters in reform schools. The reverse happened: undeserv­
ing delinquents were moved closer to the adult system, while the de­
serving were steered toward the juvenile system. 
Why can't we break out of this vicious cycle? The reasons reside in 
the system itself. It makes even occasional "successes" questionable. 
Too often, as Edmund Leach put it, cure represents "the imposition of 
discipline by force—the maintenance of the existing order against 
threats which arise from its own internal contradictions/'25 To the de­
gree that this is so, the success of revolutions in juvenile justice will 
continue to be limited. 
Disillusionment with the child-saving movement and cynicism to­
ward the juvenile justice system are well founded. The disillusion­
ment, however, is more a function of bureaucratic traditions than of a 
failure of ideas. Practice has never approached its goals. Perhaps it 
never could. Perhaps youthful captives can never expect accountability 
from those who treat them. Perhaps reform will always be subject to the 
altruism of those who provide the service. Yet altruism is notoriously 
undependable, eventually wears away, and often deteriorates into vio­
lence. That has been the sad history of the juvenile justice system from 
its beginnings. 
I dimly understood this when I set about the task of reforming a 
juvenile corrections system mired in scandal and abuse. So it was a 
slight surprise when the endeavor turned out not to be so quixotic as 
predicted. There were ways to make a difference. Whether those dif­
ferences would be allowed to survive was the more crucial question, 
and it has yet to be answered. 
2 A Preview of Deinstitutioncilization 
v J  n a chilly March morning in 1972, a ragtag assortment of cars and 
vans drove onto the grounds of the Lyman School for Boys, a cluster of 
decrepit stone and brick buildings on a hill outside the town of West­
boro, Massachusetts. Opened in 1846, Lyman was the first state reform 
school in the United States. It was founded following an 1836 law 
prohibiting incarceration of certain juveniles in state prison. If the 
offense did not call for life imprisonment and the young offender was 
deemed a proper subject, he or she was committed to the State Reform 
School for Boys or the State Industrial School for Girls. 
Massachusetts pioneered reform schools. In 1842, Charles Dickens vis­
ited Boston's House of Reformation for Juvenile Offenders, noting the boys 
there "had not such pleasant faces . . . and in this establishment there 
were many boys of colour." But Dickens was nevertheless impressed. 
The design and object of this institution is to reclaim the youthful crim­
inal by firm, but kind and judicious, treatment; to make his prison a place 
of purification and improvement, not of demoralization and corruption; 
to impress upon him that there is but one path, and that one sober 
industry, which can ever lead him to happiness; to teach him how it may 
be trodden, if his footsteps have never yet been led that way; and to lure 
him back to it, if they have strayed; in a word, to snatch him from 
destruction, and restore him to society a penitent and useful member.1 
16 
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Such was the promise of the reform school. It became the model for 
hundreds of similar youth institutions which opened across the United 
States and Europe over the next century and a half—an unlikely col­
lection of reform schools, industrial schools, reformatories, training 
schools, learning centers, youth development centers, and institutes 
for juvenile guidance. But the Lyman School for Boys was the grand­
daddy of them all.2 Lyman had outlived a century's worth of visits, 
investigations, reforms, and name changes. It would not survive this 
March morning's events. 
Lyman was the last of the seven Massachusetts state training schools 
we closed between 1970 and 1972, making Massachusetts the first state 
to do away with all of its reform schools. Having invented them, it 
seemed fitting that Massachusetts should be the first to abandon them. 
Though we'd quietly planned this day for months, the institution went 
out with few of the graces usually afforded a 130-year-old tradition. I 
had told the superintendent only a week before that all the boys in his 
facility would be moved out the following week. He told the staff three 
days before it happened. Why this belated notice, which flies in the 
face of the tenets of planned change? Because we had learned our 
lessons well. By now, we knew that any lengthy phasedown of a reform 
school invited problems. Within days of the announcement, we could 
expect a dramatic increase in kids sent there by the juvenile courts, the 
judges' way of showing opposition. That would be followed by an inor­
dinate number of incidents—escapes, riots, assaults, and fires—often set 
off by less-than-subtle messages from staff to inmates well-conditioned 
to act on cue in proving the need for their own institutionalization. 
When the Lyman staff were told the school would close in a few 
days, most dismissed the news as a fantasy. Their skepticism gave us 
the respite we needed. No weekend incidents occurred. The place was 
relatively calm. But now the truth was out. Today the inmates were 
leaving Lyman. An administrator's muttered, "They'll be back,'7 told 
the story. The experiment would fail, the kids would soon get in serious 
trouble and be returned to the institution, the cottages would be filled 
again. That's the way it had always been. Why should this be any 
different? The staff simply had to wait it out. And wait they did. Lyman 
remained fully staffed but empty of inmates. As the waiting stretched 
from weeks into months, everyone finally recognized that the inmates 
weren't coming back. 
We hadn't come easily to this day. I had originally hoped to reform 
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the reform schools, make them more humane—maybe even Utopian— 
islands of care in the otherwise coercive and destructive milieu of juve­
nile corrections. We began new programs: individual therapy, guided 
group interaction, positive peer culture, transactional analysis, special 
tutoring, and a variety of other models. We brought in the British 
pioneer in therapeutic communities, Maxwell Jones, the inventor of 
"positive peer culture,"3 Harry Vorrath,4 and Al Trieschman, with his 
marvelous psychoanalytic therapeutic model.5 By these measures, we 
were successful. The institutions grew more in touch with the world 
outside. The kids felt better about themselves. The brutality slowed 
and the violence subsided.6 
But whenever I thought we'd made progress, something happened— 
a beating, a kid in an isolation cell, an offhand remark by a superinten­
dent or cottage supervisor that told me what I envisioned would never 
be allowed. Reformers come and reformers go. State institutions carry 
on. Nothing in their history suggests that they can sustain reform, no 
matter what money, staff, and programs are pumped into them. The 
same crises that have plagued them for 150 years intrude today. Though 
the casts may change, the players go on producing failure. 
The decision to close the institutions grew from my frustration at not 
being able to keep them caring and decent. If I'd been able to stay away, 
I probably could have tolerated them. But as I came to know the young 
people in them, my responses to the system altered in ways I hadn't 
planned. It was, after all, my system. As long as I was in office, I was 
responsible for it. Now, years later, it's easier to admit my inability to 
sort out my own feelings for those who were caught in a system which 
made as little sense to me as it did to them. Had I known what I now do 
of government, politicians, and professional helpers, I probably would 
have abandoned the effort. By the time I'd come to that March day at 
Lyman, there wasn't much room for neophytes. I'd lost my political 
virginity. 
Conflict dogged virtually all our attempts at reform. Whether we 
wanted to loosen up a tight and coercive institution or move the young­
sters into the community, most of our reforms were greeted with ca­
cophony, partly blather and partly threats, couched in dire warnings of 
chaos and crime in the streets. When it became obvious that I intended 
to close the state institutions, the upset among Massachusetts politi­
cians was matched by the turmoil among my fellow correctional ad­
ministrators. 
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National delinquency program administrators voted to censure 
me.7 State employees7 unions picketed on the capitol steps. Immediate 
staff fed information to hostile legislative committees. A department 
lawyer, sitting next to me at legislative investigations ostensibly to 
advise and defend me, was allegedly giving the committee staff se­
lected internal departmental reports and documents aimed at nailing 
me to the wall. There were a host of colorful verbal variations on the 
theme of getting my ass, putting me in jail, or running me out of the 
state. 
I turned to my professional peers: psychiatrists, psychologists, and 
social workers. A few offered support, for example, Eveoleen Rexford 
and Katie Van Amarungen, who were child analysts at Boston Univer-
sity's department of psychiatry; Hubert Jones, then with the Roxbury 
Multi-Service Center; Paul Quirk, who headed the state's association of 
child-care social workers; and Don Russell, a psychiatrist and expert in 
juvenile violence. But they were the exceptions. We were in uncharted 
territory. The helping professions were as intimately tied to the institu­
tions as any old pol in the legislature. At best, they treated the whole 
affair with detached tolerance, leaving themselves room for a quick 
bailout should things collapse. At worst, they waited for business as 
usual to resume—doubtless with the hope of a few consulting contracts 
and increased professionalization of the reform schools. I was effec­
tively isolated. To use a term of the American psychiatrist Harry Stack 
Sullivan, I had very little "consensual validation." From time to time 
the realization of my abandoned state threw me off stride and severely 
tested my emotional equilibrium. 
Although we herd hundreds of thousands of inmates through our 
prisons, jails, detention centers, and reform schools, and show a nota­
ble lack of curiosity about them, much would be written about the 
tumultuous three and a half years leading up to that day at Lyman. The 
Harvard Center for Criminal Justice produced six books and a few 
dozen articles devoted solely to the Massachusetts Experiment,8 and it 
also became a case study in a number of universities, including the 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, the University of Pennsyl-
vania's Wharton School (under Thomas Gilmore), Duke University 
(under Robert Behn), and the London School of Economics. Most text­
books on delinquency and its treatment now routinely include a sec­
tion on the Massachusetts deinstitutionalization—with about as many 
interpretations and versions as there are authors. Scholars like Ivan 
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Illich and Michel Foucault, whom I knew only from their writings, 
made inquiries.9 We had visitors from Germany, France, Italy, Japan, 
Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, Israel, 
Australia, Denmark, and even South Africa. This was remarkable for a 
field so shy of examination. 
It is a rare correctional institution that can yield very much detail 
about its inmates, their life histories, their strengths and weaknesses, 
or their eventual success or failure in keeping out of trouble. Aside 
from routine statistical data—age, sex, crime—personal details about 
a particular inmate are, for the most part, used to serve collective 
myths—the ax murderer, the serial killer, the sex offender. Such war 
stories fuel political speeches and " attack" journalism while rationaliz­
ing institutions. Paradoxically, personal tales usually ensure further 
depersonalization of the inmates. In this system, any authentic chron­
icling of the life histories of individual inmates is threatening and must 
be invalidated. The categories we allow, the theories we use, and the 
labels we apply limit information to the sorting and deterrent task at 
hand. Selective inattention, which Sullivan associated with paranoia, 
is endemic to penal institutions. Too close attention to individual lives, 
too much knowledge of later adjustment, too much personal involve­
ment would quickly undo the rationale for the institution and make it 
unmanageable. One cannot individualize en masse. Except for rare 
lapses, institutions must remain Procrustean beds where limbs are 
stretched or amputated to meet institutional norms. 
We deinstitutionalized a relatively small number of inmates. De­
pending on the time of year, the Massachusetts youth institutions held 
fewer than a thousand delinquent youngsters. Though as many as 
8,000 to 10,000 went through our detention centers in the average year, 
and we had more than 2,000 under supervision on an average day, this 
figure was dwarfed by the deinstitutionalization going on at the same 
time in mental health and retardation facilities. While we were moving 
a few hundred delinquents back to the community, state departments 
of mental health across the United States were deinstitutionalizing 
thousands of mental patients. But the numbers alone didn't tell the 
story. 
Asylums, prisons, and reform schools have hidden tasks to per­
form. They rest uncomfortably close to what holds a society together. It 
is a delicate balance, a societal cohesion that authentic deinstitution­
alization threatens. To bring back into the community those who test 
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the boundaries of its tolerance, beliefs, and safety is to invite a barrage 
of harsh questions and a resurgence of dark impulses. Institutions 
provide more than one kind of asylum. While they lock away those who 
offend our sensibilities or threaten our well-being, they also allow us to 
escape the deliberation we might otherwise expect from a compassion­
ate society. They relieve us of responsibility. It's relatively unimportant 
whether an institution succeeds in its public purpose, whether curing 
the mentally ill or setting criminals straight. Its private task is to give 
absolution to society. Whatever treatment is allowed, whatever cure is 
sought, whatever control is imposed, the institution must first reassure 
us that we have no share in the malady. This is why authentic deinstitu­
tionalization almost never happens and, when it does, seldom sur­
vives. The pull is always toward exile. Even on those rare occasions 
when resources follow the inmates to the community, what often hap­
pens is a perverse reconstituting of institutional regimens in the com­
munity. For finally, deinstitutionalization is not a technical problem. It 
is not a matter of means. It has to do with values. 
The cars and vans winding their way toward Lyman's administration 
building that crisp New England morning were driven by university 
students and a few trusted youth workers from around the state. As the 
students and youth workers left their vehicles and fanned out over the 
grounds to help this or that boy get packed, their upbeat mood was 
tempered by an occasional sarcastic remark from a cottage parent who 
stood on the sidelines watching the circus, but missing the message of 
these prophetic clowns—a hundred or so boys, some shaking hands 
with administrators or staff members, others saying nothing, saunter­
ing down to the waiting cars. Cardboard boxes half full of the boys' 
meager belongings were packed into trunks and on luggage racks—a 
pair of sneakers, a few socks and shorts, here and there a picture or a 
charm—simple possessions which lie about on chairs and bureau tops 
in most teenagers' bedrooms but are obsessively hidden and treasured 
by youngsters in reform schools. Lyman had always been awash in 
poor kids. But today, for a while, their delinquent identities seemed 
blessedly less secure. In the dress-down manner common to the early 
1970s, young, mostly middle-class men and women wandered about 
the grounds and cottages with this or that youngster in tow, excitedly 
talking of hopes and plans for the next few weeks. Except for their age, 
one couldn't tell the keepers from the kept. 
I felt relieved as I drove off the grounds. Most of the boys seemed 
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pleased and left Lyman with few regrets. But a lone fifteen-year-old 
boy put it all in perspective. He came up to me on the arms of a cottage 
parent. He was crying and begging me to let him stay at the institution. 
The irony was palpable. This impersonal and occasionally violent place 
had become his home. It was probably less violent and more stable than 
his family home. Cottage staff added to the confusion by telling him 
that an uncertain, probably dreadful, fate awaited him on leaving 
Lyman. My reassurances didn't help. I finally told him he'd have to 
leave. He walked off with a student, albeit unwillingly. 
This distraught adolescent epitomized the paradox of the Massa­
chusetts Experiment. What I saw as humane reform and greater free­
dom for a generation of youngsters relegated to brutal and ineffective 
institutions this boy saw as a threat. He was successfully institution­
alized. He believed he needed what the institution gave. His anguish 
defined the moment. Were we doing the right thing? Were we hurting 
the kids? Were we headed for disaster? As I left, I knew only that we 
were all out on our own. 
W h e  n I was just out of graduate school in 1957, I was assigned to 
Sheppard Air Force Base with the Air Training Command in that dusty 
tornado alley between the Oklahoma border and Dallas. All day, every 
day, lines of basic trainees would trudge into the psychiatric clinic, 
telling me about all the maladies common to a group of near-adoles-
cents who had gone into the service for as many reasons as their com­
plaints mirrored. For the next ten years, I worked as a psychiatric social 
work officer in military psychiatric facilities, stockades, schools, and 
family service agencies. 
The military was apt preparation for what came later. One learns to 
keep one's own counsel in bureaucracies which take themselves too 
seriously. Psychiatric clinics in the service (at least those worth their 
salt) were always on the edge. They were needed, but only tolerated, as 
they turned over rocks and nosed about in things most unmilitary. 
Reluctant clients kept falling out of their assigned cubicles and per­
sonal closets. I saw a series of transvestite nuclear bomber pilots; a 
young officer not long out of the Air Academy caught masturbating 
with women's panties in the Base Exchange; a bombadier with moral 
scruples over the effects of his handiwork; a young sergeant caught 
caressing the body of a teenage girl he'd taken from a freshly dug grave. 
Getting "help" was as ambiguous and risky as giving it. A pilot who 
showed up in the clinic put his career in jeopardy. No records were 
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confidential. I learned to write clinical notes in a personal code. More 
often, I didn't make notes at all—a habit which later served me well in 
state government. 
After Sheppard, I was part of a small unwelcome psychiatric clinic in 
Curtis LeMay's Strategic Air Command (SAC). LeMay had no use for 
psychiatrists or social workers anywhere near his troops. But Karl 
Menninger, who had pioneered American military psychiatry during 
World War II, wanted a psychiatric clinic at Forbes Air Force Base in 
Topeka, Kansas, the home of the Menninger Clinic. Menninger, a gen­
eral in the Army Reserve, prevailed on the Air Force surgeon general at 
the Pentagon to establish a clinic at Forbes. It was the first psychiatric 
clinic in SAC. 
There were three officers on the staff—El Cook, a Menninger-trained 
psychiatrist, Dan Brown, a clinical psychologist, and myself. Given the 
official ambivalence, we kept a low profile. Menninger was our close 
consultant and adviser, usually spending Wednesdays with us. He 
brought with him whichever eminent visitor happened to be at the 
Menninger Clinic that week. Our small staff meetings became mar­
velous seminars. (Because I was the junior officer, I was assigned the 
less formal tasks, ending up as chauffeur and tour guide to Aldous 
Huxley, Margaret Mead, Konrad Lorenz, Nathan Ackerman, and other 
notables who visited the Menninger Clinic in those halcyon days.) It 
didn't take long, however, for us to understand the resistance of a 
single-minded military leader like LeMay to having any shrinks around 
the Strategic Air Command—the backbone of our nuclear-deterrent 
national policy. 
One afternoon, a young sergeant ambled into the clinic complaining 
of vague anxiety and problems in sleeping. He talked of visiting his 
mother in Wichita and getting into a violent argument with her. As the 
threats and shouting mounted, he grabbed his mother's kitten, stran­
gled it, and threw it at her. He ran from the room, leaving the stunned 
woman rocking and moaning over the dead pet on her lap. He then 
drove the hundred miles to the base. On the way, he came upon a 
bloody car accident. He stopped to rubberneck. Looking at the guts 
and gore, he got an erection. 
The next day he wondered why the day's violent events had been 
such a turn on. His anxieties warranted concern, and he was scheduled 
for another appointment. But with an offhand comment the interview 
took an unexpected turn. When I asked what his job was, the sergeant 
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replied, "Oh, I fuse weapons." "Weapons" in the Air Force meant only 
one thing, hydrogen bombs. We removed him from his assignment 
pending further evaluation and informed Air Force Headquarters in 
Omaha, strongly recommending that SAC begin psychiatric screening 
of persons assigned to sensitive positions, particularly those who 
worked closely with nuclear weapons. Headquarters immediately clas­
sified the report secret, sent it back, and instructed us not to mention 
the case again. 
A couple of months later, another distraught young airman came 
into the clinic ranting about his wife's unfaithfulness. His sergeant was 
having similar problems. In their frustration, the two talked of creating 
"Lake Kansas/' Both worked with nuclear weapons. Although we nev­
er knew for sure, we had been told by others in the unit that at that time 
two persons acting in concert could detonate a "weapon." We sent this 
case to Air Force Headquarters with a more urgent request for screen­
ing to be initiated in SAC. We took for granted that similar cases were 
appearing elsewhere. We had stumbled on ours only by accident. The 
Air Force gave the same response: the case was classified, and no 
further action was taken. 
At about this time I was selected by the Air Force Institute of Tech­
nology to return to graduate school. The Air Force wanted me to apply 
to Catholic University's doctoral program in social work. I scheduled 
interviews, and my trip to Washington provided an opportunity to 
bring a potentially disastrous problem to the attention of the new Ken­
nedy Administration. El Cook put together a bundle of the classified 
cases he'd been obsessed with for months. I concealed the files in my 
luggage and hopped aboard an Air Force refueling tanker, hitching a 
free ride to Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington. 
My best friend's father, Jim McDevitt, called Eugene McCarthy (then 
a senator) and asked that he see me. I gave McCarthy the case records 
and briefly summarized them. Although McCarthy seemed annoyed 
and didn't give the impression that he took me very seriously, he 
offered to pass the information along. I never heard from him again, 
but a few months later the Air Force announced a "human reliability" 
screening program for those who worked with nuclear weapons. I 
hoped we'd had something to do with it. 
I transferred to Washington and began school. El Cook, over­
wrought by his concern with the laxity in Air Force screening of per­
sonnel who handled ''weapons," attempted suicide. For a while he was 
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hospitalized at Andrews Air Force Base in Washington, and we had the 
chance to go together to see Stanley Kubrick's Dr. Strangelove. Neither 
of us laughed much. A couple of years later El succeeded in killing 
himself, leaving his wife and three preadolescent sons. When I met 
Senator McCarthy at a fundraiser fifteen years later and reminded him 
of our meeting, now invested for me with tragic recollections, he was 
gracious but clearly had no memory of the event. 
After completing my doctorate, I was assigned to the tactical air 
forces in England. I worked in Air Force psychiatric clinics and hospi­
tals for the next five years, living "on the economy" rather than on the 
base. Through my clinic work with British therapists and social work­
ers, I got to know some of the experimental psychiatric and child-care 
programs which would never be allowed in the States, but which, 
paradoxically, the strait-laced British considered routine. 
For example, there was the startling George Lyward, a 73-year-old 
former headmaster and lay psychoanalyst. During the Blitz he had 
wandered from London to Tenterden in Kent with a group of troubled 
adolescents. There, in an old monastery, he began Finchden Manor, 
a therapeutic community. Lyward's model stayed with me over the 
years—a place of openness, unconditional care, and emotional growth 
that followed the lead of the child therapist August Aichhorn.11 placed 
some difficult and disturbed adolescent sons of American servicemen 
there, at Finchden Manor, and visiting the place was a therapeutic 
experience for me. Finchden Manor became the standard I later ap­
plied to programs for troubled adolescents.2 When I took over the 
Massachusetts reform schools ten years later, I hoped to recreate Ly-
ward's model of care and acceptance on the grounds of a U.S. reform 
school. It was a naive expectation. 
I found Lyward through A. S. Neill, whose more talked about (and 
less impressive) Summerhill was a short drive down the road from the 
village in which I lived.3 Neill had put me in touch with Lyward after 
I'd asked him for help in finding a residential school for an Air Force 
pilot's son who insisted on wearing his mother's clothes. The boy's 
behavior sent his macho father up the wall, and the kid was desperate. 
Neill said, "There are only four schools in England that don't teach 
hate—-Summerhill, St. Francis, Redfern, and Finchden Manor." I called 
them all. They were all full. But Lyward, true to a form I later came to 
know well, suggested I stop by with the youngster anyway. Perhaps 
something could be worked out. 
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Neill was a big bear of a man in his eighties. Following the American 
success of his book Summerhill, a treatise on child care fit for the fitful 
sixties, his school had been inundated with the rejected and troubled 
children of wealthy American families. They tested Neill's therapeutic 
model, so dependent upon the basic civility and traditions which char­
acterized the English, to the limit. I vividly remember sitting next to 
him during a house meeting. The house meeting was the touchstone of 
Summerhill, the kids' self-government. As one particularly domineer­
ing and big-mouthed American youngster took over the meeting, Neill 
softly muttered, "Can't someone shut the little bastard up?" No one 
could. The success of Neill's model was so tied to his own decent 
persona that Summerhill declined with Neill's health. 
I also got to see the worst of organically oriented British psychiatry 
and authoritarian behaviorist psychology. The horrifying visions of 
H. G. Wells and George Orwell took life. I sat in a staff conference at 
prestigious Fulbourne Mental Hospital near Cambridge as disciples of 
William Sargant, the polemicist for brain surgery ordered a lobotomy 
for a sixty-year-old woman troubled with cycles of depression. The fact 
that her depressive episodes were triggered annually on the anniver­
sary of her husband's death was of no interest or relevance to the 
assembled psychiatrists and psychologists. 
Behaviorism held sway in England in the 1960s. For example, psy­
chologists working at a British approved (reform) school for delinquent 
boys treated one boy's predilection for stealing cars with a bizarre 
mixture of aversive conditioning and a naive reconstruction of psycho­
analytic theory. Placing the boy in a chair, they showed him color slides 
of cars. As each Rolls or Rover flashed on the screen, he was given a stiff 
electric shock in the groin. This pattern was varied by occasional slides 
of nude women (the car thefts putatively stemming from the boy's 
unresolved sexual feelings). At this point, the boy was given tea, toast, 
and marmalade. When he returned to the streets after the course of 
treatment, he promptly stole another car. This time, however, it was a 
Morris Mini. Formerly he had stolen Jaguars. This was taken as a sign 
of progress—the object of his desires was less phallic! 
The closest I got to the British correctional system was Rampton 
Hospital, a facility for the so-called criminally insane. The psychol­
ogist, a disciple of H. J. Eysenck,4 had been engaged in a decade-long 
search for the "criminal mind." The result was an office overflowing 
with the machinery of the behaviorist research psychologist. There 
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were polygraphs, shock machines, skin galvanometers, and other im­
posing armamentaria. To his disappointment none of the procedures, 
measurements, or mechanical stimulants proved predictive of the crim­
inal mind. 
I felt almost sorry for this man, who was being inexorably crowded 
out of his office by the tools of his trade—and all for naught. But I could 
have spared my pity. With a quick smile he told me that he had, after 
all, found meaning in his decade-long efforts. He had discovered a 
reliable way to predict a new inmate's adjustment to Rampton. His 
prediction was based on how intimidated and agitated the inmate be­
came when first confronted with the useless machinery, dials, wires, 
and buttons which crowded the psychologist's office. It was a fitting 
denouement, a variation on the Hawthorne effect.5 The research tech­
nique had become its own justification. 
By this time the United States was well into the Vietnam War. Things 
changed in the clinic. Fighter-bomber pilots from our base "reflexed" 
regularly to Vietnam. A new breed of Air Force psychiatrists came to be 
in charge, some of them back from duty in the Far East. The sheltered 
and relatively decent inpatient community, which we had worked so 
hard to establish, collapsed. The electroshock machine reappeared 
(and was quietly rendered unusable by myself and a staff nurse). The 
Air Force had finally become comfortable with its psychiatric clinics. 
We were no longer on the edge. We were all becoming, in H. G. Wells's 
term, "psychojusters" who were expected to label those who ques­
tioned what was happening as emotionally disturbed or otherwise 
flawed. Such pathology had to be controlled immediately or excised, 
lest we glimpse its sources. 
Meanwhile, I'd made major, but accepting the promotion would 
have meant another four years in the Air Force. Leaving was not the 
moral decision I wish I could say it had been. The truth is, the Air Force 
had become wearing, and I wanted to do something new. It was time to 
leave. I'd met Charlene, my wife-to-be, in England. She was a psychi­
atric nurse at the base hospital, and she was being transferred back to 
the States. We decided to get married when I returned. 
After having worked with prisoners in Air Force stockades and set 
up a clinic in England for troubled teenage dependents of American 
military and embassy personnel in Great Britain, my interest in the 
causes and treatment of crime and delinquency, always present, had 
become preeminent. I decided to look for that kind of civilian job as I 
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hopped Air Force and U.S. Navy planes back to and around the States 
over a frenetic ten days. I received a number of offers and decided to 
take a position as Assistant Director for Research and Training with the 
newly formed Maryland Juvenile Services Administration. It was an 
important job in a new state agency and my first civilian job of any 
consequence. It was also my introduction to state government human 
services. I lasted six weeks. 
I arrived in Baltimore and settled into the new job, meeting with 
staff and visiting youth institutions and camps. I was excited at being 
part of a reform administration. The Maryland legislature had passed 
one of the most progressive juvenile justice laws in the nation. We had 
an adequate budget and a group of skilled young professionals at the 
top. Everything was in place for effective and innovative programs. We 
could place youngsters in treatment, design the programs, and decide 
the length of time. But there was a drawback: the agency was run with a 
pollster in the anteroom. 
It soon became clear that bureaucratic survival was the watchword. 
Nothing was proposed without first running it past a hodgepodge of 
union representatives, local judges, sundry advocacy groups, local 
politicians, and others. This seemed democratic enough. But in agen­
cies with a captive clientele, compromises tend to be made at the ex­
pense of those who are excluded from the process. 
One morning I attended a meeting in the superintendent's office at 
the state's largest boys' reform school. Most of the top administrators 
were there. We had a thoughtful discussion about plans for new treat­
ment and educational programs at the school. Clearly this was a well-
motivated, decent group of men (no women) with progressive ideas 
about reforming an ineffective system. After the meeting, I wandered 
upstairs, mulling over the possibilities. Strolling down the hallway 
directly above the superintendent's office, I glanced to the right. There 
were isolation cells containing this or that youngster, stripped down 
and learning whatever lesson the institution was teaching that day. At 
our staff meeting no one, including myself, had made any mention of 
this brutal practice within shout of our deliberations. We all knew 
about it. If a poll of those in the meeting had been taken the majority 
would have opposed this use of isolation. But it was unseemly to talk 
about it. In pursuit of larger goals we passed over the misery counte­
nanced by existing policies. 
I walked back downstairs. It was only too clear that if I were to make 
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a career here, I'd have to avoid seeing too much, particularly in the 
individual faces of the adolescent inmates. It was a lesson I never 
learned. Years later I found a rationalization in the work of a con­
servative philosopher, Karl Popper, who warned of the brutal potential 
in planning which overlooks present evils in its pursuit of eventual 
nirvana.6 
The next morning I called Dick Medhurst, dean of the School of 
Social Work at The Ohio State University, and asked if his earlier offer 
of an associate professorship still stood. It did. I left Maryland a few 
days later, apologizing to Dick Batterton, the director, leaving my con­
cerns unspoken and giving difficulty in finding suitable housing as my 
reason for quitting. 
Although I'd taught a few courses in the University of Maryland's 
overseas programs, Ohio State was my first teaching experience on a 
major university campus. I was assigned graduate and undergraduate 
courses in human behavior and delinquency. Things started on a sour 
note when, a few days after my arrival, a group of students protested 
my occupying my office, which they had been using as an informal 
meeting place. That I had come to Ohio State from the military didn't 
help. A petition was circulated demanding my ouster. Looking over my 
assigned space, I agreed it wasn't much of an office and signed the 
petition. I got a different office. 
I enjoyed the students and the university atmosphere immensely, 
and it was a productive time for me. I caught up on the literature and 
had several articles accepted for publication in professional journals. I 
was an occasional consultant to the Ohio prison system and the Ohio 
Youth Commission. I also learned a bit more about academic bureau­
cracies. Along with some young administrators with an inner-city pov­
erty program and a group of osu graduate students, we used federal 
Comprehensive Employment Training Assistance (CETA) funds to get a 
couple of hundred inner-city youths and adults admitted to osu. Using 
a general letter of support from the University's Vice Chancellor, John 
Corbally, we talked a number of department heads into admitting our 
clients (most of whom lacked high school degrees) into their programs, 
allowing each catch-up time at the beginning (one quarter's credit for 
two quarters' work). Most eventually got bachelor's degrees, and a few 
went on to graduate school. Many of those involved in setting up the pro-
gram—Tom Jeffers, Paul DeMuro, Magnus Lewis, and Rudy Adams-
later joined the reform effort in Massachusetts. 
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The following spring, the dean told me I'd be getting a full profes­
sorship and would be recommended for tenure in the fall term. I was 
elected to the faculty senate. To top things off, Charlene and I had 
lucked out with a pair of fifty-yard-line season tickets to osu's annual 
football rituals. Things looked good at Ohio State. 
4 The Invitation

I  n midsummer of my first year at osu, the personnel information 
bulletin of the National Association of Social Workers came across my 
desk with the morning mail. Massachusetts was looking for someone 
to head its newly created Department of Youth Services (DYS) the state's 
youth corrections system. The new department had been created fol­
lowing a series of scandals regarding abuse of youthful inmates.1 The 
idea of working there was one of those "What if?" fantasies for me. I'd 
been teaching a course in delinquency and social deviance at osu, with 
particular emphasis on therapeutic communities, but my only foray 
into the field in Maryland still gnawed at me. 
A faculty sociologist with a radical bent sarcastically suggested that 
since I was constantly berating the Ohio Youth Commission's training 
schools, I might want to put up or shut up. We laughed and went about 
preparations for the fall term. With little reflection and virtually no 
intention of anything serious happening, I threw a resume into an 
envelope and sent it off to Massachusetts. A couple of weeks later the 
chairman of the search committee called and invited me to Boston for 
an interview. I was flattered, but I still didn't take it very seriously. I 
planned to be at osu in the coming term, but the invitation was an 
opportunity to visit Boston and, perhaps, to influence the direction the 
committee might take in assessing candidates. 
I flew out to Boston in mid-August, arriving about twenty minutes 
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early for an 8:00 P.M. interview. The screening committee was meeting 
in the central office of the Massachusetts Youth Service Board (YSB), 
then housed on the seventh floor of a rundown office building near the 
capitol. As I waited in the hallway, a prospective candidate emerged 
from his interview along with a couple of the panel members. It was a 
friendly scene, with backslapping and handshakes all around. They 
were going to meet later for a few drinks. Though I'd been told there 
were about thirty candidates, clearly this one had an inside track. It 
reinforced my view that nothing much was likely to come of the inter­
view. Search committees in state government routinely conduct na­
tional searches for executives. They then, just as routinely, nominate a 
member of the search committee. As a matter of fact, that's what almost 
happened in this case, but other matters intervened.2 
I went into the interview feeling pretty much free of any need to tell 
the committee members what they might want to hear. I saw it as a 
forum for discussion and argument on the always controversial subject 
of delinquency. I was introduced to the members of the committee. True 
to form, I remembered no names. They asked about my experiences 
and my views on youth services and treatment models for offenders. 
One asked me what I might do if I were directing a state juvenile 
corrections agency. I said something about making the institutions 
more humane and setting up aftercare programs. I thoroughly enjoyed 
the hour-long interchange and left feeling that though it had been 
stimulating, it would lead nowhere. I'd had a free trip to Boston, a 
chance to wander down to the Union Oyster House for a lobster, to 
walk about the Common, and to poke around Harvard Square for a 
couple of hours—in the summer of 1969, a "trip" in itself. I flew back to 
Columbus expecting to hear no more. 
A few days later Leila Deasy, a former professor of mine at Catholic 
University, called. She had been contacted by Lloyd Ohlin, professor of 
criminology at Harvard University's Center for Criminal Justice. He 
had asked a good deal about me, and she had the impression it was a 
serious inquiry. Then a faculty member from the Ohio State English 
department called and asked me if I was applying for a job in Mas­
sachusetts. I was surprised he knew. Though I'd not kept it a secret, I 
hadn't mentioned my trip to Boston around campus. A friend of his in 
city hall had asked, "Who's Jerry Miller?" Someone in Boston was 
making inquiries of the mayor's office and the police department, ask­
ing what they might know about me. It turned out that the inquiries 
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came not from the search committee but from others who had caught 
wind of my name's being on the list and who were looking to head off 
the governor from nominating me. 
I hadn't expected this. It sent me to the phone to try to find out more 
about the job. I had no contacts in Boston, but I'd recently had a paper 
accepted for publication in the Family Law Quarterly of the American Bar 
Association. The editor was Father Robert Drinan, then dean of Boston 
College School of Law. I called and asked his opinion. He was more 
politically informed than I'd expected a cleric professor to be. I'd for­
gotten he was a Jesuit. He sent a sheaf of news clippings on the Youth 
Service Board, commenting that the Massachusetts legislature had a 
tradition of creating new programs and then refusing to fund them. 
Though he wished me well, he wouldn't advise me to take the position. 
The following week, Chris Armstrong, an aide to Massachusetts 
governor Frank Sargent, phoned. He asked me to come out to meet 
with members of the governor's staff. I made another trip to Boston 
and, eventually, met with Governor Sargent, an amiable and forth­
right man of old Yankee stock. He was unusually open about the prob­
lems and scandals in the Youth Service Board, weaving an intriguing 
yarn about the difficulties he had had getting John Coughlan, the for­
mer head of the board, to resign. He told me how he'd invited Coughlan 
to his office one morning and kept him there well into the evening, 
until he agreed to submit his resignation. Years later a former aide to 
the governor told me that the act had bordered on kidnapping. The 
governor got his way, and Coughlan signed the resignation letter 
drawn up for him. Later he tried to withdraw his resignation, but the 
governor refused. 
Governor Sargent bluntly told me I wasn't his first choice. He pre­
ferred Frank A. Maloney, the acting head of the department. At the 
governor's request, Frank had taken the job as an interim assignment. 
Following Maloney's swearing-in at the governor's office, he was ac­
companied by state troopers for the short trek down School Street from 
the capitol to the offices of the YSB. He fully anticipated that Coughlan, 
having announced he would not vacate his office, would have to be 
carried out in his chair. 
Maloney, an affable, nonabrasive social work administrator, quickly 
settled things down in the department. He enjoyed his job and had 
expressed interest in the new commissioner's position. The search com­
mittee, however, had recommended me. Despite his preference for 
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Maloney, Governor Sargent felt obliged to honor the committee's 
wishes. He told me I could have the position if I wished to accept it. I'd 
never met a governor before and was frankly flattered by such high-
level attention. The ambivalence that had dogged me from the day I 
sent in my resume took flight. I said I would be honored to accept the 
position. 
As I left his office, the governor remarked somewhat cryptically, "I 
hope you'll get along with Frank Maloney." I was slow to pick up on his 
meaning. Chris Armstrong clarified it outside. I was expected to ap­
point Frank deputy commissioner. The governor wanted to cover his 
bets, so that if I fell on my face, he'd have someone to pick up the 
pieces. But there were other conditions attached to this prearrange­
ment. I had to make another flight to Boston for a two-hour airport 
meeting with Frank to see whether we were compatible. We were. I'm 
not sure what would have happened if we hadn't been. 
Massachusetts politics being what they are, things weren't going to 
be smooth. I was an outsider—at best an unknown, at worst a threat. 
My nomination had to be confirmed by the Executive Council, a hold­
over from pre-Revolutionary War days. This group was originally cre­
ated as a check on the absolute power of the British governor of the 
Massachusetts Colony, but over the years its role had degenerated. 
Known on Beacon Hill as the "swap shop," it was a place to trade favors 
and bank influence. My nomination was in limbo while this group 
went about its work. Some council members objected to the way Cough-
Ian had been treated. Councilman Walter Kelly was particularly per­
turbed. His brother, a former fireman, was assistant superintendent at 
one of the reform schools. Before confirming anyone, Councilman Kelly 
wanted to guarantee his brother's job. Other councilmen wanted less 
definable favors. I was not privy to the kinds of negotiations the governor 
engaged in, but I took it for granted that trades had to be made to soften 
the blow. After a month of haggling, I was confirmed. 
During those long days of waiting, I strolled over to the YSB offices (a 
block and a half away from the statehouse) and walked unannounced 
into the same seedy office building in which I'd met the search commit­
tee a couple of months earlier. I took the rickety elevator up to the 
seventh-floor administrative offices and wandered down the poorly lit 
hallways, introducing myself to whatever staff I found here or there at a 
desk. People were friendly but guarded. The new Department of Youth 
Services was peopled with the same staff and administrators who ran 
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the now defunct Youth Service Board. It had just been renamed. I later 
concluded that the old YSB could have done virtually everything the 
new DYS would accomplish. The legislation provided a respite rather 
than a new mandate. Reform is always more a matter of will than of 
legislation, and most youth and adult corrections agencies have the 
capacity to reform themselves within existing legislation and budgets. 
They seldom use the means at hand and, as the least accountable of 
state bureaucracies, they maintain an entirely reactive stance, waiting 
for mandates which seem never to arrive. 
Since I was in the building, Frank Maloney offered to arrange an 
informal get-acquainted session with administrators. I tried to put 
everyone at ease with light talk about my excitement at coming to 
Massachusetts. For most of my professional life I'd been a therapist in 
one or another psychiatric setting, and I used whatever therapeutic 
skills I could muster. The staff seemed a beaten-down group, under­
standably concerned with where they'd land in the newly reorganized 
department. They had little reason to worry. The state legislature had 
been unduly responsive to intense lobbying by DYS staff. Though more 
than nine hundred of the approximately one thousand YSB employees 
were political appointees, the legislature gave them all civil service 
tenure. Whatever uneasiness I sensed at that first meeting didn't have 
to do with whether they'd keep their jobs. In fact, many of those sitting 
in the room had been applicants for the job I got. 
After the meeting I flew back to Columbus, and the next morning I 
got a call from Chris Armstrong. A summary of the meeting had ap­
peared in the Boston Herald in a political column written by Thomas 
Gallagher. I was portrayed as an arrogant outsider who insisted on 
being called "Commissioner" while proposing a series of radical changes 
in the department—all this before my appointment had been con­
firmed by the Executive Council.3 The meeting reported was not the 
one I remembered. I had no plans for the department. The reference to 
wanting to be called commissioner gave my students at Ohio State a 
few laughs. But I learned to take the Gallagher columns seriously, not 
for their accuracy but because they gave a clue as to what the opposition 
was up to. Gallagher's opposition ran deep: "Nationwide searches to 
fill state positions are, of course, ridiculous, in light of the depth of the 
talent in every field of endeavor which abounds in Massachusetts." He 
added that, on those few occasions when Massachusetts governors or 
mayors had plucked department heads from other states, "the results 
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have ranged from unsatisfactory to disastrous/'4 Gallagher's favorite 
candidates for the commissioner's job were a former Suffolk County 
sheriff, John Sears, who had recently lost his reelection bid, and 
George McGrath, a well-known political figure in Massachusetts who 
was then commissioner of corrections in New York City and a member 
of the search committee that had selected me. 
Over the years Gallagher attacked almost everything I did and be­
came the favored press outlet for disenchanted staff, who fed him a 
regular diet of gossip, rumors, scandals, and fantasies. That the hap­
penings in DYS were written about primarily by political columnists 
fitted the traditions of that department well. 
My first days on the job were a haze. It's not that my recollections 
have grown misty. Rather, the experience was a confusing blur of meet-
ings—kind faces, hostile glances, pols on the make, imperious judges, 
troubled staff, child advocates with mixed motivations, meetings with 
no purpose, speeches, press briefings, cocktail parties, and private 
dinners. The activities weren't motivated by any sudden demand by 
public and private figures to make my acquaintance. But I headed a 
small state agency which was tied to strong special interests—ideologi-
cal as well as political. Virtually everyone had an agenda—to lobby 
for favorite programs, jockey for position, seek contracts, bless union 
agreements, become consultants, tell of new scandals, cajole, manipu­
late, support, and occasionally threaten. 
I later learned to put some of this in perspective, or at least to keep 
my own counsel until I knew what I wanted to do. Every new head of a 
cabinet-level or other large state agency goes through this stage, but 
Massachusetts was my first experience with it. I simply didn't know 
what I was getting into. I'd been a clinician for most of my professional 
life and had no more than a passing interest in the mechanics of gov­
ernment. The most difficult problems came from those who presented 
themselves as, and who should have been, my natural friends and allies. 
My political education was a case of sink or swim. I almost undid the 
hope of reform while learning to survive. I wandered through the halls 
of the historic Massachusetts State House not unlike the professor who, 
I'm told, wandered about Chicago's West Side during the riots follow­
ing Martin Luther King's assassination. Aside from police, he was the 
only white man in sight but was left untouched by the gangs of rioters. 
His naivete apparently saved him. Anyone so bereft of common sense 
must be held to a less demanding standard. 
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I was in a game in which I knew neither the rules nor the players. 
Only later did I find out how vulnerable I'd been. It's not that I didn't 
try to inform myself. I wanted to understand state government and 
know who held the levers of power. This might seem relatively easy— 
the most powerful people, one would expect, can be identified by their 
office. But that's not the way it works. The vice chairman of a committee 
might have more power than the chairman because of a personal inter­
est or a stake in a particular department or issue. Nearly invisible 
advisers and aides at various levels often called the shots, screened the 
information, and made the final judgments. I'd been told that the re­
form legislation had broad support in the legislature, but not that the 
support was also shallow. My own position wasn't funded for a year 
after my appointment, nor was that of the deputy commissioner or the 
four assistant commissioners called for in the legislation. I paid myself 
and Frank Maloney by leaving other positions unfilled. 
The assault on the old YSB had come from a small coalition of liberal 
legislators led by Brookline senator Beryl Cohen and a young new 
legislator, Michael Dukakis. The rest of the legislature eventually joined 
in with a wider range of motives. I later concluded that the reform 
legislation was passed not because the legislature wanted more effec­
tive handling of delinquent youngsters. Instead, it grew out of such 
cause as feeling slighted over not sharing in the well-known patronage 
pot, getting even with YSB administrators, and the herd instinct which 
routinely seduces legislators when there is the smell of blood—anyone's 
(in this case, Coughlan's). In that kind of atmosphere even old loyalties 
collapse pretty quickly. 
Despite Massachusetts' liberal reputation, liberal is not an apt de­
scription for its brawling state politics. On local issues, the legislature 
was conservative and provincial. The problem was compounded by its 
large size—240 members. (The number of legislators was later cut back 
under pressure from a coalition of citizens' groups led by the League of 
Women Voters.) This conservative legislature was totally dominated by 
Democrats. I worked for a liberal Republican governor. Theoretically, 
the Democrats should have had no problem passing any legislation 
they wished. But the Massachusetts legislature resembled the Congress 
of forty years ago, with some legislative committees being controlled 
by conservative Democrats who would have been equally at home in 
Mississippi. Boston city council woman Louise Day Hicks personified 
that aspect of Massachusetts politics best as she resoundingly won her 
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seat with a less-than-subtle appeal to racial fears—while the state voted 
for George McGovern for president. 
There were exceptions to the self-serving in the legislature. Jack 
McGlynn, a legislator from Maiden, was one example. Though liberals 
were not his natural constituency, Jack carried the ball for the Mas­
sachusetts Committee on Children and Youth in getting the reform 
legislation through the House. Without him there would have been no 
reform. He was one of those rare birds in politics who are able to hold 
onto that part of one's character where one does what seems right 
despite the political repercussions, all the while playing the public 
game with the best (or worst) of the old pols. Jack chaired the House 
Committee on State Administration, and in this role he protected and 
shepherded the reform legislation through a legislature usually hostile 
to this kind of reform. He later guided me through some difficult inves­
tigations and attacks from the legislature. 
My original guide around the statehouse was Mark Burke, the public 
relations person in the department. Mark, a rotund, red-faced Irish­
man, offered to acquaint me with the state's political powers. He also 
had his own agenda firmly in mind as we proceeded up and down the 
halls, meeting the senate president, the speaker, the chairman and vice 
chairman of Ways and Means Committees, and a wide assortment of 
legislators. Mark led me from office to office, introducing me as the 
new commissioner and telling the various dignitaries he was trying to 
ease my way into the workings of government. I was a prop in Mark's 
show, but I dutifully went along, speaking when spoken to, answering 
the kinds of empty questions such occasions elicit, and trying to get a 
fix on the cast of characters I came to know well. 
My first meeting with Dave Bartley, the Democratic speaker of the 
house, was particularly memorable, not for its content, but for the fact 
that I didn't realize it was important- I was sitting with him and the 
majority whip, Tom McGee. The speaker sat in his JFK rocker, an af­
fable man who had more than a passing interest in what I wanted to do 
in the department. He jokingly asked what I was doing in Mark's 
company, and we all laughed. I enjoyed the meeting, and Mark told me 
it had gone well. As we walked down the marble hall from the speaker's 
wood-paneled office, I remarked that he seemed a nice person and 
appeared to be in an influential position. Mark replied sarcastically, 
"Yes, Jerry, he's an 'influential' person." The speaker had afterthoughts 
as well, but of a different kind. He quietly got word back to me through 
40 / Going to Massachusetts 
the lobbyist for the Massachusetts Committee on Children and Youth, 
Ceil DiCicco, that I was being introduced around the legislature by the 
wrong person. Mark was seen as tied to the old guard. Bartley went out 
of his way to be protective of me, and his low-key support meant the 
difference between success and failure over the next four years. 
Mark was well known on Beacon Hill. His uncle was Michael Paul 
Feeney, a legislator from Boston. I got a firmer impression of Mark's 
political involvements later when he casually remarked that he'd be 
taking a leave to run for the Massachusetts legislature—"But don't 
worry, Jerry. I won't be elected." It seemed curious that he would 
spend so much effort on a lost race, but in Boston it made sense. Mark's 
uncle was opposed in his reelection by a fellow named Michael Burke. 
Mark ran as "M. Burke," to draw off a portion of Michael Burke's 
supporters. Mark was back in his office the day after the election. 
Michael Feeney was back in the legislature. 
The speaker's advice made it seem wise for me to be reintroduced to 
the legislators. This time my guide was George O'Shea, an admin­
istrator in the department who had formerly been in the legislature. 
George had had a good reputation as a legislator, though he too was a 
patronage appointment in the department. He knew both the liberal 
and the conservative blocs in the legislature, but he went out of his way 
to ensure that I was introduced to Mike Dukakis, Beryl Cohen, Jack 
Backman, Marty Linsky, and others who had supported the reform 
legislation. George also took me back to Speaker Bartley and to the 
senate president, Maurice Donahue, as well as to Joe Early, chairman of 
the house Ways and Means Committee, and a somewhat menacing 
"Blackie" Burke, chairman of the senate Ways and Means Committee. 
Burke and I carried on no discussion of issues. I was warned simply 
not to antagonize him. His only interest was funding for the Maritime 
School, which was in his district and apparently had some program 
money from my department. 
Mark initiated me rather quickly into the local political traditions: 
going to a nearby bar for a couple of beers after work, chatting with the 
hangers-on and assorted pols who routinely conducted much of their 
business there, sharing stories and gossip. It was usually in some bar or 
other that I first met members of the Boston City Council, legislators, 
and local political appointees. "Dapper" O'Neill, for instance, then 
head of the Liquor Control Board, was a Boston pol to fit an outsider's 
worst stereotype—given to sitting briefly at the table, speechifying 
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loudly about crime and permissiveness, telling a dirty joke, waving the 
flag, working the crowd, scoping me out, and occasionally offering "a 
bit of friendly advice/' But not so friendly that, if the opportunity arose, 
he wouldn't do me in with a crowfooted wink of a usually red eye. 
Despite his backslapping and his loudly shouted "Commissioner," to 
Dapper I was in the enemy camp. 
In an attempt to be helpful Joe McCormick, a respected local political 
figure formerly associated with the YSB, invited me to address a Holy 
Name Society Communion breakfast in his large West Roxbury parish. 
I brought along a copy of one of the logbooks from the Lyman school. I 
thought it might be instructive to this group of two to three hundred 
(mostly Irish) Catholic men to hear about the ethnic history of the 
reform schools. I began by reading a log entry from the late 1800s. 
"Kevin O'Reilly," went the intake summary, "typical Irishman, coarse 
and stupid." It was a lame attempt at making the point that those sent 
to our institutions were on the lower rungs of the socioeconomic 
ladder—that though the Irish had been replaced by blacks and His­
panics, today, the mechanics remained the same: inmates were never 
taken from among the sons and daughters of those who made the laws. 
My point fell flat. I got polite applause and thanked Joe for the invita­
tion and the Jerusalem Bible given me by the Holy Name members. 
My tenure as commissioner was uncertain, but I hoped to survive long 
enough to keep the lid on a set of reform schools I couldn't avoid 
changing. Tommy Sheehan, the department's child legal counsel and 
head of the Democratic City Committee for Boston, told me the betting 
on Beacon Hill was that I wouldn't last more than six months. I'd been 
in office a couple of months and had provided plenty of raw meat for 
politicians. I'd made some pretty outlandish public statements which, 
though true, were not the kinds of things anyone bent on staying long 
in state government should say. But I had a poor appreciation of this at 
the time and went about my business unaware. Now, twenty years 
later and looking back over the news clippings, I realize how insen­
sitive I was. I'd like to think it wasn't so much arrogance as ignorance, 
but I'm not sure. My insensitivity certainly didn't make things easier. I 
was preoccupied with this or that inmate in a detention center or 
training school and tended to make my judgments relative to that indi­
vidual case. At times, an unannounced off-hour visit to this or that 
facility would leave me in a state of panic. What I'd see was so at odds 
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with what I'd envisioned that I would get sick to my stomach. The 
images stayed with me for days after. I fell prey to an obsessiveness 
which allowed little room for compromise and was a recipe for failure in 
the politics of state government. I had to learn to let up without selling 
out—a tightrope act which, even when I was successful at it, ground 
away at my innards. 
Maurice Donahue, a former schoolteacher serving out his last year 
as senate president, was strongly interested in the department and 
stressed the need for better educational programs in the institutions. 
He suggested I might want to consider running for office. My name 
had been in the papers so often, though usually associated with prob­
lems, riots, and escapes from the institutions, that I could win. Don­
ahue told me it didn't matter much whether the press was good or bad; 
it had provided name recognition. 
In politics a new incumbent is usually given a "honeymoon" by the 
press and political adversaries. But for me, no honeymoon was on 
anyone's agenda. I was fair game before, during, and after assuming 
office. Some of my friends in human service might say, "But you are a 
professional. Your position wasn't really political." Unfortunately, 
that's not how it is. I was immersed in politics from the day my name 
surfaced as a candidate for commissioner. That it took me a while to 
understand simply delayed getting on with the business at hand. 
5 Punishment vs. Restoration 
JVlassachusetts reform schools had more than a century to become a 
tradition, even setting the course of institutionalization for the nation. 
Though they grew and prospered, periodically a dark side emerged. 
Comparing Dickens's characterization of Boston's House of Reformation 
for Juvenile Offenders as a place "to reclaim the youthful criminal by 
firm, but kind and judicious, treatment"1 with a report to the Mas­
sachusetts legislature in 1969, one might conclude that the reform 
schools had greatly deteriorated over the years. But some nineteenth-
century reformers like abolitionist Samuel Howe had questioned the 
concept from the beginning, proposing alternatives for institution­
alized youth. 
There had been changes over a century and a half. The Lyman 
School no longer maintained the policy of giving boys over to clipper 
ships—often never to be seen again. The early schools were strict. A 
visitor to the House of Reformation for Juvenile Offenders in 1832 
described how "the boys worked their tasks without talking, using sign 
language and gestures as the sole means of communication" and how 
"they took their meals at prescribed periods at long tables and were 
forbidden to eat at other times." This regime of the reformer superin­
tendent, the Reverend E. W. P. Wells, was apparently not strict enough, 
however. The institution was closed four years after its opening with 
charges that discipline was too lax for a penal institution.2 
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Strict regimens and liberal use of corporal punishment were the rule 
in nineteenth-century reform schools. Flogging a youngster in the 
mid-1800s was less unusual than it became later. But the forced hair­
cuts, the demeaning silence and marching, the occasional beatings, the 
planned, ritualized violence of discipline cottages, and the restraint to 
beds in the 1970s were mightily out of keeping with the larger society of 
that period. Still, if one visited the reform schools in 1920 (in an un­
guided tour) or in 1900, the institutional regimens would probably 
have made the average contemporary visitor uneasy. But unguided visits 
were as "uncivil" in Victorian times as they are "inappropriate" today. 
But state institutions with captive inmates and a deterrent role have 
always had convoluted aims. Twelve years before Lyman School opened 
its doors, British law had found such a gruesome use for its public 
institutions. Before the nineteenth century, hanged criminals provided 
the only legal source of bodies for medical dissection. When hospitals 
made surgery respectable, there were no longer enough available 
bodies. Medical schools began purchasing them from grave robbers 
and murderers. This scandalous situation was mitigated by the Anat­
omy Act of 1832, making it legal to dissect the bodies of those who died 
in public institutions. Two years later, this was tied to the Poor Law 
Amendment Act, which attempted to deter applications for public 
assistance by requiring recipients to be placed in institutions where, 
should they die, they would be subject to dissection. It was a particu­
larly effective deterrent to application for aid among the religious poor, 
who saw the mutilation of the body as threatening the afterlife.3 
The Lyman School was established in 1846 from funds contributed 
jointly by the state and by Theodore Lyman, a former mayor of Boston. 
It seems initially to have been seen as a caring, relatively homelike 
setting, though the length of the sentences belie any expressed good 
intentions. The old logbooks from the period tell the familiar stories of 
nineteenth-century child welfare: 
Oril ]. Barden, age 9, committed in 1856 for larceny. Both parents died 
when he was a year old. Lived with aunt and uncle. Both respectable 
people. He was in the habit of stealing fruit. Stole 28 cents at one time 
and cried when he told his aunt. 
John O'Daniel, age 11, a 10-year sentence. Father sometimes gets drunk. 
He played on Sundays with idle boys, stole apples, stole money from his 
mother. Got whipped pretty hard, but seems like a sweet boy. 
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Simon Leary, 14. Mother and father would fight and strike each other. 
Got turned off from work places because breakfast was late served. Has 
been punished for talking in school.4 
Over the next 140 years, there would be periodic investigations, 
charges, updates, and reforms—new buildings, probation, parole, di­
version programs, and professionalization of the staff. But the reform 
schools only grew larger and more numerous. The reforms never broke 
their institutional tether. 
The logbooks, huge leather-bound ledgers written in longhand in 
fastidious Victorian prose, sketched the history of every boy sent to Ly­
man from 1846 to 1910. One could trace the waves of ethnic immigrants 
into Massachusetts as their children were sent to the reform school. . . 
along with a small but overrepresented sampling of "coloureds." 
In the late 1800s Lyman was inundated with Irish, Portuguese, and 
Italian youngsters from the streets of Boston. An annex was created—a 
ship in Boston harbor. Boys were held there until such time as a passing 
clipper or other cargo vessel sailed by. The ship's master stood on the 
bow calling out, "One boy!" 'Two boys!" If a ship's captain had need of 
a cabin boy or other young laborer, the youngster was sent off. "Kevin 
O'Reilly [for example] was last seen off the South China coast."5 
But even with this seagoing alternative, the model of choice re­
mained the reform school. Each school had its own methods and popu­
lation characteristics (age, sex, offense). A loose statewide system de­
veloped around each facility's traditions. Some took older boys, some 
younger. Others took boys who were difficult to manage, likely to run 
away, or in need of discipline. One school took girls. Some intakes were 
based on the ability of the institution to break the recalcitrant. 
Four years after the Lyman School for Boys was founded, the Lan­
caster Girls' Industrial School was established, first as a foster home for 
wayward girls. After a few years, more homes were opened on the 
same grounds and were placed under a central administration. Over 
the protests of Samuel Howe and others, Lancaster devolved into a 
girls' reform school not unlike Lyman.6 Those who ran the Massachu­
setts reform schools soon cultivated their own political power bases 
within the legislature. Superintendents of mental hospitals, wardens 
of prisons, and sheriffs of jails tend to gauge their effectiveness by the 
buildings and staff they can acquire. By these measures, Massachusetts 
reform school superintendents were very effective indeed. 
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Reform schools sprouted across the state. Though there was never 
much evidence that any of these nineteenth-century institutions was ef­
fective at its stated goals—curing the mentally ill, humanely caring for the 
retarded, reforming the delinquent, or calming the recalcitrant—all were 
highly successful at exiling the unmanageable, the unproductive, and 
the threatening. Their purpose was custodial, despite the gloss succeed­
ing eras placed upon them. Humane reformers tried less to make insti­
tutions succeed in rehabilitating or otherwise fixing the inmates than to 
mitigate the harm the institutions did. Boards of visitors were estab­
lished to ensure minimum standards and inhibit the tendency to slip into 
frankly brutal practices. They provided a way to keep a cap on things 
when institutional abuse strayed too far beyond the boundaries of civility. 
But the Victorian sense of proper order, of taming the wild, of celebrating 
"the imposition of human structure on the threatening chaos of nature" 
provided the backdrop. Harriet Ritvo's analysis of the metaphorical pur­
poses of the Victorian obsession with zoos is equally apt to the role 
inmates still play in many state-run mental hospitals, and in most pris­
ons and reform schools. These institutions corroborate the claims of the 
Caucasian male to superior status; they embody his anxieties about the 
maintenance of social discipline; and through the maintenance, staffing, 
and funding of the institutional system, they justify enterprise.7 
But the governing principle of virtually all state institutions, whether 
for the retarded, the mentally ill, the delinquent, children, or adult of­
fenders, was soon established. Reform schools were bound to the polit­
ical power of local legislators. In those states in which I have been 
responsible for such state institutions—Massachusetts, Illinois, and 
Pennsylvania—they were immersed in patronage. Local officials spon­
sored a large percentage, if not a majority, of state employees on the 
institutional grounds. Though civil service requirements were meant 
to alter these arrangements, they failed. 
The word reform always has a different meaning when a state institu­
tion is at stake. As the number of institutions grew, so did their influence 
in state legislatures, a fact that people routinely ignore. Any proposed 
change in services to or supervision of those who would otherwise be 
inmates had first to pass the political test. Innovation had to be accom­
plished without threatening the institution's stability. In politics, this 
means the institution must survive. Reform strategies must therefore 
absorb existing staff, add new institutional staff, and bolster the institu­
tional plant. 
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Their foundations firmly set in a century's worth of rough-and-tumble 
Massachusetts politics, the reform schools were joined under one ad­
ministration in 1948—the Massachusetts Division of Youth Services. It 
consisted of a three-person board with a chairman and came to be 
known as the Youth Service Board. The goals of the new reform were 
spelled out by the special commission devising the legislation, a com­
mission distinguished by its emphasis on diagnosis and application of 
"modern knowledge of human behavior to the treatment and rehabil­
itation of young offenders." 
The first step is diagnosis—physical, mental, emotional and social—to 
determine, if possible, why a child is delinquent and the type of treat­
ment most likely to restore him to acceptable behavior. The Board is 
required to make this thorough study of each child, on commitment. 
This may be done in the existing training schools or in a separate 
reception and diagnostic center. The job requires a team consisting of a 
pediatrician, psychiatrist, psychologist and social investigator, plus 
properly trained teacher and other supervising personnel. 
The second step is treatment to fit the diagnosis. Accordingly, the 
Board may place the child under supervision in his own home or in a 
foster home, or in one of the training schools, or in any public or private 
institution that can best meet the particular child's need for treatment 
and retraining. The Board is given control of the three training schools in 
order to control commitment to them not merely by age, but according to 
the needs of the youngsters, and thus to transform them eventually into 
treatment centers for specialized groups capable of effectively re-educating 
children. Any other training schools that may be established by the 
Commonwealth in the future will also come under the Board so that it 
may provide a wider variety of units to fit the needs of different catego­
ries of personality disorders. 
The third step is the goal of the whole process, namely, successful 
replacement in the community. The Board is necessarily the paroling 
agency and responsible for supervision of parolees. The intent of the act 
is to return a child to the community as soon as this can be done with 
some hope of success, so the Board has power to grant parole as well as to 
discharge at any time.8 
As rational as all this appeared, political realities dictated that the 
institutions be left untouched. The independent superintendents were 
politically unassailable. The 1948 reform legislation fixed their jobs and 
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the institutions more deeply in the state bureaucracy. In addition, the 
legislation mandated new institutions: reception and detention centers 
with diagnostic services. It also established a state system for parole 
(aftercare) and preventive services, a treasure trove of patronage jobs. 
John D. Coughlan was appointed director of the Youth Service Board 
in 1953. His academic background was in education and his doctorate 
from the Staley School of Speech in Boston. As I learned later, he could 
give a stem-winder of a speech, particularly when threatened, as he 
was wont to say, "by vipers at my breast/' Coughlan directed Mas­
sachusetts youth corrections for seventeen years through a succession 
of Democratic and Republican administrations—a remarkable feat for 
an appointee without civil service protection. He was unusually adept 
at courting state legislators, the governor's executive council, and county 
government officials. 
Coughlan made liberal use of a tradition which reached its zenith in 
the administration of Boston mayor James Curley—the political patron­
age system. After I left Massachusetts, I held cabinet-level positions in 
other states, some much devoted to patronage—but Massachusetts 
took the prize, hands down. In 1969, the Boston Globe estimated that 
over 90 percent of YSB employees were non-civil service appointees.9 
With the advent of the 1969 legislation, all the politically appointed 
administrators and staff were given civil service protection by the Mas­
sachusetts legislature under a grandfathering clause. 
Patronage was neither hidden nor embarrassing to either party. I can 
recall an aide to Governor Sargent asking me to run a new hiring past 
the "patronage office"—a particular cubbyhole in the statehouse where 
new applicants to state agencies were screened for political purity or 
"trading" potential. I went over expecting to see "Patronage Office" 
etched in the frosted glass of the door. I soon learned to disregard these 
requests, which were usually made by a second-level operative in the 
administration. The governor was not going to insist that I follow tradi­
tional hiring protocol. 
The degree to which patronage drove the department was brought 
home to me a few days after I took over. I was rummaging through the 
old gray metal desk in my office, and there, in a thick maroon folder, 
were notes listing employees in the department. Alongside each name 
was penciled in a sponsor—the legislator, county commissioner, or 
party official who had referred the employee for hiring. I later learned 
that most of those who came in the front door of the YSB looking for a 
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job were told first to step across the street to the Golden Dome and find 
a legislator willing to request the hiring as a favor. Every favor carried 
an obligation, and the system was designed to ensure administrative 
longevity. The department had only three blacks among its thousand 
employees, but it couldn't hold out indefinitely. The cast of characters 
changed as some legislators lost elections, original sponsors went on to 
other things, and opponents won elections and wanted their own peo­
ple in the jobs. Although there were attempts to keep new legislators 
happy with jobs for constituents, there were never enough openings to 
keep pace with the demand. 
In the mid-sixties tales of brutal abuse of youngsters leaked out: 
stories of beatings, widespread use of solitary confinement, isolation in 
unheated rooms, rapes, staff discontent, violence, and dilapidated 
buildings. Scandals are usually poor harbingers of reform. The sensa­
tion they cause is settled with cosmetic change. But the times were 
unusually ripe. The question was whether, this time, things would be 
different—whether the state could finally break loose from the reform 
roundabout which usually follows expose. 
Massachusetts had been through the ritual many times before, and 
each crisis had ended in new buildings and more staff. Massachusetts 
reformers were never much into the third tenet of traditional reform-
prof essionalization. The YSB had never brought in many psychologists, 
psychiatrists, social workers, or educators. This was probably because 
of the extensive patronage. When I took over the department we had 
only one full-time psychologist with a Ph.D. and one social worker 
with an M.S.W., along with three part-time consultant psychiatrists. 
Ironically, the fact that the YSB was relatively unprofessional made it 
more vulnerable to substantive change. If it had had more social work­
ers, psychiatrists, and psychologists it would have been far more im­
mune to any significant moves to create alternatives. I doubt, however, 
that it would have been any less brutal. A study of reform schools done 
by Robert Vinter at the University of Michigan found an inverse rela­
tionship between deinstitutionalization and professionalization.10 From 
this point of view, corrections reform is probably more easily accom­
plished in a state like Alabama or Arkansas than in California, rou­
tinely among the worst in the nation.11 California's brutal Youth Au­
thority is overrun by M.B. A/s, M.S. W/s, and Ph.D.'s. They do the same 
things which cried out for reform in Massachusetts, but with more 
technical finesse and professional arrogance. 
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The Massachusetts Experiment came to be discounted not because it 
didn't work, but because it happened in Massachusetts. It must have 
been, people seem to think, a criminological as well as a political anom­
aly. Certainly the 1988 presidential campaign added fuel to that fire. 
The state's delinquents must have been "different." There was one 
surprising difference. The Massachusetts system held a large number 
of youngsters who in other states would have been in adult prisons. In 
1988, for example, a total of twelve juveniles were waived to adult 
courts in Massachusetts. In that same year, Maryland waived 900, Flor­
ida 4,000, and Virginia 800. But Massachusetts is no more liberal when 
it comes to law and order than other states. It continues to have some of 
the most brutal prisons in the nation. 
Who were the inmates in Massachusetts reform schools? They varied 
little from those in institutions in other states. They were no more nor 
less criminal than youngsters in the Texas Youth Council's infamous 
Mountain View reform school in the early seventies, Los Angeles' Juve­
nile Hall in 1988, New York's maximum-security facility for delinquent 
teenagers at Goshen, Illinois' St. Charles Reformatory, the District of 
Columbia's Oak Hill, Tennessee's Taft, Oregon's MacLaren, or Florida's 
Dozier. I mention these particular institutions because I was subse­
quently involved in lawsuits against them making court-ordered visits, 
studying statistical and case records, and interviewing youngsters, 
staff, and administrators. The average age of inmates in the Massa­
chusetts reform schools was fifteen and a half. Most were sent to the 
facilities for breaking and entering or other property crimes. Though 
blacks formed less than 5 percent of the state population, they made up 
more than 30 percent of the reform school population, and at times 
almost half of those in pretrial detention. Hispanics accounted for an 
additional 15 percent of the reform school population. As is still true, 
most were involved with alcohol or drugs (acid, speed, heroin, and the 
beginnings of the cocaine epidemic). As is the case in almost all juris­
dictions, most of the youths were the offspring of teenage unions, and 
almost half had themselves fathered or borne children. Of the approx­
imately two thousand youth under DYS supervision, usually no more 
than fifteen or twenty had been committed for murder or manslaughter 
(about five or six youths per year). These fifteen or twenty constituted 
virtually all juveniles convicted of murder in the state. Approximately 
25 percent were formally charged with crimes of violence or crimes 
against persons. When distilled case by case, however, those who dem­
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onstrated a capacity for personal violence were less than 5 percent of 
the youth committed to DYS. This is because charges don't necessarily 
reflect the particular violence or dangerousness of the individual young­
ster. The difference between aggravated assault and simple assault, 
both crimes against persons, may be the difference between impulsive­
ly pushing a policeman away and beating an aged stranger senseless. 
Despite the common mythology, most juvenile courts tend not to lower 
the level of charges, but rather to overcharge. Massachusetts was no 
exception. To suggest that juvenile courts routinely mollycoddle delin­
quents by disregarding serious crimes is nonsense. When juvenile 
courts latch on to a kid caught in a violent act, they hang on with a 
tenacity far beyond that of most adult courts. 
Another interesting fact about the delinquent youngsters in Mas­
sachusetts is how little they differed over the years. Though one fre­
quently hears that juveniles have grown more violent than the rest of 
the population, the statistics do not bear that out. There was a growth 
in crime nationally—adult and juvenile—in the twenty-year period be­
tween 1960 and 1980, and again in the early 1990s, but it has been much 
overdramatized with reference to juvenile crime. Juvenile crime rates 
rise or fall pretty much in line with adult crime rates. 
Even with the spread into the suburbs of drug abuse—along with 
more burglary, petty crime, and the occasional armed robbery—the 
percentage of middle-class youngsters inhabiting state reform schools 
or detention centers didn't rise. The offenders incarcerated in state 
juvenile institutions are predominantly black, Hispanic, or econom­
ically disadvantaged whites.12 The youngsters in Massachusetts deten­
tion centers and reform schools supported the thesis that reform schools 
and detention centers are not for our own—for the sons and daughters 
of legislators, academics, judges, journalists, politicians, or any other of 
a host of middle-class parents. They are for others, though local stan­
dards may call for variations on who those others might be. 
One other thing characterized the many young people in the Mas­
sachusetts reform schools and detention centers: they were often prod­
ucts of the very programs set up to treat them—particularly the child 
welfare system. Early on in my administration, I brought in Joe Leavey 
as assistant commissioner for community-based programs. Joe had 
been an administrator with the Division of Child Guardianship, the 
state child welfare agency. As we walked through the institutions, Joe 
kept wandering off to this or that room. He was constantly getting 
52 / Going to Massachusetts 
hailed by the inmates. Joe knew too many by their first names. It was 
like old home week as he went up and down the hallways. Here were 
the alumni of child welfare. Our children were theirs. Theirs were 
ours.13 These kids were not the failures of a caring child welfare sys­
tem, but the perverse successes of a neglectful child welfare system-
its by-products. 
n
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6 WaitingRooms 
Roslindale 
The Judge Connelly Reception and Diagnostic Center was in the Ros­
lindale section of Boston. Built in the early 1960s as a centerpiece of 
reform, it stood hidden down a side road between a cemetery and a 
dump. In it were juveniles awaiting trial or transfer to a reform school. 
The kids had aptly dubbed the place "Rozzie"—a place of random 
punishment and occasional deliverance through identification with the 
aggressor—it produced sufficient dread among its inmates to guaran­
tee the obligatory macho overreaction, particularly in the strongest of 
the frightened. 
I drove out to Roslindale with Frank Maloney. We were met by Len 
Avery, the superintendent Frank had recently appointed. Len had 
worked for the Youth Service Board as an assistant superintendent 
following his retirement from the FBI. He was a big, soft-spoken man 
who kept his natural sensitivity to troubled youngsters subdued through 
a lifelong immersion in law enforcement ideology. He was naturally 
kind, but like so many graduates of the American Catholicism of the 
1940s and 1950s—people assiduously recruited by the FBI and the CIA— 
he was a true believer in the ideology of discipline which was the 
backbone of Roslindale. Nevertheless, Len was someone to depend on. 
He tried his best to carry out whatever reforms were proposed, and put 
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up with me in spite of his fear that I was an insufferable bleeding heart. 
He would never attempt to undermine me. 
Roslindale, originally designed with eighty-four small cells and four 
small dormitories, was rated to hold one hundred. It was filled to 
overflowing with boys eleven to seventeen years old. Len outlined the 
new intake procedures, educational programs, and gym repairs. Be­
cause of allegations of staff brutality, he was trying to make shift super­
visors more accountable. I sat through the presentation by Len and his 
assistants and congratulated them on the progress they were making. 
The scene reminded me of military briefings with its charts, projec­
tions, pointers, and so on. I tried to be polite and ask appropriate 
questions. Len then took me on a tour of the institution. 
As I walked the buffed floors, I soon saw that, despite the admin-
istration's efforts, the place was not much more than a giant, walled 
waiting room. The boredom was overwhelming. Rollo May was abso­
lutely right when he said that the opposite of love is not hate, but 
apathy. Going into a locked living unit, I was confronted with a hun­
dred or so mostly sullen boys dressed in institutional dungarees and T-
shirts. The boys were watched and ordered about by a coterie of gener­
ally young, bulky "masters"—virtually all of them political appointees, 
and most hardly above their charges socioeconomically. The halls got 
darker, dirtier, and smellier the farther we wandered from the front 
office. Individual cells didn't meet minimal standards. There was a 
small gym with a cement-backed tile floor (the source of many injuries) 
and a large empty swimming pool, now closed as a health hazard. All 
the horrors were there—the open, doorless, seatless toilets, the occa­
sional crying youngster, the pervasive stench of urine, the herding by 
size and age—all the accoutrements and routines of rabble manage­
ment, which occasionally produce the personal violence that revali­
dates the system. 
Some youngsters were locked in rooms in their shorts for punish­
ment or control. Their shoes stood outside with their pants and T-
shirts, which were wrapped in neat bundles. If this was not enough 
control, the more recalcitrant could be mechanically restrained in isola­
tion cells downstairs. At bedtime, usually 7:30 P.M. (for the sake of the 
staff), the boys were made to stand at attention outside their cell doors 
and were ordered to strip. Each was then inspected by a master, after 
which he could enter his locked cell for the night. The whole procedure 
was a cross between boot camp and a castration ritual. 
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There were no toilets or sinks in the rooms. "Head call" was held 
before the boys were locked in. They stood silently in lines along the 
walls outside the congregate Johns, waiting their turn to sit on an open 
seatless toilet to relieve themselves in full view of the waiting line. Each 
boy wiped himself with the number of toilet tissues dispensed by an 
observing staff member. Because many of the boys had serious emo­
tional problems, mattresses and floors were regularly soiled and soaked 
in urine and occasionally in feces. During the night, the more resource­
ful youngsters, rather than trying to rouse the slumbering staff mem­
ber locked in the control unit at the end of the long hall, would urinate 
out the barred window. On hot summer days the sides of the brick 
building reeked. 
The day I visited was barber's day, and I walked by the silent line of 
boys waiting to be shorn. This was in the heyday of the youth culture of 
the late sixties, when hair was of more than usual importance to kids. 
Each boy had most of his hair shaved off. Although the reason given 
was to prevent hair lice, the ritual served to brand the teenager as a 
Youth Service Board boy. Youngsters regularly cried during the ordeal, 
a response that seemed oddly satisfying to staff. My own thoughts 
went to the classic 1930s study by the University of Chicago sociologist 
Clifford Shaw in his marvelous Natural History of a Delinquent Career. A 
young man described the haircut he was given at the St. Charles Refor­
matory in Illinois. After it was done, he said, "I knew I was a criminal/'1 
Here and there was a youngster with a scarred face or a black eye— 
an accident or the result of some street altercation. Battle scars were 
routine at Roslindale, and not all were street wounds. Youths were 
herded into a classroom or gym for occasional activities, which served 
as a means for better institutional control. The ostensible purpose of 
schooling—education—was beside the point, but if a boy learned some­
thing along the way, all the better. 
I was told that the most dangerous youngsters in the state passed 
through Roslindale's portals. That statement was hard enough to be­
lieve on those first visits. When I left the state four years later, with 
more experience and knowing most of this group personally, it was 
even less believable. "Can you get out of here?" "Would you call my 
mother?" "What's Lyman like?" "I didn't do what they said I did." Such 
were the questions and hustles of these predictable settings. It was no 
chore to be taken in by a story. What neither the staff nor most of these 
youngsters understood—and what I probably couldn't explain—was 
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that being conned was never much of an issue with me. I think I knew 
when it was happening. If an adolescent in this strange place manipu­
lated or dissembled, it was only normal behavior in an incredibly 
abnormal setting. Although the staff constantly worried about being 
taken in, to me it hardly seemed crucial to call a youngster's bluff just to 
bolster my own ego. There's usually more risk to the integrity of the 
therapist than benefit in that technique. Awareness of that risk made 
me come to mistrust many of the so-called therapeutic community 
programs based on confrontation and group peer pressure. Too often 
they seem aimed at reassuring the therapists. 
Though about 8,000 young people went through Roslindale each 
year, Roslindale, like virtually every other youth detention center in the 
United States, didn't hold many violent youth, nor were many particu­
larly threatening. Though these deep-end delinquents provide the 
rationale for a massive national system of locking up juveniles, they 
seldom make up more than 3 percent of the institutionalized popula­
tion. This means that of the 80,000 to 100,000 youngsters in the nation 
who are locked in detention facilities and reform schools on any given 
day, only about 2,500 need to be in "secure" settings. In Massachusetts, 
the state with eighth-largest detention population in the Union, we 
lowered the daily population of our largest locked detention facility 
from 250 to twenty-five at no increased risk to the community. We could 
have lowered it to five or ten. 
Huntington Avenue 
The Detention Center at Huntington Avenue in Boston was our only 
facility exclusively for girls awaiting trial or placement, though there 
were girls in two other smaller detention facilities in western Mas­
sachusetts (Westfield) and in central Massachusetts (Worcester). The 
center bordered a busy thoroughfare on Huntington Avenue and looked 
like a deteriorating warehouse. It was a self-contained brick building 
with a large adjoining parking lot. Only by going around the building 
could one see the barbed-wire-topped security fence surrounding a 
tarmac yard, which clearly distinguished it as something more than a 
storage facility. 
Most girls at Huntington Avenue were awaiting transfer to the Lan­
caster Girls' Industrial School or an opening at Madonna Hall or the 
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House of the Good Shepherd. The old YSB had had ways to contract 
with private, nonprofit agencies. I learned fairly early on that I was 
expected to keep Madonna Hall, a Catholic girls' home, supplied with a 
given number of girls. The state house speaker's office would call my 
office if the population began to fall at Madonna Hall. We were expected 
to supply enough girls to keep the place solvent. At first I couldn't 
object, since their care and services, though rigid, seemed a cut above 
the services of the only alternative we had—the Lancaster reform school. 
Despite its rundown, grubby appearance, Huntington Avenue was 
kept in rigid order under a superintendent who tolerated no relaxation 
of control. Any mildly sassy girl found herself in isolation. Most girls 
came to Huntington Avenue for status offenses like truancy, incor­
rigibility, and running away—crimes which wouldn't have been crimes 
if they had been committed by an adult. This was a common pattern in 
the department. A large number of the boys were also charged with 
status offenses. After Congress passed the Juvenile Justice and Delin­
quency Prevention Act in 1972, a national effort was launched to re­
move status offenders from the juvenile justice system. It failed.2 The 
same kids were just relabeled as bona fide offenders and committed to 
detention centers and reform schools. 
A common ploy used by the juvenile courts was to order a truant to 
go to school, or a disobedient child to be home by 9:00 P.M. At the first 
day of school missed or the first 10:00 P.M. return home, the status 
offender became a delinquent in violation of a court order liable to 
juvenile corrections like any other. This procedure has recently been 
upheld and endorsed by a conservative California Supreme Court.3 
Huntington Avenue was a good example of overkill—control gone 
awry. Though we heard the routine myths about increasingly violent 
delinquent girls, we didn't see many then, and I haven't seen many 
since. Most were status offenders or other lightweight delinquents in 
need of individual care and supervision. From informal interviews, it 
was my impression that at least a third were victims of incest.4 As we 
began to relax things a bit, one of my new staff found a girl ordered to 
us as incorrigible on the complaint of her father, who brought his 
daughter to court when she stopped honoring his nightly request for a 
bed partner. 
As we walked along the narrow hallway of the admissions unit, girls 
peered out from isolation rooms—their faces pressed hard against the 
small scratched windows of the heavy security doors. Here and there a 
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door was ajar. Many wore hospital-type gowns and cloth slippers. It 
was hard to get a fix on why so many girls were in isolation. I'd seen it 
justified for escape risks or for young people who were violent man­
agement problems, but here girls were in isolation who, as best I could 
tell, were simply waiting for classification or placement. The phrase 
medical isolation kept popping up as a kind of official rationale meant to 
put the procedure beyond question, at least to a "layperson" like my­
self. Finally the nurse told me that each girl coming into the Huntington 
Avenue detention facility was locked in solitary for up to two weeks 
following the policy dictated by the physician in charge. In his view 
medical isolation was necessary to avoid the spread of venereal disease 
even in those cases where there were no allegations of sexual promis­
cuity. As part of this rite of entry, each girl was given a vaginal examina­
tion. Fd heard staff at the central office occasionally joke about "Dr. 
Goldfinger" at the Huntington facility. Now I knew what they meant. 
A virgin's hymen would frequently be broken during the exam—a prac­
tice which a study committee of the Harvard School of Public Health 
would later call barbaric. 
Despite their surroundings, the girls seemed giddily upbeat and 
verbal (though softly so), and they reached out for help and support. 
Those not locked in isolation were dressed in housedresses or smocks. 
They sat in small circles on the floor, whispering and playing jacks, a 
game I hadn't seen since the 1940s. The aura made me uncomfortable: 
infantilization with a tacky erotic quality. The girls called the female 
staff "Auntie"—adding their first names or initials—"Auntie B.," Auntie 
Alice," and so forth. Against the unvarying backdrop of neglect, isola­
tion, and occasional strong-arm handling was this fawning, clinging 
quality. Girls held onto and wound their arms around the necks of staff 
members who were as likely as not, in another instant, to lock them in. 
7 Warehouses 
The Boys3 Industrial School at Shirley 
A few days after my swearing-in, I began a series of trips around the 
state to visit the reform schools. Herb Willman, a staff member in the 
central office who was an ex-Army sergeant, offered to help me get to 
know the system. I felt an immediate affinity for him. He made me feel 
as if I were back in the Air Force again. Herb had been in the Youth 
Service Board for most of his working life, with time out for a stint in 
the service. He knew where most of the skeletons were buried, and I 
had the impression he'd also been on most sides of the issues affecting 
youth care in the YSB. 
It was natural that I gravitated toward Herb. He had the street smarts 
of a lot of NCOS I'd known in the military: they were masters at manip­
ulating young officers who were fresh to command but afraid someone 
might betray their incompetence. Experienced NCOS perpetually walked 
the thin edge between insulting a dumb new co and carrying him 
along. I'd been properly handled by a few such NCOS during my time in 
the military. But I'd learned a few lessons as well. The best technique 
was to allow someone to think he was using me while I learned as much 
as possible from him—and never openly to acknowledge the process. 
Both parties, of course, know what's happening, but it becomes a com­
fortable, even relaxing, game. My relationship with Herb had some­
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thing of that quality. During the hours of driving, he spun out anec­
dotes intended to advance his own agenda. I neither trusted the infor­
mation nor neglected it. Instead, I listened and filed things away. Herb 
was a great gossiper, and his evenings sometimes seemed to be taken 
up with phone calls to superintendents, cottage supervisors, and oth­
ers, listening, advising, passing on stories and rumors. His offhand 
comments and jokes were a good barometer as to how things were 
going, what problems were coming up, and what I'd best look out for. 
My first trip to Shirley Industrial School, more than any other, set me 
on the path that eventually led to my closing the reform schools. 
Shirley was about an hour's drive from Boston, near Leominster, Mas­
sachusetts. Many of the buildings dated from the late 1800s when 
Shirley had been a Shaker community. But as the celibate Shakers 
declined in numbers, they had no further need for such a large facility. 
The state acquired the property and added new buildings. There was a 
logic to all this: the industrial school was as Utopian a concept as the 
eccentric religious settlement. Shirley Industrial School was to be a 
place for retraining and teaching discipline and proper ways. Though it 
never worked very well for the inmates, it was if anything even less 
rehabilitative for the staff. Shirley traditionally held 150 to 200 of the 
oldest boys in the department. In earlier years, its Cottage Nine was 
also the end-of-the-line institution for obstreperous youngsters who 
were management problems in the other institutions. The YSB devel­
oped a special discipline program for these boys at Shirley. Later, it 
opened the Institute for Juvenile Guidance at Bridgewater to handle 
this hard-core population.1 
We drove slowly up the narrow road which circled a long central 
mall between lines of cottages facing each other. At the top stood the 
administration building. Behind it were the school and shops. It could 
easily have been a prep school or college campus. Lawns were neatly 
cut, flower gardens in place. It was really quite impressive. But I didn't 
see any boys. I asked, "Where are all the kids?" There had to be a 
couple hundred somewhere on the grounds. Herb's facetious reply was 
that they were stashed in tunnels under the quadrangle. "Where are 
the kids?" became a sick joke as we toured institutions. The more 
presentable the reform school, the less visible were its inmates—an 
inverse ratio between neatness and care. Like those who can't chew 
and walk at the same time, many state institutions find it difficult to 
maintain tidy institutions while giving personal care to the inmates. 
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This isn't universally true—most youth correctional institutions are 
both dirty and uncaring. 
On this first visit, I simply wanted to meet the superintendent and 
get the amenities over with. Instead Herb and I were ushered into a 
large room adjoining the superintendent's office. The superintendent, 
assistant superintendent, director of education, and chaplain sat around 
an impressive conference table. The flags, comfortable chairs, carpets, 
and paneled walls testified to a well-ensconced administration. I was 
given a presentation describing the types of boys in the institution, its 
programs, and building plans for the future. This was followed by a 
guided tour of the chapel, the school, the kitchen, and an empty 
cottage. 
I saw the auto repair shop (where the staff's cars were repaired), the 
upholstery shop (where the staff's furniture was reupholstered), the 
bookbindery (where the staff's books were rebound), the machine 
shop, and the dining hall—all the appendages of reform schools for the 
past century. I looked in on a vocational program and an empty cottage 
dorm. Then there was the arts and crafts room, where one is shown 
things "made by the boys themselves" as though this were an epoch-
making accomplishment, given their supposed deviance. (It's charac­
teristic of many institutions with captive inmates that the usually 
pathetic products of their arts and crafts programs serve only to rein­
force the outsider's perception of deviance in the inmate population. 
Walpole prison sold chokers made by the Boston Strangles Chillicothe 
prison in Ohio sells miniature electric chairs "made by the inmates 
themselves.") 
The boys I encountered were polite when spoken to. Otherwise they 
were mostly silent. The administrators were loudly off-the-cuff as we 
passed this or that inmate in a shop or classroom: a shouted "How we 
doing, Jimmy?" to a somewhat startled inmate sweeping a floor. "Did 
you get a chance to see your parole officer this week, Harry?" "How's 
the food, Billy?" The hail-fellow-well-met ambience was decidedly one-
directional, and I grew more uneasy, though I said nothing. After an 
hour or so, I thanked my guides for their time and apologized for 
having to leave so early, citing the need to visit the girls' reform school 
at Lancaster a few miles down the road. 
As we drove away from the administration building Herb pointed 
out Cottage Nine standing halfway down the mall. Since no one had 
mentioned it, I suggested we stop briefly. Herb hesitated. He didn't 
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think the superintendent would want us to visit this particular cottage 
unannounced, adding somewhat cryptically, "You're the boss, though/' 
That piqued my interest, and Herb knew it. He said he wasn't sure the 
staff on duty would let us in. 
We negotiated the steps of the old stone building, and Herb pressed 
the doorbell. After a long wait, a beefy, unsmiling master cracked open 
the heavy door and eyed us up and down. Herb was ill at ease, though he 
seemed to get something of a kick out of the whole scene, as if we were a 
couple of students breaking rules. He assumed an officious tone and an­
nounced that the new commissioner wanted to tour the cottage. We were 
ushered into a sparsely furnished room. The whole place was deathly si­
lent. The master picked up a phone and called the administration build­
ing. After a few mumbled words, he hung up and escorted us inside. 
There they were—about a dozen fifteen and sixteen-year-old boys 
with clipped heads and institutional garb sitting across from one an­
other, four at a table. Nothing was happening. There was no talk, no 
reading, no movement, nothing. They just sat with their hands folded on 
bare tabletops. Another burly master sat up front, blankly staring out on 
the sullen assemblage from behind a scarred desk. I said hello and got a 
grunt in response. A more talkative staff member came in from an 
adjoining hallway and struck up a conversation, explaining that this was 
rest period. The boys had just finished chores and would later be in­
volved in programs. He said a group therapy program was conducted 
every Wednesday or Thursday. A Boston psychiatrist, Irving Kaufman, 
met with individual boys as needed. The name resonated uncomfort­
ably. I had used Kaufman's material while working at various clinics in 
the Air Force. He was a nationally respected expert on character disor­
ders, a psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrist whose approach seemed 
unusually humane in a field not particularly distinguished by humane-
ness.2 I thought it odd that he would be a consultant here. 
I walked uneasily across the room to the boys sitting silently at their 
tables and asked a routine question: "What's your name?" I got a slight 
smile and a couple of whispered words—''James, from Lowell.'7 That was 
it. This was no place for banter. I was caught up in some sort of local 
drama. Everyone in the room seemed to hang onto whatever slight 
utterances might be exchanged. Talking seemed like a deviant act, and 
the silence overwhelmed my puny stabs at civility. I withdrew with the 
comment that I'd be back, and hoped to get to know them better. 
The more talkative staff member showed us the rest of the cottage. 
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There was a small kitchen, though food was apparently bused in from a 
central dining hall. Upstairs, I was shown the large dorm where the 
boys slept, complete with the fenced-in booth for the staff member who 
watched them. At the far end stood an open seatless toilet. As we 
headed back toward the stairs, I noticed a closed door across the hall­
way. I asked if we might see that area as well. There was a noticeable 
hesitation before the staff member ushered us into the "tombs"—a 
series of cement cubicles not quite reaching the vaulted ceiling of the 
old building. The coffinlike rooms were aptly named. I asked to look 
inside one. The master unlocked the steel mesh door, and there, on the 
floor, nude in the darkness of his own tomb, sat a sixteen-year-old. He 
was being punished for having caused a scene in the cottage a few days 
earlier. I asked our guide how long the boy would be kept in the tomb 
and was told it was usually a matter of days but could go on longer. I 
asked the boy his name. He approached the doorway, blinking at the 
light from outside, and told me his name and what he'd done to get 
himself confined. The hovering staff, and the prospect that any conver­
sation would get back to the silent room below, served to make me limit 
my remarks to the impersonal rituals and bureaucratic inanities which 
traditionally attend this kind of insanity. I wished the boy good luck 
and walked away as the master secured the door. 
We went downstairs again, past the roomful of cropped heads. I 
thanked the staff for showing me the facility and left without comment. 
I had to get out. I feared that the superintendent would arrive shortly, 
and I didn't want to meet him then. I didn't know what to say. As we 
drove away, I tried to sound detached, commenting that it was an 
interesting place. Herb said he didn't think I'd made a good impression 
by visiting Cottage Nine unannounced. I was less concerned with the 
impression I'd made than with an obsession that was beginning to take 
me over. Our tour had touched something that would make the reform 
schools my personal ghosts. 
The Girls9 Industrial School at Lancaster 
We left Shirley and drove the few miles down the road to Lancaster's 
Girls' Industrial School, which dated from 1848. The plain red brick 
buildings scattered about tree-lined grounds held about 150 girls. 
Buildings had been added over the years as the institution grew, but the 
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place had a certain sense of architectural integrity, giving the impres­
sion that, except for a few conveniences like phones, the buildings, 
offices, dormitories, and dayrooms were probably much as they had 
been in the mid-1800s. 
This was to be the most formal of visits. A staff person ushered us 
into a waiting room outside the superintendent's office. After a twenty-
minute wait (which seemed somehow appropriate to the occasion), 
Mrs. Van Waters, the superintendent, made her appearance. She was a 
proper, distinguished-looking woman who appeared to be in her late 
sixties. Though she was gracious, it was a studied, supremely con­
trolled graciousness. 
Mrs. Van Waters was a survivor. As the daughter-in-law of a famous 
Massachusetts prison reformer of the early 1900s, she had developed a 
close relationship with local community groups who supported her 
way of running the school. She suffered the occasional intrusions of the 
YSB central office into her programs without ceding any control to 
Boston. She'd kept the place pretty much incident-free. There were few 
escapes. The town of Lancaster considered the girls' institution as 
integral to it and was well pleased with Mrs. Van Waters' tenure. 
Mrs. Van Waters outlined the programs, describing some of the 
rather wild girls and their need to be resocialized to be proper ladies. 
After her presentation, we adjourned to the dining room and sat down 
at a long Victorian dining table, with Mrs. Van Waters at the head. Her 
foot touched a button on the floor under the table. A bell rang faintly in 
the next room, and presently a teenage girl appeared. She was dressed 
in a long pinafore smock and wore a cloth granny cap secured with 
elastic to cover her hair and ears. I felt as if I were caught in a time warp 
as the blushing girl served us. Mrs. Van Waters introduced her and 
asked her another of those pro forma questions meant not so much to 
be answered as to exhibit the youngster. 
After lunch, we were shown one of the cottages. Girls in frumpy 
housedresses and granny caps sat at tables knitting, sewing, and read­
ing. A couple wore something resembling a nightshirt. Apparently 
those girls were security risks. The place was mostly silent, though 
occasionally a girl would raise her hand and, following a nod from a 
matron, would run across the room to whisper in the ear of an "auntie." 
A few years later when I toured girls' reform schools in Tennessee and 
Texas, I learned, alas, that the girls there didn't call the matrons 'Auntie" 
but "Mommy," and in the case of male supervisors, "Daddy." 
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Like Shirley, Lancaster wasn't a place for spontaneous conversation. 
From reading the Children's Bureau report, I knew Lancaster had its own 
isolation unit hidden in the basement of one of the cottages. Unruly girls 
were placed in whitewashed brick basement rooms. As we left, I asked 
Herb if it was equivalent to Cottage Nine. He said he didn't think anyone 
would be in it, if for no other reason than that the administration knew I 
was coming. He suggested we defer visiting Lancaster's version of the 
tombs to another time. A few days later, I returned unannounced and had 
a maintenance man unlock the doors of the isolation unit. It was empty. 
The Lancaster Girls' Industrial School was a brick-and-mortar em­
bodiment of a pattern noted by the social historian David Rothman. 
Institutions sprang up in the United States in the Jacksonian period-
prisons, jails, mental hospitals, and reform schools—and were, in a 
sense, designed to re-create for the people of the mid-1800s the more 
disciplined world which had ostensibly spawned the American Revo-
lution.3 But memories falter and such re-creations can survive only 
inside institutional walls. Institutions are different. Inmates can be 
coerced into the most extreme caricatures our selective memories con­
jure up, giving us blessed, though false, reassurance. 
John Augustus Hall 
In a quaint twist of logic the department's institution for seventy-five 
to one hundred seven to twelve-years-olds was named for John Au­
gustus, a nineteenth-century Boston shoemaker who invented proba­
tion and devoted his life to keeping offenders out of institutions.4 The 
idea of sending a twelve-year-old, much less a seven-year-old, to a 
reform school seemed peculiar to me. It was a "liberal" Massachusetts 
reform school for toddlers. 
John Augustus Hall was the newest institution in the department. 
The modern building looked much like an elementary or junior high 
school. However, as soon as we set foot inside, it was clear this was no 
ordinary school. It was run by a kind of troika that showed the kinds of 
alliances Coughlan had forged with the legislature. The superinten­
dent, Paddy Creedon, was a benign gentleman in his fifties or sixties, a 
bachelor who lived in a room at the institution. He was often seen 
wandering up and down the hallways in slippers and nightshirt, check­
ing to see that the boys were tucked into their beds. His political con­
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nections came from the Worcester area. The Children's Bureau consul­
tant had been impressed by Paddy: "While . . . John Augustus Hall 
fails to meet many of the minimum staffing, program, and physical 
plant standards, it would be a gross disservice to the present superin­
tendent and staff to fail to state for the record that the institution is 
being operated in a compassionate and humane fashion/'5 
The assistant superintendent, Joe Kelly, seemed an equally friendly 
sort, but I had no way of knowing the friendly from the hostile during 
those first weeks. I had not yet learned to recognize the blarney which 
masks less-than-salutary motives. Joe's brother Walter, it turned out, 
was a member of the governor's executive council and had led the battle 
against my confirmation, so Joe had no reason to love me. The third 
member of the troika was the institutional psychologist, a woman in 
her fifties who spoke gushily about the "poor little boys" who peopled 
John Augustus. Though she did some psychological testing and, ap­
parently, some counseling, I didn't believe she was a clinician. 
Our guides took us on a quick tour of the institution. It was an 
architecturally updated version of Roslindale. The inmates occupied 
individual cell-like rooms with solid doors and steel bed frames. Unlike 
Roslindale, however, these rooms had toilets in them, though they were 
solid steel jail toilets without seats and with attached sinks. There were 
even isolation cells if a seven or twelve-year-old should get defiant. I 
had the impression, however, that they were rarely used. 
What had these kids done? Joe told a couple of war stories—the kind 
that would make a kiddy reform school seem reasonable—of a twelve-
year-old burglar who led older teenagers to follow him and an eleven-
year-old car thief who kept getting picked up because his head barely 
showed above the dash when he drove. That was about as bad as they 
got at John Augustus. But it was clear that the people who ran the place 
really didn't know why most of the children were there. They knew the 
offense, and occasionally they read probation reports or met a visiting 
family member. The personal and family tragedies which attended 
most youngsters who had landed in John Augustus were purely tan­
gential to running a clean, incident-free institution for little tykes. At 
best they were material for a good story. Less entertaining problems 
had a way of undoing the myth that John Augustus Hall was a happy 
place for youngsters wrested from ill-disciplined families. As I passed 
a pile of sheets lying on the hallway floor, a familiar stench greeted me. 
Most of these kids wetted or soiled their beds. 
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Joe invited us to have lunch in the staff dining room, a glass-
enclosed room off the main dining hall. Joe told us that this would 
allow us an opportunity to see the inmates. Shortly, seventy or so small 
boys with burr haircuts and striped T-shirts filed in and sat at tables. 
They were mostly silent, though a few words were exchanged. As we 
sat observing these children eating, we were served by the kitchen chef. 
Lunch was chow mein—-a glutinous plateful which appeared the same 
as what the kids were eating. After the first forkful my mouth was on 
fire. I looked across the table at Herb, whose face was turning shades of 
purple. The boys seemed to be having no trouble at all downing their 
chow mein, and I figured someone was trying to make some sort of 
point. We ate our chow mein, drank a lot of water, and said nothing. 
The Lyman School for Boys 
Lyman was the first reform school in the nation. It began with great 
hopes. As Massachusetts governor George Briggs said at its opening: 
Of the many and valuable institutions sustained in whole, or in part, from 
the public treasury, we may safely say, that none is of more importance, or 
holds a more intimate connection with the future prosperity and moral 
integrity of the community, than one which promises to take neglected, 
wayward, wandering, idle and vicious boys, with perverse minds and 
corrupted hearts, and cleanse and purify and reform them, and thus send 
them forth in the erectness of manhood and in the beauty of virtue, 
educated and prepared to be industrious, useful and virtuous citizens.6 
But Lyman strayed from these ideals. Jon Connearney and Robert 
Dellelo were in Lyman School as teenagers in the early 1950s. In 1970 
Connearney, at age thirty, was in Walpole State Prison for murder. He 
described his memories of Lyman to a reporter from the Boston Globe: 
"My first day there I talked in the dining room. I got 50 dollars. That's 50 
blows with a stick on your open palm. Makes it swell up good." Robert 
Dellelo, also in Walpole for murder, had vivid memories of being "drop­
kicked" like a football and learning to hate authority.7 Lyman was a 
testament to institutional longevity—an odd agglomeration of decrepit 
stone, brick, and wooden buildings scattered about low rolling hills. It 
had accumulated a century and a half's worth of annexes, tacked on to 
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reflect whatever changing ideologies the politics of the times dictated— 
from punishment to education to military training to vocational train­
ing to rehabilitation and back again. It routinely held between 250 and 
300 thirteen to fifteen-year-old boys. 
I was given the grand tour of the grounds, the school, the shops, 
various cottages, and the farm. As the afternoon progressed, the super­
intendent, Frank Ordway, kept referring to this or that beast, building, 
barn, or gym as his own— "my cattle," "my farm," "my pond/' He'd suc­
cumbed to the besetting temptation for wardens and superintendents, 
which afflicts competent and incompetent alike, whose chief symptom is 
a tendency to turn a state institution into a personal fiefdom. It infects 
those most perniciously who invest themselves in trying to develop 
effective institutional programs, a process which inevitably undoes it­
self. I think it has something to do with the overwhelming sense of 
futility one feels at seeing the failed products of the institution return 
again and again. One retreats to a benign acceptance of the inmates as 
flawed beyond hope, and focuses instead on having a spiffy facility. 
Lyman's administration was more humane than most. Frank and his 
assistant, Bob Brown, devoted themselves to trying to make the school 
responsive to its inmates. When I visited, I would almost always find 
them in the superintendent's office trading stories and discussing ideas 
for programs. But their innovations were no more than rearrange­
ments. This was Lyman's Achilles' heel: they couldn't get much be­
yond their institution. Even their community-based ideas were institu­
tionally bound, and the tie to the institution undid their efforts. In the 
midst of all their well-intentioned activity stood Lyman's discipline 
cottage, the stigma of failure. 
The U.S. Children's Bureau consultant had noted that, when he vis­
ited Lyman, more than 25 percent of the institution's population was in 
the discipline cottage. "This was regrettable inasmuch as the experience 
in the security program did not seem at all constructive to the consul­
tant." Noting that discipline seemed to place considerable stress on boys' 
polishing floors to keep busy, the consultant described a cell in the 
basement of the discipline cottage. "The only furnishings are a floor mat 
for each boy. Boys are placed in this area who need maximum control. 
When the consultant first came into the cottage there were at least six 
boys sitting next to each other on their mats. At the time of another visit 
to the cottage all boys had been removed from the cell so a boy sus­
pected of having syphilis could be placed there for isolation purposes/'8 
Warehouses I 71 
Frank Ordway was unhappy about the discipline cottage and peri­
odically shut it down. But after an incident, or because of staff pres­
sure, he'd reorganize and reopen it. I was forever being told that he 
planned to close the discipline cottage finally but it remained open 
well into my tenure. It had some illustrious alumni, among them Albert 
Di Salvo, the Boston Strangles9 
But despite this, Frank ran Lyman more creatively than the other 
reform schools were run. He tried to normalize Lyman. He and Bob 
thought it could be a home. But no home, at least no nonabusive home, 
would have a discipline unit where youngsters were forced to sit in 
silence for weeks or to scrub floors with toothbrushes a number of 
hours a day. No caring home would treat every youngster's defiance, 
sassiness, or running away in the same manner as every other. That is 
part of the dilemma of the institution. It must handle all inmates alike. 
To do otherwise undermines order. But now and then a child grabs 
normalcy even from the institution's repressive environment. 
Billy, a grinning, hyperactive fourteen-year-old, had spent long 
periods in discipline. He had no family and no prospect of one, but was 
forever looking for a home. He was a mascot at Lyman. With Frank's 
permission, Billy painted the walls of one of the unfurnished rooms in a 
crumbling old cottage. Late one afternoon, as I walked alone past that 
cottage, Billy came up quietly behind me. He pulled me by the arm and 
led me into the room. In colorful crude letters from ceiling to floor, he 
had written his favorite song. I read some of it aloud: 
Here comes the sun 
. . . and I say it's alright. 
. .  . It seems like years since it's been here 
It's alright—it's alright.10 
"Do you like it, Mr. Miller?" 
"Yeah." 
He smiled and folded his arms. 
The Institute for Juvenile Guidance 
Bridgewater's Institute for Juvenile Guidance (IJG) was what finally 
brought the Youth Service Board down. The abuse of inmates and the 
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public confrontations between the superintendent and the assistant 
superintendent were too much. But the IJG had begun as a major reform. 
It was the single locked institution set up by Coughlan to house violent 
and obstreperous youngsters away from all the other institutionalized 
teenagers in YSB. 
What about violent youth in correctional institutions? Inmates who 
end up confined to discipline units, holes, and segregation are not 
necessarily those who've committed the most serious crimes. Most 
cause management problems for the institution. They rebel, have prob­
lems of attitude, try to run away, goad cottage staff, or threaten to 
embarrass the administration. The paradox is that these harsh units are 
often filled with the institution's lesser offenders, the youngsters who 
most resist their own institutionalization. Chronic serious offenders 
usually succumb willingly to the demands of institutionalization. They 
are more likely to be alumni and to recognize the routines and the 
proper role of the inmate. They follow the axiom of the good con— 
"Keep your mouth closed, your nose clean, and do your time"—biding 
their time until they are poured back onto the street. An inmate's in­
stitutional "adjustment" is one of the worst predictors of later behavior. 
In its earlier years, Cottage Nine at Shirley sufficed for the perceived 
need for isolation, at least for the older boys. Though the brutality of the 
place was well known within the administration, no one said much. As 
time passed, however, even Cottage Nine wasn't a sufficient "ham­
mer." It held Shirley Industrial School together, but it wasn't enough 
to contain inmates from all the reform schools. A larger facility was 
needed. Though Bridgewater was meant to provide treatment beyond 
having youngsters scrub floors with toothbrushes or sit rigidly mute at 
tables, the new facility wasn't to be mollycoddling or permissive. It was 
a place to separate offenders, as Coughlan put it, "through restraint 
heretofore impossible."11 
State institutions were a cottage industry outside the town of Bridge­
water. It was already home to Bridgewater State Hospital—made infa­
mous by Fred Wiseman's controversial documentary, Titicut Follies. The 
IJG opened in 1955, two years after Coughlan took over the agency. Be­
tween 100 and 150 boys were to be housed in a large nineteenth-
century building with a yard surrounded by a stone and stucco wall. 
The building's history gives some insight into the survivability of these 
kinds of facilities. It had been a county farm, a men's prison, a place for 
defective delinquent women, and finally a warehouse for recalcitrant 
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teenagers. Shortly before I arrived, a seventeen-year-old parolee from 
the IJG was found hanging from a tree in the front yard of his home, his 
hands handcuffed behind his back. His death was ruled suicide. Staff 
commented that the boy had been kept in the same isolation cell his 
mother had occupied twenty-five years earlier as a defective delinquent. 
The scandals at the IJG were brought to Governor Volpe's attention in 
1966 following the publication of a highly critical U.S. Children's Bu­
reau report. It became a cause celebre of reformers, and when Lieuten­
ant Governor Frank Sargent became Massachusetts' chief executive in 
1969, he made cleaning up the IJG a priority. Feelings about the institu­
tion ran high. An influential citizens' reform group, the Committee for 
Youth in Trouble (CYT), formed around the scandals at the IJG, was 
unhappy with the attempts of the new superintendent, Bill Mac­
Donald, to salvage the place. The CYT touted professionalization— 
more psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers. MacDonald pre­
ferred to rely on trusted staff from within the department to ensure 
better management. He instituted new regulations and rules to ensure 
greater consistency, placing limits on using isolation and mechanical 
restraints. They did, however, continue to be used periodically. He 
began new programs and brought in tutors and a part-time psychiatrist 
to meet individually with some of the more disturbed boys. Things 
quieted down, and the IJG was off the front pages. 
Frank Maloney took me on my first visit to Bridgewater. I remember 
my shock at coming upon this rundown, gray-walled institution along 
a narrow country road outside the town of Bridgewater. It was an 
ominous-looking place, and I wondered what thoughts went through a 
youngster's head as he sat shackled in the back of the state van deliver­
ing him to this broken-down, God-forsaken slab of concrete and stuc­
co. A master came down to the front gate in the wall, opened it, and 
escorted us up to the central building. The IJG was decaying-—it had 
cracked walls, ceilings, and floors—as well as the familiar institutional 
stench, in this case smelling not so much of antiseptic or urine as of the 
cloying scent of Pine-Sol meant to cover the smell of bodily excretions. 
Maloney had appointed MacDonald superintendent, and he was 
anxious that I recognize MacDonald's progress. We sat in the superin-
tendent's office while he went over various charts outlining programs— 
tutoring, upholstery, bookbinding, and so forth. Then we had a quick 
tour, with emphasis on the newly painted walls in hallways and rooms. 
We met a few youngsters along the way—here and there in a classroom 
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with a teacher, or else mopping the floors. Though there was an occa­
sional smile, the smile looked like what one sees in a state mental 
hospital. 
MacDonald showed us the isolation unit, where youngsters had 
been kept stripped in unheated rooms. They had slept on the cement 
floors or been shackled to steel bed frames welded to the floor. He 
stressed that he was not using isolation anymore. The IJG was trying 
to be decent and effective. I wasn't immune to the self-deception. It 
would come to me later masked as reassurance that at last, after weary­
ing battles and bloody skirmishes, I had accomplished something. 
Such self-deception gives one respite, but it is the bane of true reform. 
The premise according to which the IJG operated was epitomized in 
the person of sixteen-year-old Jimmy, whom I first met in four-point 
bed restraint (hands and feet strapped spread-eagled to the bed frame 
corners). He had been tied down because of his verbosity and bad 
attitude. I got to know Jimmy well in the next four years. He became a 
symbol to me of what we were about, what we had done to our charges, 
and how difficult it would be to reclaim them. Eighteen years later I 
received a letter from Jimmy, who is now in the adult institution for the 
criminally insane at Bridgewater, still one of the most despicable insti­
tutions in the nation and not half a mile from the room where I first met 
him. A couple of weeks after the letter came, I got a call from a local 
radio station, followed by an inquiry from the White House Secret 
Service. Jimmy had escaped and given out as his intention the assassi­
nation of Vice President Bush. He was caught on his way to Washing­
ton and sent back to Bridgewater. 
Topsfield 
I had been in the state only a few days when the subject of Topsfield 
first came up. Chris Armstrong mentioned it almost as an aside follow­
ing my first meeting with the governor—"We've made arrangements to 
buy a convent on the North Shore to replace Bridgewater." Topsfield 
had been a Catholic convent and had stood empty for a few years as 
vocations declined. It was a well-maintained building that with some 
adjustments could probably be converted into an acceptable institution 
for up to a hundred youngsters. The problem was how to make it secure 
for the—ostensibly—most dangerous youngsters in the department. 
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Staff had reconnoitered the facility to see what would be required to 
bring it up to security standards. In those days relatively few such 
standards existed. The hardware-and-shackles crowd which now dom­
inates the American Correctional Association (ACA) had little interest in 
juvenile corrections. If we had had to meet current ACA standards, we 
would have produced a juvenile version of the "new generation" pris­
on touted in recent years by the U.S. Justice Department—concrete and 
steel behemoths combining the best of twentieth-century technology 
with the worst of nineteenth-century ideology. 
We hoped to make Topsfield reasonably escape-proof through pe­
rimeter double fences. The fact that the individual rooms didn't lend 
themselves to the kinds of security which characterized more tradi­
tional correctional architecture seemed to me an advantage. We would 
have to try something new. In the back of my mind was the hope of 
creating caring, therapeutic communities in the state's reform schools. 
Topsfield's inadequacies could be turned to advantage by making staff 
rely on program, one-to-one interchange, and personal involvement 
rather than electric doors and isolation. Eyeball and program security 
would be our watchwords. 
The idea was not that farfetched. Years later, I started other programs 
in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania for hard-core and violent young­
sters in which the hardware security was minimal, relying on staff-to-
inmate ratios for program security. These programs demonstrated the 
feasibility of unwinding from the overkill most juvenile corrections 
practices. The citizens of Topsfield, however, wanted no part of any 
correctional facility, traditional or otherwise. They just wanted to keep 
us out. A local opposition group formed headed by Jordan Patkin, a 
Cadillac dealer from Boston. 
After my first week in office, Frank Maloney introduced me to the 
Topsfield town selectmen. The meeting was chaired by a state senator, 
Bill Saltonstall, son of former U.S. senator Leverett Saltonstall. The 
selectmen took pains to conceal the meeting from the Topsfield citi­
zenry. We met in an almost deserted private club near Manchester. 
Despite this initial display of paranoia, the meeting was cordial. The 
selectmen were concerned that a scheduled town meeting, at which I 
was to defend the placement of dangerous delinquents in Topsfield, not 
get out of hand. There'd been threats, particularly from some residents 
who'd recently moved to the quiet, rural North Shore community-
Senator Saltonstall asked me to reconsider the plans to acquire Tops­
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field. I told him that not everything had been decided and that we were 
open to compromise, though I wasn't sure what shape it might take. 
New England is firmly wedded to its town meetings, and this was one 
to remember. About five hundred people showed up. The meeting was 
broadcast on the local radio station and presided over by the chairman of 
the board of selectmen. I gave a forty-five-minute apologia for our plans, 
pointing to the unacceptable conditions at the Bridgewater institution 
and the need to replace it. I tried to describe the inmates in some case-by-
case detail, expressing my hope that the people of Topsfield might get to 
know them, start volunteer groups and tutorial programs, regularly visit 
the institution, and help us work with these difficult young offenders. 
Though a few supported my position, most people were loudly 
hostile. After my presentation came the question period. The first 
query, which set the tone for the evening, was in the form of a state­
ment. It went something like this: "Someone ought to shoot you with a 
rifle." The elderly man who said this was roundly applauded amid a din 
of muffled boos and self-conscious laughter. The selectmen, true to 
their promise, kept order, reminding the audience that I was a guest 
and had not come to be tarred and feathered. Things settled down, and 
I thought I might even be making some progress—if in nothing else, at 
least in engendering a smidgen of guilt in some of the more liberal 
members of the audience. Questions and comments began to be pref­
aced with "I know you mean well, but" or "It's not that we have any­
thing against these boys, but," and usually ended in an offer to help me 
look elsewhere in the state to place the institution. 
The town meeting confirmed the conventional wisdom holding that 
local communities don't want prisons and jails in their own neigh­
borhoods. That is true as far as community-based facilities like halfway 
houses and day treatment centers go, but it doesn't always obtain when 
it comes to prisons, jails, reform schools, and detention centers. Com­
munities just as commonly vie for new correctional institutions.12 Most 
local leaders recognize the potentials of a large prison or reform school-
jobs, contracts with vendors of services, building and architectural 
services, and so on. But Topsfield was different. It was an old and 
secure community. Unemployment was not a problem. Even if it had 
been, I had the impression that the community would rather have had 
those who needed employment consider moving elsewhere. The incen­
tives which usually work toward acceptance of a reform school were 
absent in Topsfield. 
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But something else happened at that town meeting. As I stood there 
loudly defending our projected move from Bridge water to Topsfield, I 
realized that I didn't see the new facility in the same light as those in the 
department and in the governor's office. Up to then it hadn't occurred 
to me that we might scrap the very concept of an institute for juvenile 
guidance or that we could close Bridgewater without replacing it. I saw 
Topsfield as offering a modest chance for some new approaches to the 
troubled young people I'd seen at Bridgewater. But in the argument 
that night, I found myself concluding that, if we got the Topsfield 
facility, it would have to be something quite different from the simple 
maximum-security institution it would replace. I began privately to 
question whether that kind of facility was needed at all for most of the 
Bridgewater youngsters. As I drove home, I mulled over the possibility 
that the old convent might serve a different purpose. Perhaps it should 
be a small, fifteen- or twenty-bed open therapeutic community. Per­
haps it should even be a model program not unlike Lyward's Finchden 
Manor. 
As the weeks went by, the opposition from Patkin's pressure group 
got nastier. I was asked to come to meetings to discuss plans for the 
Topsfield institution. The group was less open to compromise than 
even the hostile speakers at the town meeting. Allegations were made 
that I, as a former Maryknoll seminarian, had arranged some quiet deal 
with the Maryknoll order, which owned Topsfield; that money had 
changed hands; that I intended to move the youngsters in during the 
middle of the night. Our last meeting was on my birthday. As Frank 
and I rode up the dark, winding road to the Patkin country estate, it 
seemed as if we were involved with some kind of pseudomilitary intel­
ligence network. We were met by men in trench coats walking about in 
the rain and fog, taking license plate numbers, and asking for identifi­
cation. The birthday cake Patkin's group had prepared only com­
pounded the unreality of the situation, and I was more stubborn than 
my embryonic plans justified. Things moved wholly into the realm of 
the fantastic a few weeks later, when I was walking around Boston 
Common during lunch hour and chanced to look up. There, written 
against the blue sky, was the name "PATKIN." I was dumbfounded and 
decided to keep this obvious hallucination to myself. I stole another 
quick glance. This time it read: "PATKIN CADILLAC." It was just an 
advertisement. So goes paranoia. 
But Patkin unwittingly did me a favor. His group doggedly opposed 
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us every step of the way, finally attaching itself to an issue which 
delayed our occupying the convent for several months. Though in 
years past fifty nuns had lived in the buildings with nary a murmur 
from the town, the sewage system was now judged inadequate for the 
same number of delinquent youngsters. I made a few unseemly re­
marks regarding discrimination in evaluating feces, but the environ­
mental problem delayed our coming to Topsfield. New tests and 
ground taps had to be made, new contracts signed, new approvals 
gotten. By the time all this was done, I had closed Bridgewater without 
sending any of the inmates to Topsfield. (Months later, I recommended 
Topsfield's use as a staff training center connected to a ten- to fifteen-
bed treatment program for youngsters with drug problems. We con­
tracted with a group to begin the program. It never got off the ground. 
Though a dozen or so youngsters lived there for a few months, Tops-
field mostly stood vacant during my tenure.) 
As it turned out, Patkin's group wasn't totally off base in its alle­
gations of financial hanky-panky in the purchase of the convent. A few 
weeks after my last meeting with Patkin, Frank Maloney and I were 
called before a closed session of the governor's executive council. To our 
surprise, we were berated by members of the council for having tried to 
''rook" the nuns. We had paid them a quarter million less than their 
asking price. We explained to the council members that we'd done our 
best to bargain and that the nuns had agreed to the lower offer. We 
thought we should be commended for getting the institution at a sav­
ings to the state. But that wasn't the way it worked. A couple of years 
later, a Boston Globe investigative team alleged that kickbacks (not in­
volving the nuns) had been arranged in connection with purchase of 
Topsfield.131 had wandered through this political minefield like a blind 
man. 
Brewster 
The Forestry Camp at Brewster was a bright spot in the state system. 
Its Outward Bound model—though much longer than the classic pro-
gram—in which kids spent a few months cleaning up the forest, 
seemed unusually humane next to the rest of our institutions. We 
eventually adjusted the program by shortening it and adding an after­
care component. My first response to the idea of a forestry camp was 
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mildly negative. What could a kid learn in the woods that had any 
relationship to his living at home or in the inner city? I'd missed the 
point. It was not a matter of learning marketable skills so much as it was 
an opportunity to succeed at something. Though the program was 
demanding, no one failed who tried. The peer support and the intense 
staff involvement all made for a satisfying experience. The Outward 
Bound philosophy—an unlikely mix of machoism and sensitivity—was 
made to order for many of the youngsters sent to us. Though there was 
little formal therapy, and problems weren't likely to be talked about in 
much depth, the atmosphere was caring. An evening campfire's shar­
ing of the day's rock climbing, hiking, or rappeling was probably as 
therapeutic as anything we could have given at that time, as later 
research demonstrated. 
The Outward Bound program inhibited recidivism, at least for a 
while. But after a youngster had been back in the community a few 
months, the positive results tended to get washed away. To sustain the 
good effects of the program there had to be solid aftercare and follow-
up supervision, a lesson that apparently is not easily learned. Fifteen 
years later, a book on another Massachusetts Outward Bound-like 
"boot camp" program on Penikese Island near Cape Cod bemoaned 
the poor success rates of its graduates, attributing failure to the depth 
of the youngsters' pathology and maybe even to their bad genes. The 
author had views of therapy as wrong as his sense of what the reforms 
in Massachusetts were all about.14 
The cantonment-type wooden buildings, the camping atmosphere, 
and the openness brought out the best in those who ran the forestry 
program, as well as in the boys sent there. There wasn't enough staff or 
hardware to allow the kinds of things which undermine good intentions 
in institutions. The young people had to be controlled and motivated 
through means other than intimidation or coercion. An overabundance 
of correctional armamentaria inevitably leads to deterioration in rela­
tionships. If the average suburban tract house were outfitted with an 
isolation cell, or if goon squads sat waiting in the parlor to handle 
unruly teenagers, a fair number of otherwise sane parents would, from 
time to time, make use of the available technology. Convenient coer­
cion is too tempting. Forestry's strength lay in its lack of facilities. 
Al Colette, the superintendent at Brewster, didn't agree. Through 
his contacts in the legislature Al got funds to erect permanent build­
ings, a large brick gym, and a dining hall at the forestry camp. I op­
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posed the appropriations. I felt it would move forestry back to being 
another institution. The neat, rambling old wooden buildings were 
part of the reason the place worked. The staff had to learn other ways to 
deal with a withdrawn or temporarily out-of-control youngster. After I 
left the state, Al got his appropriations. I hope he's proven me wrong, 
but I doubt it. 
Ill
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8 Finding a, Direction 
Competently administering a corrections system is of course a diffi­
cult task. Success is measured by a very peculiar set of criteria. Robert 
Hitt, the writer and researcher on state-run human service agencies, 
has put the qualifications succinctly. You are a successful state admin­
istrator if you (1) keep staff happy; (2) stay within your allocated bud­
get; and (3) avoid untoward incidents (escapes, suicides, riots, blatant 
incidents of abuse) which might come to public attention.1 None of 
these has much to do with the purposes of the agency—rehabilitating 
offenders, deterring crime, making the streets safer, or whatever. But in 
corrections, the goals of the agency are mostly irrelevant. 
Correctional reform in this country of lawyers and management 
experts has taken the form of setting minimum standards and ensuring 
that rules and regulations are well written and properly promulgated 
and enforced. Ignoring the possibilities of more basic reform, these 
actions try to mitigate abuse. Through a variety of suits on conditions 
in institutions, most states are under court order about or supervision 
over conditions in prisons and jails. Looking at the results, one wonders 
whether the effort was worth it. Court decisions have no doubt moder­
ated harsh prison conditions and softened some of the grosser bru­
talities. The court's involvement, however, has simultaneously served 
to reinforce reliance on the failed institutional model as our primary 
correctional response to crime. 
83 
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Any halfway intelligent corrections administrator can use a lawsuit 
to cajole reluctant legislators into voting higher budgets for more staff 
and buildings. And that's precisely what has happened in the United 
States over the past twenty-five years. Court-ordered reforms are even­
tually swallowed by traditional correctional ideology. Reforms directed 
at meeting minimum standards through regulatory procedures end up 
driving the same vicious cycle that brought about the original prob­
lems. New institutions are built to meet court-ordered standards. They 
soon become overcrowded. More lawsuits follow, then more prisons, 
more guards, and more hardware. In a warped and minimal way, it 
works well for all concerned. The inmates (most of whom wouldn't be 
in prisons or reform schools if the same funding had been made avail­
able for alternatives), get minimal standards for a while. Lawyers and 
federal masters get a virtually unending source of funding for their 
efforts. Prison administrators and sheriffs get more buildings and staff. 
And politicians get to scream about being tough on crime while more 
criminals are created in the correctional system and crime rates rise, 
refueling the whole cycle. This is reform based on minimum standards 
and efficient administration. Had these standards been our goal in 
Massachusetts, the reform schools would be more numerous, bigger, 
and more firmly ensconced in the political structure than ever . . . and 
by now undoubtedly overflowing with children. 
At first I had no specific agenda, only hazy ideas. I wanted to stop the 
brutality and lessen the harm we were doing, and I hoped to challenge 
some traditional correctional approaches to young offenders. That seemed 
like enough. But these modest goals turned out to be much harder to 
achieve than the more radical step of closing the institutions. My experi­
ence corroborates Margaret Mead's comment that, in the late twentieth 
century, massive change would be easier than incremental change. 
Reform legislation had laid out a structure, a series of administrative 
positions and bureaus. It didn't mandate deinstitutionalization, and I 
didn't intend to start it. At most the legislation called for professional­
ization of the department. The U.S. Children's Bureau report which 
provided the impetus for the reform called for civil service tests for em­
ployees and more professional caseworkers, clinical psychologists, and 
psychiatrists. It recommended restrictions on overuse of isolation and 
less severe discipline practices—and more structured institutional pro­
gramming. Perhaps the best example was its approach to John Augustus 
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Hall, the reform school for seven to twelve-year-olds. Not pausing to 
question the concept behind this bizarre facility, the Children's Bureau 
report merely asked for its professionalization: "The long range goal for 
an institution of 80 boys would be a half-time psychiatrist, a half-time 
psychologist, three full-time caseworkers, and a social group worker/'2 
Similarly, when confronted with the Shirley Industrial School which, 
according to the report, "exudes an atmosphere of defeat and nega­
tivism," the suggestion was to appoint a "qualified" person to bring in 
specialized services. This after making note of Cottage Nine's tombs, 
the silence, and the fact that the outdoor play area had not been used 
"since a boy escaped by going over a fence more than a year ago."3 The 
reform schools would stay, but would be properly run and accredited. 
Community-based programs were seen as additional resources rather 
than as replacements for the institutions. 
As I traveled from meeting to meeting it became clear that most 
wanted to hear the same things—qualified staff, new facilities, better 
salaries, better classification, better isolation hardware, perhaps uni­
forms, stainless steel toilets with sinks attached, staff training in tech­
niques for subduing aggressive teenagers, and more emphasis on 
teaching discipline to the recalcitrant. These are the pronouncements 
one routinely hears, for example, from the leadership of the American 
Correctional Association—the old boys club of present and former 
guards (now risen to administrative positions), right-wing academics, 
and construction developers which speaks for professional corrections 
in this country. It's as if standards for the practice of medicine were 
being dictated by a cabal of semiskilled nineteenth-century barbers. 
Though my policies changed with events, a direction eventually 
emerged for me. To borrow a phrase from Robert Theobald, I had not so 
much a map as a compass.4 We were mapping uncharted territory as 
we made our way. It couldn't be otherwise, for no one had been there. 
But the reasons for change were often embarrassingly personal. Again 
and again I altered plans in response to the presence of some boy or 
girl. They were always catching me up in the hurtful conundrums 
created by the agency I headed, even as I was trying to keep a lid on the 
upset caused by meddling in reform school affairs on behalf of some 
youngster. But I was getting an education of sorts. As I beat this or that 
tactical retreat, I found myself reconnoitering the institutions and their 
administrations, looking for points of vulnerability, and finding a few 
allies among the generally hostile or apathetic staff. 
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My visits convinced me that I couldn't claim the institutions as my ter­
ritory. Over the months I grew more alienated. My frustration was com­
pounded by legislators, investigative committees, professional groups, 
and an edgy governor's staff communicating an imperfectly muffled 
faintheartedness which occasionally rose to thundering threats: "Don't 
move too fast/' "Be sure to touch all the bases." Sometimes the message 
was a less benign: "You'll be lucky to last ninety days." "We'll have you 
in jail before this is over." Or even this: "I'll flush you down the toilet." 
What we did was characterized by some as radical correctional re­
form. Indeed, the Boston Phoenix called me the only anarchist to run a 
state agency. I didn't consider myself either radical or an anarchist. I had 
been an Air Force officer, I had been educated in Catholic schools, I was 
not given much to worrying about class struggle. I had no grand scheme 
or ideology for reforming youth corrections, and I was as wary of doc­
trinaire explanations for crime and delinquency as I was of recipes for 
treatment, whether concocted from the narrow nosologies of the psychi­
atric professions or derived from the grand social and economic theories 
in vogue among left-wing criminologists. My views were conditioned 
mostly by clinical experience. This cast me as a liberal incrementalist, a 
person frightened of confrontation, willing to spell out lofty goals but 
unwilling to move toward them without majority support before the 
fact. Radical sociologists pretty much dismissed what we were doing. 
Only after we had finally closed the institutions did they pay much 
attention, and then it was to discount as basically irrelevant whatever we 
might have accomplished, calling it a classic liberal reform that ignored 
the economic roots sustaining the institutional tradition. 
After a few months in office, I was invited to speak to a citizens' 
group made up mostly of angry Harvard students and leftist hangers-
on who, as was their worit in the early seventies, were briefly hobnob­
bing with the oppressed working class from the rowhouses of Somer­
ville and outer Cambridge. The group wanted to know what I intended 
to do about the state's reform schools. When I said I wanted to do better 
by individual youngsters, the audience was in near riot. At my sug­
gestion that by going kid by kid I hoped we might actually reduce the 
populations of some reform schools, I was all but hooted off the stage. 
Most of these politically involved students could not have cared less 
about knowing an individual youngster unless he or she was a good 
follower. When, in frustration with staff, I hired some radical university 
students to work in one of our institutions, I soon found them knock­
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ing youngsters off the wall with alacrity, matching blow for blow the 
presumed fascists who traditionally worked the floors. There were 
exceptions: Toby Yarmolinsky, for example, who at times seemed to be 
wherever I needed help, and Jim Kunen, who had recently written The 
Strawberry Statement and who came as a conscientious objector to teach 
the girls at Lancaster. Both were totally committed and unthreatened 
by the difficult youngsters with whom they worked. 
Setting Wide Goals 
I hoped that certain small actions of mine might carry wider implications 
for social change. My workaday approach was more at home with the 
ideas of social reform laid out by the British conservative philosopher 
Karl Popper, who distinguished between "utopian engineering7' and 
"piecemeal engineering." Attributing Utopian planning to Platonist think­
ing with all its authoritarian implications, Popper explained it this way: 
The Utopian approach may be described as follows. Any rational action 
must have a certain aim. It is rational in the same degree as it pursues its 
aim consciously and consistently, and as it determines its means accord­
ing to this end. . . . Only when this ultimate aim is determined, in rough 
outlines at least, only when we are in the possession of something like a 
blueprint of the society at which we aim, only then can we begin to 
consider the best ways and means of its realization, and to draw up a 
plan for practical action.5 
Popper contrasted Utopian engineering with what, in an unfortu­
nate phrase, he calls piecemeal engineering. 
It is an approach which I think to be methodologically sound. [The 
planner] may or may not have a blueprint of society before his mind, he 
may or may not hope that mankind will one day realize an ideal state, 
and achieve happiness and perfection on earth. But he will be aware that 
perfection, if at all attainable, is far distant, and that every generation of 
men, and therefore also the living, have a claim; perhaps not so much a 
claim to be made happy, for there are no institutional means of making a 
man happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. 
They have a claim to be given all possible help, if they suffer. The 
piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, 
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and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather 
than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good. . .  . It is 
the difference between a reasonable method of improving the lot of man, 
and a method which, if really tried, may easily lead to an intolerable 
increase in human suffering. It is the difference between a method which 
can be applied at any moment, and a method whose advocacy may easily 
become a means of continually postponing action until a later date, when 
conditions are more favorable.6 
Popper, of course, spoke mostly of geopolitical issues, of doctrinaire 
Marxism and Fascism. But the model is just as apt for the discrete 
elements of political entities, including the structuring of youth correc­
tions. Whereas Utopian experiments must be on a large scale and 
must involve the whole of society if they are to be carried out under 
realistic conditions . . . piecemeal social experiments can be carried out 
under realistic conditions, in the midst of society, in spite of being on a 
"small scale," that is to say, without revolutionizing the whole of society. 
In fact, we are making such experiments all the time. The introduction of 
a new kind of life insurance, of a new kind of taxation, of a new penal 
reform, are all social experiments which have their repercussions through 
the whole of society without remodeling society as a whole.7 
This was precisely what I hoped to accomplish: the amelioration of 
individual suffering and the bringing about of small changes which 
would carry wider repercussions without demanding the whole society 
to change first. It was a minimalist approach, the small, unadorned 
specific containing larger implications—the "unadorned specific" in 
this case being a young offender for whom I was, for a time, responsi­
ble. I felt closest to the conception of William James, "The trail of the 
human serpent is thus over everything/' 
Making Small Actions Count 
The work of the American sociologist Neil Smelser had provided the 
framework for my doctoral thesis a decade earlier. Building on theories of 
Herbert Blumer and Talcott Parsons, Smelser developed a model within 
which to consider any social action. It had four components: values, 
norms, roles, and situational facilities. Smelser described them as follows: 
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(1) the generalized ends, or values, which provide the broadest guides to 
purposive social behavior; (2) the regulatory rules governing the pursuit 
of these goals, rules which are to be found in norms; (3) the mobilization 
of individual energy to achieve the defined ends within the normative 
framework. If we consider the individual person as actor, we ask how he 
is motivated; if we move to the social-system level, we ask how motivated 
individuals are organized into roles and organizations; (4) the available 
situational facilities which the actor utilizes as means; these include knowl­
edge of the environment, predictability of consequences of action, and 
tools and skills.8 
Smelser posed four questions: What values legitimize action? Which 
norms ensure that action is coordinated and kept relatively free from 
conflict? How is the action structured into roles? What kinds of situa­
tional facilities are available? He arranged these four components into a 
hierarchy and explained his scheme as follows: 
As we move from top to bottom, we approach components which are 
progressively less central to the integration of the social order. A change 
in values will demand changes in norms, roles, and situational facilities. 
But the same logic does not apply by reading up the hierarchy from 
bottom to top. . . . Changes in the basic values entail changes in the 
definition of norms, organization and facilities. Changes in norms entail 
changes in the definition of organization and facilities, but not values. 
Changes in organization entail changes in the definition of facilities, but 
not norms or values. Changes in facilities, finally, do not necessarily 
impose any changes on the other components.9 
It was put more simply by Blumer, who described the successful agitator 
not as the person who comes into town and challenges the system, 
proposing radical action or change, but as the one who asks the ques­
tions that lead others to reflect on the situation and change its definition. 
Traditional reforms in corrections are directed to the more specific 
levels of Smelser's hierarchy—situational facilities and occasionally roles. 
Such actions are concerned with matters like improving staff skills, 
building new buildings, and creating new programs which won't threat­
en institutional routines. Such reforms assiduously avoid anything that 
might affect values and norms. Even the most brutal institutional sys­
tems can absorb reform if it is confined to such things as management 
procedures. Smooth management is as crucial to inhumane systems as it 
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is to humane systems. Perhaps the best example of this kind of reform 
was the introduction of the so-called control model into the Texas prison 
system in the 1960s. An efficiently run system of minute rules, unbend­
ing regulations, and obsessive accountability, it was violent to its core. 
The values which countenanced depersonalization and chronic abuse of 
inmates were left untouched. Things were simply managed better.10 
This seems to be the goal of contemporary corrections. 
Here, for example, is how the ACA viewed standards for the use of 
isolation in juvenile training schools. First, the rule book—setting the 
line across which you dare not cross-—which contains all chargeable 
offenses, breaches of institutional rules, ranges of penalties, and disci­
plinary procedures is posted in conspicuous and accessible areas. 
Then, for major violations, a youth may be placed in isolation for 
twenty-four hours. "Confinement for periods over 24 hours is re­
viewed every 24 hours by the administrator or designee who was not 
involved in the incident." If this doesn't work, one can escalate to 
"security room confinement," commonly known as "the hole." The 
ACA recommends the keeping of a log with name, date, and reasons for 
confinement. If the breach of the rule can be interpreted as a crime, the 
ACA recommends reporting it to the local prosecutor for charging and 
trial.11 This is not so much wrong as it is irrelevant. It's the rational 
approach for the large institution, but it has no place in the rehabilita­
tion of already alienated youngsters. 
There are simpler ways to regulate the use of isolation. I eventually 
made it a rule that whoever ordered a youngster into isolation should 
sit in the isolation cell with him until his release. This seemed appropri­
ate, given the purportive rationale for isolation—to allow the youth to 
calm down. The rule effectively stopped use of isolation. 
Of Symbols and Gestures 
Because of their symbolic meanings, certain very small acts can shake a 
system from top to bottom. I sought less to avoid conflict than to take 
small actions which made others rethink the values that were at the 
source of the conflict. Our small actions challenged the values which 
justified the reform schools and detention centers. The values were 
ambiguous, even contradictory (Should we punish or rehabilitate? 
Can we do both?). Even questioning them created hyperambivalence, 
Finding a Direction I 91 
weakened norms, and blurred roles. It was no recipe for smooth man­
agement, but management wasn't my purpose. I wanted to assure that 
the day-to-day decisions I made would challenge others to question the 
premises sustaining the reform schools and detention centers. Training 
staff in new methods of supervision or therapy techniques, reorganiz­
ing the department, and reclassifying the youngsters wasn't likely to 
have much lasting effect without a reordering of the goals and values 
behind the actions. I therefore began scrutinizing actions for their sym­
bolic power and for their potential for reverberating across the spec­
trum of action outlined by Smelser. 
I looked for issues which touched the reason behind the institutions' 
existence but which could be contained in an individual youngster. The 
rationale underlying corrections is the violent, irredeemable offender 
or intractable delinquent. The whole system rests on those difficult and 
dangerous youngsters at the deep end. If they weren't there, there 
would be no need for the system. Violent and dangerous youth became 
my symbol. If I could do something decent and humane with these 
most threatening delinquents, then the whole system would be shaken. 
If we didn't isolate and abuse the intractable we weren't likely to in­
stitutionalize a simple burglar. If we didn't institutionalize a burglar, 
we couldn't very well institutionalize a truant or a runaway. 
This decision to focus on the deep end led inexorably to the Institute 
for Juvenile Guidance and Cottage Nine. They contained the "worst," 
most difficult, least likely to succeed, and most militantly rejected 
juveniles in our system. I would change the way we dealt with these 
"dangerous" inmates first. I would demonstrate that we could listen 
to, understand, assist, treat, and care for those least deserving delin­
quents. Doing things differently with these youngsters would demand 
that we address the values justifying our system. The strategy was to 
undermine the whole institutional system. Our reforms would be ac­
complished in precisely the opposite way from most reform in correc­
tions. We would go first to the deep end. 
Undoing the Silence Rule 
The superintendent of the Shirley Industrial School was an avuncular 
man who'd been in the department for more than thirty years. He had 
nurtured close relationships with the community and commanded 
92 / Reforming Reform Schools 
unusual loyalty from the staff. But beneath the administrative tidiness 
and high staff morale, the place occasionally slipped into near barba­
rism in handling recalcitrant youngsters. It didn't take more than a few 
weeks to see that the administration wouldn't support even my most 
minimal suggestions for change. Though the superintendent voiced 
his support, I sat in frustration as my puniest recommendations were 
undone. I concluded that, so long as he occupied his office, not much 
was going to happen. I couldn't attack him head on. He was a decent 
man at least twenty years my elder. It would have been an unseemly 
display, and I would have lost. But as conditions at the school deterio­
rated and incidents multiplied, I hit on an option. Browsing through 
the red book of personnel rules and regulations, I discovered that 
though I had no power to remove administrators, I could send them on 
leave for health reasons. I suggested he take some time off at full salary. 
He had heart problems and in the past had wintered briefly in Florida. 
He took my offer, and with his departure the staff lost their champion. 
The assistant superintendent was another problem. He'd been at 
Shirley for more than a decade. Though he presented himself as an 
agreeable person, he was the hammer who enforced rules and reg­
imens quickly and harshly. This sort of role splitting is common in 
penal institutions. To get a fix on a prison, a jail, or a reform school, it's 
often more useful to look past the top dog to the second in command— 
an assistant warden or a deputy for operations. Somewhere on that 
level one usually finds the enforcer who holds the place together by 
delivering on the implicit threats, never far below the surface in institu­
tions. It's not unlike the administrative structure of some public high 
schools. 
The assistant superintendent was a charming enough man. His major 
complaint was that the boys weren't institutionalized long enough for 
the discipline to have its effect. This is a common lament among institu­
tional administrators, notwithstanding the fact that the longer an inmate 
stays, the less likely he or she is to make it on the streets. The assistant 
superintendent wasn't shy about his philosophy of treatment. As he 
told me in an unguarded moment, "You have to totally break a delin­
quent boy—break him down." I mentioned this later to Irving Kauf­
man, the consulting psychiatrist to Cottage Nine at Shirley. He shook 
his head—"What kind of people are these?" The surprise of this emi­
nent clinician regarding what went on in a building he had visited 
weekly really disconcerted me. The well-known child psychiatrist and 
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writer Robert Coles had likewise been a consultant to the Lancaster 
Girls' Industrial School. Coles later wrote of Lancaster, "The place 
wasn't as bad as some of its critics would allege." These professionals 
seemed to lose their bearings when they were absorbed into the reg­
imens of total institutions. 
Our problems seemed to be no one's fault. There were no convenient 
scapegoats. The keepers were as much victims as the kept. Staff were 
so wedded to institutions that I took it for granted that those who 
eventually supported me probably compromised their own integrity in 
the process. Most lay back and waited. But I was obsessed with other 
things. Late one evening, I stopped by Cottage Nine again. It was the 
same scene I'd witnessed on my first visit—sullen boys, hands folded 
in front of them, facing each other over scuffed square tables. Nothing 
else was happening—no talk, no reading, no television, no movement, 
no programs. A burly master sat up front. A torn magazine something 
like the Police Gazette lay on his desk. The atmosphere was heavy with 
violence and made eerie by the numbing silence. 
I pulled up a scarred chair. "What's your name? Why were you sent 
to us?"—The words resonated across the silent room. A long pause, 
then a few words slipped through the clenched teeth of a thin, dark-
haired youngster who was smiling ever so slightly. "I'm Joe Kerry. I 
stole some tires out of this guy's garage." Having broken the ice, I 
pursued things a bit more. "Why are you in Cottage Nine?" Smirks 
broke out around the silent table, and there were quick glances to the 
front of the room, where the master sat looking at us with a fixed stare. 
I was beginning to feel as much a ward as a commissioner. The fifteen-
year-old muttered, "I tried to run away from here." I thought to myself, 
I'd probably try to run away from here, too. I tried conversing briefly 
with each of the twenty or so boys over the next couple of hours. Each 
boy was about as forthcoming as a paranoid personality being publicly 
interviewed in the auditorium of the CIA—and not surprisingly, given 
the surroundings. 
I took another quick trip upstairs. There were a couple more young­
sters in the tombs. I asked the guard to open the doors so I could chat 
briefly with those inside. One boy was there for having yelled in Cot­
tage Nine, another because he'd tried to escape. They would now 
spend a set number of days in the tombs, followed by more weeks in 
Cottage Nine. I later learned that this could go on for months and even, 
in some cases, for a year or more. 
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As I drove home, I mulled over what to do next. Why not simply 
close Cottage Nine down? But it was the threat which kept youngsters 
in line on the larger campus, and its symbolism resonated throughout 
the department. Closing it would probably destabilize Shirley. I de­
cided to wait. It was a mistake. I should have followed my first impulse. 
In the following weeks, as I made unannounced visits to Bridge­
water, Shirley, and Roslindale, other unsettling facts emerged. There 
was an even darker side to these places. I was told that a local state 
trooper to whom the task of returning runaways to Shirley had fallen 
dreaded bringing the boys back. As he walked away from Cottage Nine 
after dropping off a handcuffed or shackled teenager, he could hear the 
shouts and moans, part of the intake at the tombs. 
As certain staff grew more relaxed at seeing me so often, they were 
less guarded in their comments about the need to "hit the little bastards 
for distance/' Programs consisted of such things as kneeling in a line in 
silence, scrubbing the floors with toothbrushes, or being made to stand 
or sit in odd, peculiarly painful positions. Having spent some time in 
the service and having counseled a few hundred young men from the 
Army, the Air Force, and the Marines, I was aware of some of the odder 
aspects of basic training. But the regimen in Massachusetts reform 
schools was not basic training. It was a demeaning ritual: an exercise in 
symbolic castration with no resolution. In their perverse way, these 
bizarre practices defined the whole system. 
Then there was the silence. It's not that I don't respect quiet. I have 
fond memories of my silent year in the Maryknoll novitiate, which I 
spent on a farm along the river near Bedford, Massachusetts. Except 
for Compline, Sext, Matins, and Lauds, we spoke hardly at all. Occa­
sionally, conversations were allowed, but they were relatively rare. 
That had been a time for thoughtful reflection. Reform school silence 
was quite something else. 
When I asked an administrator why the boys didn't talk, he replied 
with a straight face, "They don't want to talk." When I sat at a particular 
table the inmates at the other tables would whisper softly to one 
another, producing a whirring sound, an odd white noise that pre­
vented our words from being understood by the staff. "Why doesn't 
anyone talk around here?" I'd say. "Because they'll beat your ass." 
Other things began to happen, too. If a cottage supervisor saw me 
talking to a particular youngster, that boy was singled out for grilling 
after I left. This lengthened my visits considerably, because I had to talk 
Finding & Direction I 95 
with every boy every time I visited. That way no one could know who 
said what. One by one we'd go into the small lobby of the building and 
close the door into the cottage to get some semblance of privacy. 
If Cottage Nine was the linchpin of the Shirley Industrial School (and 
in some ways of all our reform schools), the silence rule was what held 
Cottage Nine together. If these " worst" delinquents could be allowed 
to talk, it would resound throughout the institutions. But first, I had to 
establish that there was a silence rule in Cottage Nine. To anyone 
unaccustomed to correctional bureaucracies, this might seem simple 
enough. It wasn't. No staff or administrator would admit that there was 
enforced silence. "Well, if that's the case, there should be no problem 
with the boys speaking in Cottage Nine." "No, none whatsoever," was 
the reply of the superintendent, seconded by the assistant superinten­
dent and the director of education. After a meeting like this, I'd traipse 
down to Cottage Nine and inform inmates and staff that there was no 
silence rule. It was all a misunderstanding. They could talk. There'd be 
a slight hubbub, and I'd leave. When I happened back in a day or two 
. . . dead silence. 
We actually had prolonged meetings in the impressive conference 
room adjoining the superintendent's office to establish whether a si­
lence rule did or did not exist in Cottage Nine. The administration 
denied its existence. I replied that the youths in the cottage said that 
there was indeed a rigid rule and that if they broke it, they were beaten 
or put into the tombs. "Nonsense," was the reply. "Well then, it might 
be helpful to post a memo in the cottage, noting this fact." "But that's 
not necessary. There isn't any silence rule." Round and round we went. 
A few weeks later, after a particularly grueling exchange, the direc­
tor of education got carried away. Even the inmates acknowledged how 
helpful Cottage Nine was. He plopped a questionnaire down on the 
conference table—a poll of the Cottage Nine boys—as proof. It was an 
"I like Cottage Nine because" study. I picked up the two-page question­
naire and absentmindedly scanned it while the discussion continued. 
There it finally was, on page two: "I think the silence rule is "helpful," 
"mildly helpful," or "not helpful." At last, acknowledgment that there 
was a silence rule. Reform then became a possibility. 
Cottage Nine had characterized Shirley for a long time in other 
ways. I'd heard from the inmates about sadistic discipline: having to 
drink from toilets or kneel for hours on the stone floor with a pencil 
under one's knees. One morning my secretary dropped a dog-eared 
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letter-size manila file on my desk. A note on the file read, "You might 
find this interesting/' The file contained case summaries for boys in 
Cottage Nine. These were internal investigations which were kept 
"inside." 
"Donald, 16, beaten on the soles of his bare feet with straps." "Wal­
ter, 16, handcuffed for 22 days and nights when returned from escape. 
He was forced to sleep and eat with the handcuffs on." "Charles, 17, 
padlocked to water pipe, given a cold shower for six minutes." There 
were descriptions of the bastado. A boy's feet were strapped to a bed 
frame and beaten on the bare soles with wooden paddles or the wood­
en backs of floor brushes. I also learned why the escape rate at Shirley 
had at one time been so low—one year there'd been only one or two 
runs from the institution. After being returned to Cottage Nine, the 
escapee's ring finger was bent back across the top of his left hand until 
the finger broke. 
Staff Sabotage 
Suspending or firing a staff person who didn't show up for work 
regularly, or who abused juveniles, seemed to be impossible. The pa­
role agents, who would be integral to our community-based system, 
had other jobs as insurance salesmen, real estate agents, or liquor 
salesmen. Though they claimed to devote full time to their parole ac­
tivities, this was questionable. I tried to make an issue over one partic­
ular parole agent who was listed as a job development specialist. When 
I asked him what he did, he said he found jobs for boys returning home 
from the reform schools. That seemed important enough. Our young­
sters needed jobs. But his role was less complicated than that. He'd buy 
the Sunday paper and, after church, would clip the help wanted ads, 
put them in envelopes, and send them to the administrators of the 
reform schools. The whole thing couldn't have taken more than an hour 
a week. He collected a full salary. 
Even more blatant personnel problems seemed beyond remedy. 
One cottage supervisor staggered drunk into a locked reform school 
dorm in the middle of the night, dragged a youngster out, and broke 
his jaw. After months of hearings, we lost the case. We couldn't fire 
him, and we had problems simply keeping him away from the inmates. 
The issue was resolved after we vacated the institution. He was as­
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signed to a privately contracted community-based program. He even­
tually punched another kid in the face in full view of passers-by on a 
busy street. With that corroboration, he was forced to resign. 
Though most staff belonged to the state employees' union, they 
weren't part of the militant American Federation of State, County, and 
Municipal Employees. Ties to the union weren't as strong as they 
might have been because of the extent of political patronage. Since 
most staff got their jobs through political connections, union mem­
bership wasn't seen as crucial. The union representative, Joe Correia, 
was an unusually moral and decent man. He'd been a union organizer 
for many years, and though protective of his members, he recognized 
the need for drastic changes in the ways they dealt with delinquents in 
the department. 
Because reform schools are total institutions (to use Erving Goff-
man's term),12 the staff held considerable power to undermine change. 
An important characteristic of total institutions is their capacity to 
shape information. Staff have unusual ability to control or to put a spin 
on information. Power relationships between keeper and captives dis­
tort the process beyond all reason. Minor changes in house rules or 
scheduling take on Olympian import. 
I didn't have to do much to put an institution in turmoil. A simple 
chat with an inmate often sufficed. Admittedly, I wasn't the most adept 
of administrators. Many of our problems were the result of my poor 
management, of not informing the staff or bringing them along. But 
given the staff perceptions of the precariousness of my own position, it 
was unlikely that I would have brought many along anyway. When I 
shared my plans, the staff took it as an opportunity to head me off or 
make my actions politically untenable. Some couldn't resist the allure 
of sabotage. Plans which in most bureaucracies might have been seen, 
at least fleetingly, as positive or helpful were seen as threatening in our 
institutions. The upset was exacerbated when I retreated to doing what 
I could with one kid at a time. 
Administrators felt undermined, and their frustration was felt 
through all the institutions. As incidents multiplied, I pulled back and 
devoted myself to administrative tasks in the central office—attempting 
to get new programs into the institutions, bringing in consultants, and 
planning staff training seminars. But events kept dragging me into 
more potentially upsetting situations. One day, as I was walking down 
the hallway outside an administrator's office at one of the schools, I 
98 / Reforming Reform Schools 
heard a shout and a loud, repeated thump. A fifteen-year-old emerged 
flushed and red-eyed. An administrator had been banging the young-
ster's head against the wall. That incident provoked one of the rare 
written memos of my tenure. In it I stated that use of physical force 
with inmates would be restricted to restraining a youngster who was 
momentarily out of control and defending oneself against assault. 
The memo wasn't particularly revolutionary. Three years earlier my 
predecessor had laid out a similar policy. But the context had changed. I 
followed this memo with another—inmates could wear their hair what­
ever length they wished. The institutions nearly went into disarray 
over that. Senior staff responded by publicly inviting staff and inmates 
to act out. At a staff meeting, one administrator commented that I was, 
in effect, telling staff they no longer controlled the institutions. "This 
means that if a kid spits in your face, you can't do anything about it." 
These less-than-subtle translations provoked more incidents, designed 
to prove that the new, "permissive" policies had given control of the 
institutions to the inmates. 
Why should staff members show the need for an institution by 
causing incidents in it? It wasn't as paradoxical as it seemed. Incidents 
in institutions seldom call attention to the concept of the institution. 
They simply prove the need for better management. Staff-stimulated 
incidents are not meant to demonstrate the uncommon incorrigibility, 
violence, or character of the staff but of the inmates—inmates clearly in 
need of stricter regimens. The institution remains serenely unaccount­
able for its products. And what better incident than the escape? Escape 
has it all—threat, conflict, fear, hysteria, danger, suspense, and final 
resolution. It is the drama par excellence for proving that the institu­
tions are needed. 
Escapes 
By late 1970, Shirley School was beset with more runaways than ever in 
its history. As I walked through the lobby of the administration build­
ing, I happened to glance to my left. There, pinned to the bulletin 
board outside the superintendent's office, was a crude map a young 
inmate had drawn for use in his escape. It had been confiscated and 
displayed for all to see. An administrator had penned large letters 
across the top: ESCAPE MAR FREE COPIES GIVEN HERE. I took it 
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down and tucked it in my coat pocket. When I later confronted the 
assistant superintendent with it, he said it was a joke and no more. I 
believe he thought it was, and I accepted his explanation that the map 
was too rough to be of much use anyway. (I later came to know well the 
youngster who had drawn it, Mike Radon. He eventually became direc­
tor of a group home for youthful offenders. As far as he was concerned, 
his map was taken very seriously indeed. For possessing it he was 
thrown into the tombs). 
The message was clear. The Shirley administration was encouraging 
runs from the institution for its own purposes. Later the flag on the 
administration building was flown upside down as a signal of distress 
over central office meddling. This was followed by open invitations to 
run. Keys were handed out to inmates by disgruntled staff. A Boston 
priest whose ministry was with runaway kids called me one afternoon 
to tell me the youngsters he was seeing were escapees from one or 
another of our state reform schools. They told him they'd been given an 
easy run by staff. 
Escapes are an obsession in juvenile corrections. The concern seems 
reasonable enough. Reform schools and detention centers are sup­
posed to keep violent and dangerous juveniles off the street and out of 
our neighborhoods. Law and public safety demand that we aggressive­
ly pursue and catch the fleeing inmate. Virtually all adolescent escapees 
are picked up at home or in their neighborhoods within a few days. A 
surprising number come back voluntarily at the urging of a mother, a 
sister, or a girlfriend. They usually run impulsively for what seems at 
the moment a valid reason—a slight, a worry about home. The run has 
less to do with any plan to get back into crime than with an impulse to 
hit the road. The sad reality is that most of these youngsters have no 
place to go. They run home and test the waters. Things haven't im­
proved. The more seriously delinquent youngsters seemed often to be 
relieved at being returned to the institution. It confirmed their view of 
the world as essentially impersonal, rejecting, and ultimately violent. 
There is odd comfort in returning to a place where the abuse is regulated 
and predictable. But woe to him who upsets this hurtful regularity. To do 
so threatens a fragile identity—even one built on the worst impulses a 
society can give. 
I remember Doug, a stocky sixteen-year-old addicted to heroin. Late 
one evening, returning from a meeting near Shirley, I decided to take a 
quick side trip by Cottage Nine. I asked the master on duty whether 
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anyone was in the tombs. No. I guess he thought I wouldn't go upstairs 
and look. There, in the far corner of one of the dim cells, was Doug, 
lying stripped on the bare floor. I stood in the doorway, trying to talk 
through the mesh security screen which separated us. "How long have 
you been here?" The muffled reply: "A few days/' "Why are you here?" 
His voice grew more agitated: 7/I tried to make it over the fence out 
back." I told him I wanted him to come out and go back downstairs. 
"We aren't using the tombs anymore." Doug let go a torrent of ob-
scenities—"You naive asshole! You dumb motherfucker! Don't you 
know kids like me need to be in here?" Doug had become the well-
socialized product of our reform school—a Cottage Nine "success" who 
believed what it taught. The way to handle unacceptable impulses is to 
be grabbed, beaten, handcuffed, dragged screaming up cement stairs, 
stripped, and thrown into a tomb. 
Few juveniles in reform schools, if they get loose, immediately 
threaten public safety. Those who do weren't particularly violent or 
dangerous youths before their institutionalization. Few reform school 
inmates are committed for crimes of random violence, and nearly all 
will be returned to the community while they are still adolescents. Why 
then would they represent such danger in the few hours they're on the 
run? Usually, it's precisely because they are on the run. The ante has 
been upped, the stakes are higher. Though most want to go directly 
home with the least possible hassle, getting there is a problem. At this 
point the danger associated with escape resides less in the youngster 
than in the hysteria attending the incident. 
A black youngster from Boston, with us for burglary, finds himself 
far from home in an almost all-white, rural part of the state. He is highly 
visible as he tries to make his way to Boston. He can't hitchhike. He 
can't walk openly during the day. His options are few—to run at night, 
to break into buildings, to hide until dark, to steal a car. If he is ag­
gressively pursued, his situation is made more desperate and poten­
tially dangerous. The need immediately to catch a runaway who would 
be released anyway in a few weeks or months heightens the likelihood 
of violence, a likelihood further enhanced by blaring sirens and the use 
of other inmates to chase escapees. It was an unwritten rule at Shirley 
that the chasers would beat the runner when caught. In return they 
were given favors which ranged from extra cigarettes to early consid­
eration for parole. 
Institutional tranquility demanded that we hound and catch es­
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capees, but it seemed to me a dangerous policy, and I passed the word 
that I didn't want escapees aggressively pursued unless they were with 
us for crimes of violence. I wanted runaways to have the benefit of 
taking their time in getting home. We could pick them up later. We 
needed to de-escalate the whole sorry mess. In a sense, I was caught 
in a trap of my own making, for I hadn't yet been able to make the 
institutions caring enough to reduce youngsters' need to escape. But it 
would have been political suicide to allow escapes to increase, so I tried 
to straddle the dilemma—with mixed results. Although tightening 
security slowed our rehabilitative efforts, I wouldn't have been given 
the time needed if the escape rate had not gone down. 
Once escapes became a political issue, it was self-defeating to tell 
some institutional administrators that a particular youngster needed 
close custody. If they knew, the kid was out a back door in record time. I 
had to keep a youngster's dangerousness to myself if I didn't want him 
disappearing into the streets, as the case of Eddie Mullaney illustrates. 
Eddie was well known to the department. He lived in the Charles­
town projects and had a long history with us. He'd been arrested a 
dozen or so times in the past for burglaries and robberies, had been 
committed to the department, and had duly spent time at Lyman and 
Shirley. Not unexpectedly, his delinquencies got more serious and 
more violent each time he was out. 
Late on a Friday afternoon, I got a call from a Charlestown judge. He 
knew our problems with escapes from Roslindale and wanted to make 
sure that Eddy would remain locked up pending his hearing. Eddy had 
been arrested earlier that day on a charge of aggravated assault and 
attempted murder. He had rolled a sailor returning to the Boston Navy 
Yard after a night on the town, but in doing so had attacked his victim 
with more rage than simple robbery demanded, fracturing the young 
seaman's skull and leaving him for dead. 
The judge set Eddy's bond at $30,000, a high bond unusual in juve­
nile cases. Clearly the judge intended to waive Eddy into adult court. I 
thanked the judge for his call and assured him we would take extraordi­
nary measures to keep Eddy in Roslindale for Monday's court appear­
ance. I called the superintendent and told him how important it was to 
hang on to Eddy. He was out by 5:00 that afternoon. I got a call stating 
that somehow he'd managed to run through an open door along with 
some visitors. The judge had gone home for the weekend before I called 
with the bad news. I took it for granted that Eddy had been let loose. 
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Saturday morning I went back into the office and pulled Eddy's 
address. I drove over the bridge to Charlestown and wandered up and 
down the project streets and alleys looking for the tenement apartment 
where Eddy lived. My knock got no reply. I strolled around outside, 
asking anybody I met whether he or she knew Eddy. A few youngsters 
did; Eddy was something of a local celebrity. I spread the word that I 
needed to talk with him, that he was on the verge of getting in more 
serious trouble and I wanted to help. I handed out a few personal cards, 
scribbling my home phone number on the back. "If any of you happens 
to see Eddy, give him a card and tell him to call me. It doesn't matter 
what time." Then I drove home. 
Around 11:00 Sunday morning, the phone rang. It was Eddy. 
"Why do you want to talk with me?" 
I asked him how he was and why he'd run from Roslindale. I told 
him he'd put himself and a lot of others in jeopardy. Then I gave what 
seemed to me my strongest argument. 
"I've been trying my best to change things around here, but when 
you ran from Roslindale, you screwed it up. I realize you're in a heap of 
trouble, and I can't say I wouldn't have run if given the chance but 
you've got to come back. It'd make matters a lot simpler for all of us." 
There was a long pause. "What will happen if I come back?" 
I promised Eddy that he'd be safe and that I'd come pick him up and 
take him back to the detention center. 
He said, "I'll call you later," and hung up. 
Eddy called again at about 4:00 P.M. He asked if I would come over. I 
was in front of his apartment forty minutes later. It was dusk, and as 
the door opened I couldn't see much in the room. The blinds were 
pulled, and a faint light reflected from a back bedroom. The musty 
smell took me back fifteen years to the South Side of Chicago, when it 
was still safe for a white welfare worker to trudge through the tene­
ments visiting families on his caseload. Eddy asked me to wait. I heard 
a slight mumbling in the bedroom, then he came out and said he was 
ready. We drove off to Roslindale. 
Eddy didn't say much during the ride. He certainly wasn't happy to 
be going back. I tried to encourage his resolve and told him how much I 
respected him for doing this. We talked about the accusations regard­
ing the mugging and about his family. Then I found out why no one 
had answered the door to his apartment the first time I went by. His 
father was in the semilit bedroom, paralyzed from the neck down. His 
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mother had died the year before. We drove up to the back entrance of 
Roslindale. I told the master on duty that Eddy had come back on his 
own and that I would be checking in later to see how he was doing. 
Eddie was escorted inside. I left feeling relieved. I'd been able to piece a 
potential disaster back together for myself, although I couldn't say the 
same for Eddy. I didn't have enough hold on my own department to 
ensure that this troubled, occasionally dangerous teenager would be 
dealt with sensitively. 
Getting youngsters to hit the highways wasn't the only way staff 
showed their displeasure. There were other equally unsettling inci-
dents—fires set by unsupervised youth, a few near riots. Often staff 
phoned the local press before the event. Once, at about 1 A.M., a local 
fire chief called me from the grounds of Shirley. A fire had been set in a 
cottage, but he wouldn't allow his men to go in and put it out until I 
came out to see "what your permissive policies have done." I asked him 
to put out the fire, promising I'd be there within an hour. By the time I 
arrived, the fire had been extinguished (it was a couple of mattresses), 
but the place was a shambles, with water everywhere. It reminded me 
of a story my father, a musician, used to tell—that a trained fireman, 
when entering a burning building with his fire ax, looks first to demol­
ish the grand piano. Clearly there'd been a bit of overkill in the effort to 
demonstrate the terrible effects of permissiveness. But there was an­
other more intriguing political angle to that night's firefighting which I 
learned about a few weeks later in the governor's office. 
Occasionally I felt as if I'd been drafted for a role in an Ionesco playlet. 
Take the day I was sitting in my Boston office and got a call from an 
administrator at Shirley (fifty miles away) telling me a riot was about to 
begin in Cottage Nine. I asked him how he knew. He said a staff member 
had phoned him from the cottage (which was only fifty yards from his 
office). I suggested he walk down and check it out. He didn't think that 
was appropriate. He simply wanted me to know what was happening 
and, not too obliquely, what my policies were causing. I called around 
the grounds looking for a line staff member I trusted. I finally found one 
and asked him to go over to Cottage Nine and let me know what was 
happening. The "riot" had to do with the boys talking in normal voices. 
This noise, in a previously silent discipline cottage, was interpreted as a 
harbinger of riot. Inmates, attuned to the staff's uneasiness, tossed 
around words like "motherfucker," "riot," and "escape" for their shock 
value, saying them just loud enough to be caught. 
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But our problems at Shirley inevitably came to the attention of the 
governor. The state senate minority whip was from the Shirley area, 
and the governor couldn't duck his political responsibilities in connec­
tion with the turmoil. Chris Armstrong called and said the governor 
wanted me to attend a meeting in his office later that week with legisla­
tors, town selectmen, and other local representatives. That meeting 
came at a particularly bad time. The Shirley staff had circulated a peti­
tion through almost every bar and hamlet in the local area and ob­
tained about a thousand signatures calling for the governor to oust me. 
A few weeks before, DYS staff had rallied on the steps of the statehouse 
carrying banners and signs with a number of messages—"Miller Lets 
Delinquents Run Free," "Training Schools in Chaos/' I was particularly 
fascinated with the sign carried by a psychologist from Roslindale: 
"Miller Condones Free Sex." This was an allusion to my attempts to 
create coed programs. 
On the morning of the meeting the governor called me over before­
hand. "Jerry, these people are very upset with things out at Shirley. I 
hope you can get matters under control." I assured him that we were 
past the worst, that our run rate seemed to be falling, and that we were 
proceeding with our plans to lower the population. I'd kept Mrs. 
Sargent well informed of the bizarre incidents of staff sabotage, the en­
couragement of escapes, and the turmoil induced in our department. I 
trusted he knew of it through her. Over the preceding two years, I'd 
come to know the governor as a decent man who, when personal 
convictions clashed with political self-interest, usually took the high 
road. I hadn't felt under great pressure from him. The thought that he 
might sack me wasn't what was uppermost in my mind, so I was more 
outspoken than either the facts or my situation justified. I told him the 
petition had been circulated by Shirley staff and mentioned the phone 
call from the fire chief, who had later informed me that he wouldn't put 
out any more fires at the school. Although the governor said he under­
stood my predicament, he was clearly perturbed. I was so obsessed 
with my battles that I had little real sense of the problems I was causing 
him. I later learned that his closest advisers were pressuring him to get 
rid of me. I was slow to get the message, but later, in the midst of a 
particularly vicious legislative investigation of me, it came through 
loud and clear. Earlier I confided to Chris Armstrong that I was consid­
ering the possibility of resigning, and to my surprise, he gave no re­
sponse. Only after many years in government did I come to appreci­
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ate how much political courage the governor had shown in not firing 
me. 
The governor outlined his plan for the meeting with the angry con­
tingent. He would listen to their complaints (of which he had already 
been informed by the minority whip) and would then ask me for my 
side of the story Following this, he would criticize me for not having a 
better hold on the department and reassure the group that he intended 
to solve the problems at Shirley. He wanted me to understand that 
despite the negative things he might have to say, he supported the 
direction I was trying to take with the department. Then he added, 
almost offhandedly, "Besides, all they want is a fire truck/7 The com­
ment threw me. "A what?" "A fire truck. That's what they want. You'll 
probably have to put one in your next budget." Before I could ask what 
he was talking about, the delegation of citizens was being ushered into 
the office. 
The meeting proceeded precisely as the governor had said it would. 
The complaints were presented in strong but civil terms. I outlined our 
plans for lowering the school's population. Things got slightly out of 
hand when a town selectman demanded I put the inmates back in state 
clothes and crop their hair. I responded sarcastically by suggesting that 
we might brand them on their foreheads. The governor interjected, 
"I'm sure the commissioner didn't mean that/' and the meeting con­
tinued as planned. The governor gave me a mild dressing-down and 
ended by saying that he was sure I'd do a better job in the future. He 
gave his assurance that if I didn't, he'd deal with that as well. I waited 
behind as he escorted the now subdued delegation to the door. He 
returned saying that he thought the meeting had gone well and that he 
wanted me to put a fire truck in the next budget for the Shirley school. I 
did, and a few months later the town had a new fire truck. Apparently 
there had been an even earlier meeting with others at which this salient 
matter had been settled. We heard nary a peep from the local leaders 
after that. 
Despite the successful meeting, things would get much worse. It 
was a lonely time, mostly of my own making. Though many staff were 
supportive, I was never quite able to trust any of them. I'd been burnt 
too often. Staff dubbed me "the phantom," a visage appearing at this 
or that cottage at some ungodly hour and then disappearing. The term 
wasn't one of endearment. I came to rely more on information from 
inmates than from staff. Though it sounds extremely unlikely, these 
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supposedly most dangerous and deceitful delinquents generally gave 
more honest assessments of their situation and of the conditions in our 
institutions than did their keepers. 
I needed to have some staff I could trust. I couldn't go it alone. I 
couldn't be everywhere at once, though I sometimes fancied I could. I 
couldn't go out and hire properly qualified people because there were 
no positions available—even if some itinerant psychologist or social 
worker had been interested in coming aboard what looked to many like 
a sinking ship. My own position hadn't been funded for almost a year, 
and neither had those of the assistant commissioners who were to be 
the first of my own appointees. 
My desires to consolidate personnel, have a trustworthy staff, and be 
able myself to be as nearly ubiquitous as possible spawned one of the 
wackier ideas of my tenure—a proposal to purchase the former Cardinal 
O'Connell Seminary in Boston and turn it into one huge youth correc­
tions institution holding almost all the children and teenagers in the 
department. My plan was to close most of the institutions and transfer 
the youngsters to this facility in Boston, where we would also move our 
central office. That way I could simply stroll out of my office and down a 
hallway to get a sense of what was happening. No more trips halfway 
across the state. I could run the whole thing myself. I got the support of 
the governor, the Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, and the Boston 
Globe for the plan to purchase the seminary, but was unable to get it 
through a legislative committee chaired by a perceptive state senator, 
Beryl Cohen, who vetoed the idea. If we had managed to get the appro­
priation, it would ultimately have stifled our reforms. 
Meanwhile, I ran around putting out the brushfires that were too 
often the consequence of some action I'd taken to try to keep my wits 
about me. Frank Maloney attempted to keep a lid on things in the 
central office by taking on the thankless task of meeting with per­
petually frantic superintendents and hostile line staff. He was out­
standingly loyal during a period that must have been one of great 
personal frustration to him and in which I wasn't in control of the 
bureaucracy I headed—and which he had hoped to head. I finally real­
ized I would have to rely on the staff I'd inherited. Most were going to 
be around much longer than I. Though only a few of them had ever 
seen a civil service exam, all were now covered by civil service protec­
tions. Our turnover rate was low, and I wouldn't be hiring many new 
people. 
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We began staff retraining programs. Though people seemed to ac­
cept some of the new concepts, the majority didn't share my views on 
the department or the youngsters in it. Most neither supported nor 
worked against the new policies. They just waited for things to col­
lapse. An active minority with strong ties to local legislators and the 
governor's executive council worked hard to get me out. 
At this time I was dividing my efforts between Bridgewater, Shirley, 
and the two Boston detention centers. Using a tactic similar to the one I 
had used at Shirley, I sent the superintendent of the girls' detention 
center on vacation with pay and replaced her with an unlikely team— 
Dan Bucci, a recent graduate with a master's degree in counseling from 
Tufts University, and seventeen-year-old Toby Yarmolinsky, the son of 
the Harvard Law School professor and former deputy undersecretary 
of defense in the Kennedy Administration, Adam Yarmolinsky. Toby 
had just graduated from high school. Dan had never worked in an 
institution before. Toby had never seen one. Dan was among the few 
degree-qualified persons who came by the office looking for a job. I 
hired him on the spot and sent him out to the Huntington Avenue 
center along with Toby to come up with some ideas as to what we might 
do to change the oppressive atmosphere. They came back with a whole 
series of plans and proposals. For the next ten months they worked 
fifteen-hour days to humanize the girl's facility. They brought in volun­
teers, tutors, new medical staff, visitors; they stopped medical isola­
tion and began coed dances, busing in boys from the IJG. They got 
Polaroid to donate twenty-eight cameras for the girls to use in a photog­
raphy class. (The cameras arrived one morning, and by evening, the 
staff had stolen all but two.) 
Staff training seemed to be getting results. We opened therapeutic 
cottages on the grounds of Shirley and Lyman and began closing out 
admissions at John Augustus Hall. We opened a day-care center at 
Lancaster and set up a summer forestry camp annex out of the budget 
of the Shirley school—something which later greatly upset a legislative 
postaudit committee. Escapes from Shirley and Lyman decreased as 
more programs were introduced. 
9 Reverberations 
1 probably survived my first two years because Governor Frank Sar­
gent wasn't a rigorous administrator. If he had known what was going 
on in the department he would have demanded my resignation. Years 
later, writing in the Boston Globe, the governor likened his situation 
to hunkering down in a foxhole while I, on the one side, and the 
legislature and DYS staff, on the other, lobbed shells at one another. 
The description outlined precisely the role of a reform administrator. 
If the governor had been openly and loudly supportive, it would have 
politicized matters even more. I accepted my potential expendability 
as a political casualty, but I hoped the governor wouldn't fire me be­
fore I could accomplish something. I couldn't ask him to take the ini­
tiative. That was my job. Humane corrections is always a loser po­
litically. 
I had no choice but to forge ahead, but the more I pursued my con­
cerns, the more things unraveled. Every abuse revealed another. Most 
people think an inmate who is being abused pines to tell others about 
it. Not so. Juvenile inmates hide their abuse and protect their abusers. 
It's not unlike what we've come to know about family secrets of sexual 
abuse and incest. Even those juveniles whom clinicians (too easily) 
label sociopathic or antisocial, from whom we might expect manipula­
tion, habitually ignore their own victimization. They don't run to out­
siders to spout tales of mistreatment. Some mention other inmates— 
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"He doesn't belong here/' "They're beating on him/' 'They take 
advantage of him."—but that's about as far as it goes. 
In recent years, I've prepared background studies on a number of 
young persons being tried on capital charges for particularly heinous 
murders. Even where the death penalty threatens, it's a rare offender 
who mentions his or her own physical or sexual abuse. They hide the 
memories from themselves as well as from others, and the history of 
their being abused has to be dug out with the tenacity of a private 
investigator. When such traumas are finally uncovered, the accused 
often asks for them to be kept secret for fear of embarrassing or hurting 
family members or friends. The idea of the delinquent wallowing in 
tales of his or her own abuse as an excuse for crime is another of the 
myths which nurture our misunderstanding of people who offend. 
By the summer of 1970 we'd made progress. The beginnings of half­
way houses on the grounds of some institutions, the introduction of 
group therapy models, the relaxation of the rigid silence rules, doing 
away with marching, state clothes, and so forth, all contributed to a 
calmer, less violent atmosphere on the institutional grounds. The new 
mood brought unanticipated side effects. 
One morning, a young counselor we'd recently hired was conduct­
ing a fairly intense group therapy session. In the emotion of the mo­
ment, fifteen-year-old Craig blurted out that his parole agent had 
forced sex on him. When the group leader pursued the boy's comment, 
he quickly backed away—"I was just pissed. I made it up." A week or so 
later, as an aside in another conversation, the counselor casually men­
tioned the boy's accusation to me. "I don't think there's anything to 
this, but. . . ." 
Craig lived in western Massachusetts and was well known to the 
department. He'd been in the Westfield Detention Center numerous 
times on burglary charges and had been committed to the Lyman 
School in his early teens, graduating to Shirley Industrial School when 
he reached fifteen. I telephoned the superintendent at Westfield. He 
was a psychologist and knew both the parole agent and Craig. He 
advised me not to trust much of anything Craig said, terming him a 
pathological liar, and I decided to drop the matter. 
A month or so later, Bobby Bolster happened by the office. A former 
boxer who had grown up in the South Boston projects, Bobby made his 
way through college and graduate school and ended up as a vocational 
counselor with the YSB. He was a friend of Billy Bulger, the powerful 
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senator from South Boston. I took for granted that Bobby's job came 
through the senator's office. Unlike many of those who came to the YSB 
via politics, however, Bobby was a highly motivated "kid-worker" and 
an advocate for the youngsters with whom he dealt. (Bobby occasion­
ally went beyond the call of duty. Late one night I happened into the 
central office and noticed a light in the photocopying room. Bobby was 
creatively altering the school transcripts of a delinquent youngster to 
ensure his acceptance in a local vocational program.) I told Bobby about 
Craig's allegations, and he offered to see what he could find out. A 
couple of weeks later, Bobby came back. Craig had told him that what 
he had blurted out in the group had indeed happened. He said that 
other boys on the parole agent's caseload were also involved. 
I telephoned the parole agent and asked him to come to my office. 
He apparently thought it had something to do with concessions I might 
be willing to make about job demands. In previous meetings with the 
parole agents, this man had been among the more outspoken against 
proposed changes. I wanted parole agents to become advocates and 
"brokers" for the youngsters on their caseloads, assisting them to find 
jobs, therapy, and services, instead of acting like cops. My view of their 
role was closer to that envisioned by the nineteenth-century shoe­
maker John Augustus, who created probation and parole in the United 
States. Many of the parole agents agreed, but the idea was particularly 
galling to a loud clique who yearly filed legislation which would allow 
them to carry revolvers as they went on their appointed rounds. Each 
year I opposed their legislation, and each year it was killed. I'm sure it's 
still being submitted and probably, some sad day, will pass. Fear and 
force have great staying power. My opposition had been very public, 
and there had been some heated meetings with the parole agents. I 
didn't want my concerns about Craig to be taken as part of a personal 
vendetta against an outspoken critic. 
We chatted for a few minutes before I brought up the allegations. I 
said I didn't necessarily believe the boy, but because his allegations 
were serious, they would have to be investigated. If the allegations 
weren't true, the agent had nothing to fear. If there was proof that the 
agent had been sexually involved with boys on his caseload, criminal 
actions would follow. If, however, he chose to resign, I wouldn't pursue 
the matter, and he could seek help for his problem. I didn't want him 
working with youngsters who were subject to his authority, though I 
didn't come out and say so. He smiled and came back at me without 
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losing a beat. "Why would you take the rantings of an antisocial delin­
quent seriously?" Nothing had occurred, and he had no reason to 
resign. It was part of my vendetta. After he left, I called Bob Quinn, the 
attorney general, and asked him to send over an investigator. A crusty 
detective stopped by a few days later, took some notes, and said he'd be 
in touch in a couple of weeks. 
Three months later, the investigator came back with a thick file. The 
boy's allegations appeared to be true and went far beyond simple sex­
ual abuse of this one boy. For over a decade, the parole agent had 
coerced sexual favors from a large number of parolees in return for easy 
supervision. But, and this was even more troubling, he had regularly 
returned individual teenagers to the reform schools as parole violators 
when they rejected his propositions. They had sat in brutal reform 
schools, some for two years or more—and not one had mentioned why 
he was there. 
The parole agent ended up in Walpole State Prison. Predictably, 
when he was released a few years later, he demanded his old job back. 
(He'd saved up enough administrative and sick leave to cover most of 
his time in prison.) Joe Leavey, who succeeded me as commissioner, 
avoided having to rehire him only through some fancy administrative 
footwork. 
What this incident shows is that, in investigating institutional abuse, 
truth is often better served by listening carefully to those inmates 
normally seen as being the least reliable. In the nearly two decades 
since Massachusetts, I have investigated abuse in reform schools in a 
number of states, and that premise has been confirmed. The best infor­
mants fall into three unlikely classes: (1) ''emotionally disturbed" in­
mates; (2) developmentally disabled or mentally retarded inmates; 
and (3) the occasional middle-class inmate. 
These three groups have one thing in common. They don't know, 
don't understand, or don't care about the codes which govern institu­
tional life. Emotionally disturbed or retarded teenagers often rnisper­
ceive or misjudge their situation and don't weigh the consequences 
well, whereas the middle-class teenager doesn't see himself as "appro­
priate" to the institution. He is an alien there and doesn't expect to 
return. Most inmates, however, know the realities of their situation 
only too well and are likely to return. They therefore do their best not to 
make matters worse for themselves by unnecessarily stirring things 
up. Investigators come and go. The abiding reality behind the bravado 
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and the macho posturing of most reform school inmates is that they 
believe they deserve whatever abuse they may get—a belief which is 
fixed long before they enter the juvenile justice system. 
As word got out about the changes in the reform schools, we began 
getting calls at the central office from adolescents in our care. That 
seemed natural enough. After all, we were supposed to be acting in 
loco parentis. But it was anathema to the institutional administrators, 
and much of the old guard in the central office, who saw it as blatant 
manipulation. Youngsters would call from pay phones on the institu­
tional grounds or make collect calls from this or that office whenever 
they managed to get their hands on a phone without the knowledge or 
consent of staff. Usually they wanted me to know about their situation, 
what was happening to them at the reform school, problems with 
families or girlfriends. I'd put the word out quietly that no youngster 
on the run would be grabbed if he or she would call us or even come 
into the central office to discuss the situation. Everything was negotia­
ble. Since we had the authority to set time, the conditions of confine­
ment, and release dates, it was also all quite legal, albeit unusual. 
Before long we started hearing from former reform school inmates 
across the state and the nation. 
Bill 
Things had not gone smoothly for Bill. He called from Canada. He'd 
escaped from the Worcester detention center the year before and made 
his way north. He'd been involved in some burglaries and was awaiting 
placement in a program. He'd heard things were changing in the de­
partment and wondered if he could return without being sent to Ly­
man or Shirley. I told him to come back and we would discuss it. He 
showed up in the office a few days later, having hitched his way. 
He was a slight fifteen-year-old more fit for the child welfare system 
than for youth corrections. He'd managed to survive on the streets in 
Toronto by catching part-time jobs and living with other street kids. As 
best we could determine, he hadn't been in any trouble with the law for 
the past year. I got his records of commitment to us. They confirmed 
our impressions—a nonexistent family, a throwaway kid, occasional 
drug use, minor delinquency. We were looking for an office boy, pho­
tocopier, and messenger the week Bill arrived, so we hired him in the 
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central office. We gave him an advance so he could rent his own room 
in a Cambridge rooming house, and he set to work. He turned out to be 
a dependable employee, getting to work on time and fulfilling his 
duties assiduously. He liked to wear an antique stovepipe hat he'd been 
given in Canada. It looked a bit unusual in the state offices, but it added 
a note of whimsy. Bill was with us for about six months before prob­
lems developed. 
Late one morning, Harry, a parolee and psychotic teenager we'd 
never been able to get the mental health department to keep, came into 
the office out of breath shouting, "A bunch of cops are headed up here 
to arrest you/' I was used to Harry's exaggerations. He'd stop by once 
or twice a week to talk with and occasionally harass staff. We'd repeat­
edly referred him to psychiatric clinics, to no avail. He wouldn't keep 
appointments, and they wouldn't stretch professional protocol enough 
to reach out to him. His diagnosis was probably paranoid schizo­
phrenic, and he was somewhat predisposed to pick up on rumors and 
possible threats. He said that he'd passed a group of police who were 
discussing a plan to come to my office, arrest Bill, and charge me with 
"harboring." I didn't know whether to believe Harry or not, but I called 
Bill into my office. While Harry talked on agitatedly about what he'd 
just heard, a secretary called from the front office to say that a group of 
four policemen was coming down the corridor. I told Harry to leave, 
and put Bill in my office while I went out to greet them. 
There stood the head of the capitol police (those assigned to the 
statehouse), along with the Worcester chief of police and an assistant. 
The chief said he had information that Bill had been seen in my office. 
They were there to arrest him as a fugitive. The chief didn't say any­
thing about charging me, but I expected that something to that effect 
would follow. It seemed curious that the police chief of a major Mas­
sachusetts city would travel fifty miles to my office to arrest a fifteen-
year-old minor offender. But the potential headline was a corker: "Youth 
Service Chief Harbors Fugitive/' 
The capitol chief seemed embarrassed as he presented me with the 
warrant for Bill's arrest. I said I would have to inquire if Bill was 
around. I asked the police to wait, I returned to my office, and closed 
the door. I told Bill to crawl into the well under my desk for the time 
being. After a frantic twenty minutes or so, I was able to reach the 
juvenile judge in Worcester, an appointee of Governor Sargent's who 
had originally sentenced Bill and later issued the warrant when he ran. 
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I told the judge that I was unaware that there was still an outstanding 
warrant, that Bill had returned to our jurisdiction six months ago, and 
that he had been under our supervision working in the central office. 
The judge said that, since Bill was back in our custody, he saw no need 
to execute the warrant. I asked if he would speak to the police chief. I 
brought him into the office and put him on the phone, with Bill still 
under the desk. The chief scowled as he listened to the judge. When he 
finished, I thanked him for his vigilance, and the police left. 
Todd 
Sixteen-year-old Todd called collect one day from New York City to say 
that he'd escaped from the Lyman School a year before. He wondered if 
he could come back and, if he did, whether he'd be put in the discipline 
cottage. He'd talked with a girlfriend in Boston before calling, and 
she'd told him things were changing at the reform schools. Todd was 
from one of the blue-collar suburbs that lie just outside the Route 128 
beltway which circles greater Boston. He'd run from Lyman after a 
stint in the discipline cottage. Late one night he slipped away from a 
dorm and ran out onto Route 9, the highway that passed the school. He 
hitched a ride with a trucker and was into the Berkshires before he was 
missed. A few hours later he was out of Massachusetts. Most escapees 
went home, but the few who didn't usually headed for New York City, 
Florida, California, or Canada, depending upon the time of year. Todd 
landed in New York City. 
Despite his history of burglaries, marijuana use, and general incor­
rigibility Todd wasn't a sophisticated delinquent. He was like most 
kids in reform schools—bumbling, hostile, not terribly shrewd, and 
with a more than adequate share of impulsiveness. An hour or two on 
the Manhattan streets and he was already in a new bind. Though he'd 
heard of hustling (prostitution) in the reform school, he hadn't thought 
of doing it himself until a middle-aged man approached him near 
Times Square and offered twenty-five bucks for a blow job. Within a 
few days he was deeply into a scene he couldn't escape as easily as the 
Lyman School. 
Todd was introduced to hard drugs by other young hustlers in Times 
Square and was always high after a couple of weeks. The hustling got 
more compulsive and more dangerous, culminating in his being tied 
Reverberations I 115 
up as part of a sexual game. He was handcuffed to a bed, shot up with 
heroin, and kept there against his will while a pimp brought in men 
who enjoyed sex with a shackled boy. Todd existed like this for a num­
ber of weeks. His diet consisted of Big Macs and Cokes brought in by 
the pimp, and he was released from the bed only for supervised trips to 
the toilet. Finally, a client felt sorry for Todd and called the police 
anonymously. Todd's pimp freed him as the police entered the build­
ing. They both ran out. Todd was too embarrassed to report what had 
happened. It was a day or two after this that he called. I told him to 
come back, and he showed up in my office a couple of days later. 
I didn't send Todd back to Lyman, and therein lay a serious problem. 
It didn't seem right to return this damaged youngster to the institution 
to sit for a month in the discipline cottage, after which he would have to 
work himself out of the institution by jumping through all the hoops 
demanded of escapees. Instead, he needed individual programs, a 
therapist, a job, some sense of self-esteem, and a semi-independent 
living situation. Lyman School wouldn't meet any of these needs. But 
not returning Todd to Lyman would undermine institutional order. I 
arranged a job in Boston, and we helped him find an apartment. He 
did well. Had we done it by the book, Todd would have been brought 
back to court and charged as an escapee, with time added to his institu­
tional stay. Or, as is common in some states, he would have been 
waived to adult court and sent to prison. 
Although I didn't much like returning anyone to the reform schools, 
we were able to talk most of the youngsters who'd been on the run into 
going back. Our success at this was a sad one, since it made so little 
sense. It had nothing to do with better care, and even less with public 
safety. It was a matter of bureaucratic survival, and for the kids was 
more destructive than helpful. 
I had tried to jolt the system by turning accepted practice on its head. 
A distraught parent would call, concerned that his or her youngster 
had just been sentenced to DYS by a juvenile court. Would their son or 
daughter be safe in the reform school? What educational and treatment 
programs did we have? Although these reasonable questions were 
bizarre given the traditions of our facilities, we tried to use such occa­
sions to stimulate administrators and staff to rethink what our institu­
tions were supposed to be. Occasionally we invited a parent to take his 
or her youngster on a tour, to meet with our superintendents and 
directors of education, to see cottage life, and to ask what services 
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might be offered. To staff accustomed to seeing new intakes arrive in 
handcuffs to be routinely assigned, meeting with parents to justify 
programs was a new twist. 
For a while I toyed with the idea of hiring nondeliquent youth, 
preferably middle-class teenagers, to live on the grounds and attend 
our schools and groups. I saw it as a way of breaking into the delin­
quent subcultures which tend to run large institutions. But though I'm 
sure we could have found willing, altruistic teenagers to help in the 
experiment, I was warned by our legal counsel that the insurance con­
siderations were too much for us to bear in case of incident. 
We did try the reverse—bringing reform school inmates out to visit 
local high schools and prep schools. I remember taking three or four 
Shirley youngsters over to Groton, a distinguished private prep school 
only a few miles down the road. Our youngsters enjoyed the inter­
change immensely, and it was a productive evening. Later, after we 
made the decision to vacate the reform schools, we did in fact find 
places for a small number of them in private prep schools in Mas­
sachusetts and New Hampshire. That cost less than half what the 
reform schools had. 
10 Anticipating the Worst

Dince Lieutenant Governor Frank Sargent had assumed the chief exec-
utive's chair when Governor Volpe was appointed secretary of transpor­
tation by President Nixon, Sargent began his first campaign for gover­
nor ten months after my appointment. It looked like a close election. The 
Democrats had nominated Boston's popular mayor, Kevin White, for 
governor, along with a young liberal legislator, Michael Dukakis, for 
lieutenant governor. In the race for the nomination, Dukakis had beaten 
another leader in the reform of DYS, state senator Beryl Cohen. That I had 
accepted a cabinet post with a governor who came up for election in a 
year was a testament to my political innocence. If you hope to have any 
impact on a state system, you try for at least a four-year tenure. After ten 
months as commissioner, my lack of job security was only too obvious. 
Sargent had appointed a number of luminaries to head the various 
state departments—Steve Minter in the Department of Welfare, Peter 
Goldmark as the first secretary of the new superagency Department of 
Human Services, John Boone in adult corrections, Matt Dumont to 
devise drug programs, Milt Greenblatt in mental health. In his cam­
paign speeches the governor regularly named the exciting and compe­
tent new people he had brought in to make state government more 
responsive. He didn't include me, and I knew why. By late summer 
19701 had become an embarrassment. Most of the governor's staff were 
recommending that he get rid of me. 
117 
n8 / Reforming Reform Schools 
In those first months I was caught up in trying to get control of the 
institutions. I had no intention of closing them; I simply wanted to 
make them reasonably humane. It had been a daunting task, and the 
department was in an upset most of the time. I had concentrated on 
such things as retraining staff, softening rigid rules, changing brutal 
disciplinary practices, and introducing what I considered therapeutic 
programs. We brought in outside experts, conducted seminars, and set 
up new programs in selected cottages. The Harvard studies later dem­
onstrated that these efforts had borne fruit. The youngsters in the new, 
more intense, individualized programs did better, thought better of 
themselves, were more settled and less violent.1 But these modest 
changes came at a price. 
Reform school staff circulated petitions across the state demanding 
my ouster, along with more specific calls for a return to whiffle hair­
cuts, inmates in state clothes, and harsher discipline. As the number of 
escapes and runaways multiplied, townspeople understandably wanted 
the inmates from local facilities to be more easily identifiable. 
The escapes and commotions in the institutions assured regular 
negative headlines. I wasn't a plus in the governor's campaign. Though 
I concluded he probably wouldn't fire me immediately, no political 
scruples would be likely to hold him back after the election. There was 
also the very real possibility that he'd be defeated, and it was unlikely 
that a White-Dukakis administration would reappoint me. White's 
chief aide, Barney Frank, had been friendly to a point, and Dukakis 
had been supportive even though I was a Republican appointee. But 
given Massachusetts politics, I knew I'd be among the first to get the 
boot. Moreover, I didn't expect that whoever replaced me would share 
many of my views, much less my methods, which often seemed to 
cause two problems for each one solved. In my pessimism, I fell into 
fantasizing a worst-case scenario. What if I were replaced by Heinrich 
Himmler and the SS? How hard would it be for a new commissioner 
with the rigidity of a Nazi to undo our meager reforms? Too late, I 
realized it wouldn't be difficult at all. 
I knew from my experience with psychiatric hospitals in the Air 
Force that institutionally based therapeutic communities are fragile 
and fleeting. Making an institution caring and decent is a full-time job. 
To step back even briefly is to invite apathy and violence. The problem 
is aggravated when the institution's inmates are captives. But making a 
decent institution indecent is relatively easy. 
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The history of mental hospitals and adult and juvenile prisons over­
flows with examples of model institutions which collapsed almost as 
they opened.2 It takes only a few new rules (say, new visiting restric­
tions, uniforms, isolation procedures, punishments for infractions, or 
behavioral modification coercion). To make a hurtful institution caring, 
however, is not so simple. Rules cannot guarantee the civility which is 
the essence of a therapeutic environment. You can't post requirements 
like these on the bulletin board—"As of eight A.M. tomorrow staff will 
care for, listen to, and try to understand inmates/' or "Staff will ques­
tion their own motives and shortcomings as they deal with these trou­
bled and troubling adolescents"—and expect to see them fulfilled. Yet 
these are what make a good institution, of which there are so few, and 
those few short-lived. In bureaucracies with a captive clientele the pull 
is always away from the personal and toward the impersonal and alien­
ating. The pursuit is less one of public safety than of convenience. 
Rigid rules, isolation rooms, behavioral management procedures, goon 
squads, threats of exile to more brutal end-of-the-line institutions—all 
become accepted techniques for "better" management. 
Humane administrators tire of seeking the unattainable—a safe and 
helpful institution. Most eventually retreat to bureaucratic roles, trying 
to find peace in mitigating destructiveness. They withdraw to such 
tasks as regulating the amount of time a teenager spends in isolation, 
certifying that staff keep behavioral logs on inmates, and setting up 
point systems to measure institutional conformity. This is the way of 
minimum standards—better than nothing, but not much. Our reforms 
were in danger of going the same route. The strides we had made in 
that first year were all within the institutions. As the election campaign 
revved up and I could count my remaining days in office, I realized that 
I'd left everyone vulnerable. I wished I'd gotten more youngsters out of 
the institutions in those first months. 
The idea of putting reform school inmates into the community 
wasn't as risky as it sounded. All of them would return to the commu­
nity within a few months anyway, and our in-house studies showed 
that the longer we kept someone, the more likely he or she was to get 
into trouble when released. When I first saw the study, I concluded it 
simply meant that we kept the more dangerous youngsters longer. But 
that wasn't the case. The longer a youngster stayed in one of our reform 
schools, the worse he or she seemed to do when released. We were 
pointing our alumni up dead ends.3 
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As I looked around the department at the superintendents, directors 
of education, chaplains, planners, and others in leadership roles, I saw 
that most would be there long after I left. They could outwait and 
outlast me. I'd made a mistake in concentrating on making the institu­
tions more humane. The idea of closing them seemed less risky. 
Of Festivals and Riots 
Early one morning, Jessie Sargent's secretary called. The governor's 
wife was interested in learning more about our department. Initially I 
put off any meeting because I didn't need another kibitzer. Politicians' 
wives are notorious for taking up causes, and this would probably be 
no more than a public relations exercise. But I couldn't put the gover-
nor's wife off indefinitely. 
A week later I dutifully drove the few blocks down Tremont Street to 
a downtown Boston high-rise where Mrs. Sargent kept a small apart­
ment office. I'd been invited for tea and conversation. It was a happy 
surprise. There was none of the stuffiness I had expected. Mrs. Sargent 
talked of the problems in the old Youth Service Board and how she'd 
like to be of help. She mentioned that Mrs. Van Waters, the superinten­
dent of the Lancaster school, had already invited her to speak at the 
strawberry festival, an annual event held on the grounds of the in­
stitution. She wondered whether to accept the invitation. I suggested 
she accept. 
The strawberry festival was a day-long celebration attended by 
friends, local supporters, professionals, and others associated with the 
Lancaster school. Though some of the inmates' family members hung 
in the background, they seemed superfluous to the events. Strawber­
ries and ice cream were served to the visiting guests during a day of 
ceremonies, including a graduation conducted in the institutional chap­
el. As was Mrs. Van Waters' tradition, every aspect was planned down 
to the last detail. Model girls were selected to recite or give short 
speeches, whose every word was prescreened by Mrs. Van Waters and 
typed on index cards from which each girl read. 
The inmates were impressive in their colorful summer dresses, 
though their contacts with the visitors were primarily as waitresses and 
hostesses. The scene was a re-creation of a Victorian lawn party, all the 
way down to the hats and the organdy. I'd been to Lancaster many 
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times before, but this was not the institution I knew. Yet I couldn't 
really object. The girls were enjoying themselves, having gotten well 
into their assigned roles. It was a rather nice, though deceptive, tab­
leau. The realities of the Lancaster's girls' reform school had little to do 
with the strawberry festival. 
At the time, I was in a continuing battle with the reform school 
superintendents over changes in the institutions, and I was probably 
too concerned with being submarined. But Mrs. Van Waters wasn't 
above firing a few silent torpedoes herself. As I watched her take a 
gracious Mrs. Sargent about the lawn, threading through the laid tables, 
shaking hands with this dignitary or that local politician-—occasionally 
even being introduced to an unbelievably proper inmate—I could see 
Mrs. Sargent being led down a primrose path in this bucolic setting. 
After the pleasantries on the green, everyone retired to the chapel 
for the formal ceremonies and Mrs. Sargent's speech. A number of 
girls preceded her to the pulpit and read from their cue cards. The 
thanks spewed forth—to teachers, to staff, to Mrs. Van Waters, to Mrs. 
Sargent for all the marvelous and good things the Lancaster school had 
done for them. We were neck-deep in encomiums. An unsuspecting 
outsider might have thought he was at the finest girls' finishing school 
in New England. I stood off to one side, watching Mrs. Sargent's face 
for any reaction to what was being so well and carefully presented. She 
sat expressionless in the front row of the chapel. Finally, it was time for 
her address, but not before Mrs. Van Waters had her moment. She 
stood in front of the chapel and spoke movingly about how honored 
she, the staff, the guests, and the girls were to be visited by a governor's 
wife. It would be a memory the girls could take with them for life. Then 
she took her shot: there appeared to be some who didn't see the need 
for institutions like Lancaster and who failed to understand how neces­
sary such programs were if girls were to become productive ladies. 
Without a glance in my direction, she stated her hope that, in conversa­
tions with the governor, Mrs. Sargent would tell him of her day at 
Lancaster and of the need to support institutions like it in Massa­
chusetts. I admired Mrs. Van Waters' chutzpah. This quiet, supremely 
controlled woman, though approaching retirement, still wasn't about 
to let an outsider invalidate her work of building a model institution, 
epitomized in the strawberry festival. 
As Mrs. Sargent began her remarks, I hoped only for damage con­
trol. She stepped into the pulpit and spoke for all of three minutes. She 
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said nothing about Lancaster. She told the girls how pleased she was to 
meet them and wished them better days ahead as they went on with 
their lives in the world outside. Then she sat down. She hadn't taken 
the bait. I was dumbfounded. I glanced over at Mrs. Van Waters. Her 
face was fixed in a stiff and proper smile. 
After the ceremonies I accompanied Mrs. Sargent, along with her 
secretary and the plainclothes state patrolman, out to the waiting lim­
ousine. I thanked her for her support and told her how much it meant. 
It wasn't what I had expected. With a woman this unimpressed by 
appearances, there was hope for involvement beyond that expected of 
first ladies. Maybe she'd be up for seeing the other side of institutional 
life. 
I called her secretary a few days later and suggested we visit some 
institutions unannounced, preferably in off-hours. We arranged to 
meet at the Huntington Avenue Girls' Detention Center a couple of 
weeks later. The visit went unusually well. The girls were in the gym at 
their usual activities, seated in circles on the floor, conversing, playing 
jacks. A number were still in medical isolation. I'd put some of my own 
people in charge of the place, but conditions had a tendency to deterio­
rate whenever they weren't around. And, though it was not nearly so 
repressive as it had been a few months earlier, the overriding impres­
sion was one of apathy. Huntington Avenue seemed a good deal more 
representative than the strawberry festival. 
Mrs. Sargent spent most of her time talking quietly with individual 
girls. This polished Yankee woman wasn't in her element among these 
mostly street girls. But she handled matters in a soft-spoken, compe­
tent manner. Jessie Sargent came to know, however briefly, some of the 
inmates by listening to contradictory stories, accusations, frustrations, 
lapses of language and etiquette, and a few faint hopes. 
A week or so later, I suggested she meet the (supposedly) most 
dangerous delinquents in the department: the boys at the IJG. This was 
the institution the governor had vowed to clean up. Things had quieted 
down at the IJG, and though it had been an uphill fight, we'd made 
progress. I even talked publicly of the IJG as a model for how young­
sters could be humanely treated in an institution. But though there 
were no new scandals, the staff seemed to move in new directions only 
grudgingly. As happens in such situations, I was bent on proving, at 
least to myself, that things were better at the IJG than they actually 
were. 
Anticipating the Worst I 123 • 
I made arrangements to meet Mrs. Sargent at the institution late one 
afternoon. Herb Willman and I drove down from Boston. Along the 
way we got caught in a mile-long backup of cars on the interstate and 
almost missed the appointment. After a frazzling ride up the median 
strip, we arrived to find Mrs. Sargent waiting in her car along the road 
outside the main gate of the institution. I was relieved that she had 
waited instead of ringing the bell. I didn't want staff to know she was 
there. If they knew it was the governor's wife, they'd gussy things up, 
and I wanted her to see the place as it was lived in by the inmates. I told 
her I wasn't sure what we'd find. To be fair, I suppose if one visited the 
average family unannounced, one might come upon embarrassing, if 
not occasionally scandalous, situations. But our institutions weren't 
families, and the unexpected in them was wont to take an ugly turn. 
I rang the bell on the front gate. No answer. Then another ring . . . 
and another. Finally, after five or six minutes, a heavy-set, ill-kempt 
master ambled down the sidewalk from inside the main building. He 
came up to the gate and let our entourage in. He was notably unfriend­
ly and silent. I performed no introductions but attempted to make 
small talk with Mrs. Sargent as we walked up to the institution. 
We entered the quiet stone building, the sound of our heels echoing 
across the hard floors and up and down the empty hallways. It seemed 
empty of the hundred or so delinquent boys I knew were somewhere 
inside, although the ambience was familiar. Here and there was a piece 
of crumpled paper or pocket trash; the smell of urine assaulted us from 
a large puddle under the doorway of the congregate lavatory 
The boys and staff were in the walled yard. Our guide unlocked a 
door that opened into the walled yard. As he led us into the yard, there 
was a commotion. Boys ran in different directions for the wall. We'd 
stumbled into an escape attempt. There was a lot of yelling and swear­
ing from the staff in pursuit, with agitated shouts of encouragement 
and profanity from the rest of the inmates, who were ringed in the 
middle of the yard by other nervous guards. Though things were out of 
control, I was more perturbed than threatened. I noticed Mrs. Sar-
gent's plainclothes state trooper nervously fingering the revolver inside 
his suit coat. Mrs. Sargent stood next to me while I tried to explain 
what I thought was happening—though it hardly needed explanation. 
No one made it over the wall, but a couple of youngsters came close. 
They were dragged down, thrown to the ground, handcuffed, and 
beaten. Out of the din came a steady torrent of cursing, and the would­
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be escapees were carried off to isolation. Their rough handling stirred 
up the rest of the inmates. They were shouting and shaking fists as 
things continued to degenerate. The guards herded them into the gym, 
apparently hoping to contain a burgeoning riot more easily there. 
Once inside, the boys began to chant 'Tig, pig, pig'' and stomp their 
feet on the gym floor. As tension built, Herb and I waded into the gym 
among the youngsters and tried to defuse matters by talking to indi­
vidual teenagers and asking questions. We did this not so much to get 
answers as to let everyone save face in a scene which was growing 
progressively uglier. A loudmouthed youngster who had "fronted on" 
(confronted) a guard had to deliver on his threats. A chat with the 
commissioner might allow him to back away. He'd made an authority 
listen to him. Mrs. Sargent, meanwhile, remained remarkably cool. 
After a while things settled down, and the boys were taken one by 
one from the gym to their cells. I suggested that Mrs. Sargent meet 
them individually. She went from cell to cell and talked with a number 
of the boys she'd seen earlier in their stereotypical stances as violent 
young offenders. I introduced her by name to inmates, telling her 
something about each and his predicament. Then I left her to chat while 
I went to talk with staff about the situation we'd just witnessed. 
Mrs. Sargent spent the next hour or so talking through the small 
hinged holes in the doors, occasionally getting a guard to open a cell to 
allow her to speak confidentially with a particular boy. It wasn't a time 
for loud demands and aggressive stances. The boys whom she'd just 
seen cursing, shaking fists, and yelling threats were taken aback. Word 
got out that this interested woman was the governor's wife. The staff 
had apparently taken her to be a friend of mine or perhaps another do­
gooder I'd imported to the central office. It wasn't a particularly fair 
thing to do to Mrs. Sargent, but it made for a visit she wouldn't soon 
forget. As we walked back through the same hallway we'd traversed a 
couple of hours before, the trash on the floor had been retrieved, the 
urine mopped up. The place was already cleaner. 
We left the institution and were let out the gate. Standing there in the 
dusk, no one said much. I thanked Mrs. Sargent for taking the time to 
come to the IJG and expressed my hope that it hadn't been too upsetting 
an evening. She said it hadn't, adding that she didn't see how "people 
like that could be of much help to these boys." 
As Herb and I drove back to Boston, we mused over the meaning of 
the night's events. I presumed that Mrs. Sargent would whisper some­
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thing in the governor's ear later. Maybe it was time to leave the IJG. We 
had hoped to have the IJG boys in Topsfield by now, but it hadn't 
worked out. With no alternatives available, things were deteriorating at 
Bridgewater. Balancing the risk of dealing decisively with the nagging 
Bridgewater institution against the problems which might accompany 
its quick closing, I decided to take the chance. 
We would have a limited time to get the boys out of the IJG. Our 
opportunity was tied to the aftereffects of Mrs. Sargent's visit. If we 
waited, we'd lose it. She seemed appalled at what she'd seen. But this 
was conjecture, since I didn't ask her directly. Nor did I propose clos­
ing the institution either to Mrs. Sargent or to the governor. I figured 
Jessie would probably agree with my actions. I could ask for her sup­
port with her husband. And, in the case of Governor Sargent, as I later 
learned, moral suasion was usually enough. 
Before making any moves, I wanted as complete an evaluation of the 
youngsters as possible. What did we know about them? What kinds of 
services did they need? Who could go home? Who couldn't? We had no 
money for hiring outside clinicians. The few psychologists in our de­
partment seemed mediocre to incompetent, turning out cookbook-
type reports on the juveniles they evaluated. These reports followed 
youngsters throughout the system, becoming a permanent part of their 
history, hung around their necks albatross-like and ensuring a warped 
consistency in the misunderstandings which inevitably followed. Ob­
viously I couldn't depend on the reports we already had. At the time, 
there was still a general belief (since disproved) that a sharp clinician or 
a thorough battery of psychological tests could predict dangerousness. 
But even these questionable tools weren't available to us. 
I'd recently hired Bill Madaus, a young psychologist from the Uni­
versity of Massachusetts who had headed an Upward Bound program 
which brought inner-city youth into the university. (Bill later became 
assistant commissioner for clinical services.) He put together an in­
house team to decide which Bridgewater inmates could be safely pa­
roled home, which ones could be absorbed into other reform schools, 
and which ones would have to be confined to secure settings. The team 
was an unlikely ad hoc combination of line staff, administrators, and 
older inmates from within the system, all persons who had known 
most of the IJG boys over the years. We included a few inmates because of 
my experience in the service. The Air Force had found that, though psy­
chological and other tests were virtually useless in predicting whether a 
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basic trainee would make it successfully through his four-year hitch, a 
simple peer-group evaluation taken in the fifth week of basic training 
was highly accurate in predicting success or failure. Since the IJG was 
considered the end of the line, most of the boys had previously been in 
one or another of the other institutions. Though they weren't neces­
sarily the most dangerous by virtue of having committed particularly 
heinous crimes, they posed management problems of one kind or 
another in the reform schools. 
Jimmy, the boy I'd first seen shackled to his bed at the IJG, had 
never committed a crime against a person. He had come to us as an 
eight-year-old for having spread rumors about the neighbors. He 
would walk up and down the alleys of his neighborhood on the out­
skirts of Boston and paw through garbage and trash cans. If he found 
a whiskey bottle, he'd accuse a neighbor of having another life—of 
being a drunk or running around on his wife. He was an irritating 
enough youngster. If he had been appropriately evaluated at the start, 
the beginnings of serious mental disability would probably have been 
picked up. 
Instead, Jimmy was taken to court and committed to John Augustus 
Hall as a delinquent. He progressed through the various detention 
centers and reform schools. At fifteen he was still mouthing the same 
rumors, getting to the same staff members where it hurt most (for 
example, accusing them of being closet homosexuals), and informing 
for the police. The pattern which brought him to us had changed 
hardly at all, but the ante was upped. As the reaction of the department 
turned more hostile and occasionally brutal, Jimmy's threats grew 
more scary. He became thoroughly institutionalized. On occasion, 
when he'd been paroled, he ensured his return to reform school by 
calling his parole agent and threatening to burn down the agent's 
house. Although his threats had never been more than verbal, he was 
considered a dangerous juvenile. It seemed to me that, if he was, we 
had had a part in making him so. 
Bill's team decided that about a dozen youngsters needed to be kept 
in a locked setting. The rest could either be absorbed into the general 
populations of the other reform schools or sent home on parole. In 
retrospect, I can see that paroling the IJG inmates home was reckless, 
particularly in view of the fact that we had no additional supervision for 
them, but things went smoothly, and there were no incidents. Even the 
press coverage was positive. I took it that past scandals at the IJG 
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contributed to the relatively calm reception. Most people were relieved 
that something was being done to resolve a chronic irritation. 
The evaluations of the boys at the IJG took about ten days. Mean­
while, we met with Frank Ordway, the Lyman superintendent, to dis­
cuss the possibility of using a cottage there as our new secure program. 
Ordway was supportive of the idea. For a while we even toyed with 
using Cottage Nine at Shirley. Though the inmates there were now 
allowed to talk and move about, and we'd begun to get some minimal 
programming, the place still had an ominous reputation. I didn't want 
to move back into it—it wouldn't have mattered if it had been run by 
August Aichhorn himself. It still carried too much baggage. 
We didn't have a model for the new secure program. I decided on 
Guided Group Interaction (GGI). GGI, now renamed Positive Peer 
Culture, was in vogue in a few training schools across the country. It 
was devised by Harry Vorrath, a social worker at the 'Braining Institute 
of Central Ohio, the Ohio Youth Commission's facility for its most 
difficult delinquents. Since I'd been an occasional consultant to that 
commission when I taught at Ohio State, I'd come to know the model. 
At the time it was one of the only honest attempts to deal differently 
with difficult young people in state institutions. I knew that Harry was 
a caring person. I didn't think he'd misuse inmates or staff. Later, as I 
saw the model operate in our system, I had misgivings. But at the time 
GGI seemed the best way to get programming quickly for youngsters 
we were going to keep locked up. 
The state employees' union representative, Joe Correia, informed 
the union that we'd be closing the IJG in a couple of weeks. Joe was a 
skilled organizer who recognized the need for change in the depart­
ment. He was a man of his word and had credibility with the staff. I met 
with Joe, laid out our plans, and assured him that no staff would lose 
their jobs, but would be reassigned. Most of the other institutions were 
within reasonable driving distance of Bridgewater. The staff knew 
there was little chance of keeping Bridgewater open indefinitely, given 
the condition of the buildings and the agitation preceding the creation 
of the new department. Though there was little opposition, I don't 
think the staff really believed we were going to close the IJG. They were 
inured to missed deadlines and five-year plans. Meanwhile, Frank 
Ordway and Bob Brown got the cottage at Lyman in shape to accept the 
IJG youngsters. Harry Vorrath arrived and began training the staff in 
GGL 
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We didn't publicly announce the IJG'S closing until a day or so before 
it was padlocked. We quietly moved all the inmates and invited the 
media to tour the empty institution. The closing even got a bit of 
national attention, with Garrick Utley of NBC standing at the front and 
then fading into a voice-over on film of dank hallways and empty 
rooms in the broken-down old building. As I learned later, the televi­
sion reality is probably the most compelling reality to the average cit­
izen. The IJG was closed on the night it was announced on the "NBC 
Evening News." 
We moved the dozen or so most risky youngsters (though even all 
these weren't unusually dangerous) to the locked cottage we had set 
aside at Lyman. Some had simply not been with us long enough to 
satisfy the courts. Though they represented a minimal risk, we knew 
we would be vulnerable to attacks from judges, the press, and the 
legislature if a youngster was seen on the street a few weeks after being 
committed to us. The few boys we sent to Lyman were pleased to be 
out of the IJG, and the Lyman staff assigned to the new program had 
been fired up by Vorrath. All this took place only a few weeks after 
Mrs. Sargent's visit. It went so smoothly that I figured it must have 
been a fluke. The very idea of closing down a state institution seemed 
reckless. Doing it quickly seemed foolhardy. But most impolitic was 
first to close the reform school which held the so-called hard-core delin­
quents. We had done it backwards. This first deinstitutionalization was 
a series of makeshift solutions to a crisis, and though we made it 
through with no serious incidents, it wasn't the way to go. In the fall of 
1970, Harvard researchers summarized our first ten months. We had: 
• Closed Bridgewater's Institute for Juvenile Guidance, the secure unit for 
the most "hard to handle" youth. 
• Begun a full-scale push to bring a "therapeutic community" philosophy 
to Shirley Industrial School. Two-hour community meetings were held 
several times a week, with all staff and inmates in a cottage assembled to 
talk over mutual problems. Small group meetings had been introduced 
following seminars conducted by Harry Vorrath, outlining his "Guided 
Group Interaction" model. 
• Completed a successful two-day conference on the therapeutic commu­
nity featuring Dr. Maxwell Jones, the British pioneer in development of 
such communities. 
• Expanded vocational training, educational programs, and an experimen­
tal tutorial program using Harvard and MIT students. 
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Structured new recreational programs. 
Opened a girls' cottage on the grounds of Lyman in preparation for a 
therapeutic community program to begin in September (upon retirement 
of Mrs. Van Waters). 
Closed the farm and expanded visiting hours at the Lyman School. 
But the Harvard researchers warned: 
Staff at this time was deeply divided about the central administration's 
goals of a therapeutic community and how it might be best imple­
mented. . . . There was also great anxiety about job security given the 
new treatment orientation, and concern about the abandonment of more 
regimented, traditional methods for maintaining orderly routines and 
discipline, especially when the form and intent of the new treatment 
approaches were so little understood. . . . The major conflict between 
the school's administration and central office emerged when some of the 
runaways from'Lyman were granted release to parole. 
Staff at Lancaster were described as apprehensive over possible whole­
sale changes that might occur. The Harvard researchers summarized 
the conflicts between the institutions and the central office. 
Principal complaints by the [Lancaster] girls focused on desires for more 
coeducational functions and more humane considerations, e.g., an end 
to being locked in their rooms at night with only pails for toilet facilities. 
The basic difference between the Lancaster administration and the cen­
tral office concerning the credence to be given to the therapeutic commu­
nity concept of treatment was left unresolved and traditional treatment 
concepts remained dominant. . . . 
At Oakdale the staff was apprehensive about the new philosophy of 
the Boston office. This lack of sympathy for the concept of the therapeutic 
community was based on the rationale that young boys needed stronger 
authority figures and well-defined rules rather than increased freedom to 
make their own decisions, either individually or in groups. . . . 
Forestry camp was generally supportive of the new approach in 
central office. . . . Staff and boys maintained easy communicative rela­
tionships and the small size, varied work assignments in the community 
and park service, attractive surroundings and the challenge of an "Out­
ward Bound" type of program created a social climate to which boys 
seemed to respond positively.4 
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Overall, I was pleased with our progress. But others saw things dif­
ferently. At about the same time, Special Justice Charles Mahoney, a 
leader of the Committee for Youth in Trouble, which had agitated for the 
reform legislation, called the reorganization a failure. He cited continu­
ing abuse and neglect of children in the institutions, imprudent and 
unwise spending for capital purposes, a failure of executive leadership, 
poor budgetary support, and gross overstaffing. I couldn't disagree. I 
told the Boston Globe a few weeks later: 
After one year on the job, it's begun to dawn on me how difficult change 
is: there hasn't been much. There's a facade of change. One can easily 
give the impression of change, but in fact, as far as the treatment of the 
youngsters is concerned, there's not been very much. I hadn't antici­
pated the staying power of this bureaucracy. There's been movement, not 
change. 
Here's how the Globe summed things up : 
Dissension and division still run rampant in the Department of Youth 
Services where politics continues to play a more important role than the 
rehabilitation of delinquent youngsters. . . . Miller is not very politically 
oriented. But almost everyone else in the department is well versed in 
how to use politics to advantage. Even some of Miller's closest advisers 
have undermined his work behind his back. . . . 
Virtually alone, Miller spent a year running a holding action and 
trying to develop new programs for the department. No reorganization 
could change the personnel problems. Most of the department's 900 
employees got their jobs through political connections. . . . For the 
majority of youth service employees, Miller's attitudes have been un­
acceptable. These employees have spent most of their years viewing all 
delinquents as hardened criminal types. It was all right to use physical 
brutality, as long as you didn't get caught. Long-term solitary confine­
ment was a regular method of discipline, although it was officially 
prohibited. . . . When Miller arrived he called on the staff to be more 
involved, to take an interest in youngsters. He developed training semi­
nars to help employees understand some of the problems and attitudes of 
the young people they supervised. Some employees supported Miller. 
But the vast majority, including men in high posts, began to undermine 
him. So far, Miller has not proved to be a very good administrator. He has 
been slow to get programs active—as much the result of lack of new top 
level staff and limited funding.5 
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Reforming a large state agency by concentrating on the plight of an 
individual youngster no doubt seemed naive. But for me, particularly 
during that first year, it offered hope for change along with the per­
sonal solace that, at least for this young person, I was able to do some­
thing. In this sense it was my escape. When I looked at the grand 
strategies being taken by my peers in other states, I was intimidated. 
Toward the end of that first year, I received a brochure outlining Michi-
gan's five-year plan for juvenile corrections from reform schools to 
community-based alternatives. The slick public relations packet laid 
out the plan and projected budgets; types of programs were illustrated 
in the glossy pictures and elegant graphs. Meanwhile, I was preparing 
our own first annual report at the dining room table on an old Hermes 
3000 typewriter, banging it out from rough notes and rougher statistics. 
My secretary, Peg Neely, put the messy text on stencils and ran it off on 
the rattling mimeograph machine at the back of the office. 
Though we planned differently, and with some eccentricity, we had 
begun to redefine the issues—more a matter of symbols and gestures 
than of sound management policies. Fifteen years later, Michigan, with 
its coterie of professional human service administrators and managers, 
was passing some of the most repressive juvenile legislation in the 
nation and locking up more children than ever. 
11 Doing Least Harm: 
Humane Institutions 
A year after I was sworn in, the legislature finally approved funds to 
hire the assistant commissioners created by the reform legislation. 
Father Drinan had been right. They'd created a new department and 
then refused to fund it not so much because of any impulse to be frugal 
as to ensure that I was controllable before they put any further re­
sources at my disposal. The hope had been that I'd make cosmetic 
changes and appoint credentialed politicos, but it wasn't happening 
that way. There'd been talk of de-funding my position if I chose not to 
resign. By now, however, I'd gotten about as stubborn as my predeces­
sor had been. I told a somewhat startled governor's aide that I planned 
to stay in the position and would drive a cab at night to support myself 
if necessary. I would not go quietly. 
But at least we finally had assistant commissioners in charge of 
aftercare, clinical services, education, and institutions. In anticipation, 
we'd frozen vacated institutional staff positions and hired Bill Madaus, 
the person I intended to appoint assistant commissioner for clinical 
services. He in turn had recommended a consultant to his program, 
Yitzhak Bakal, to head the Bureau of Institutions. Yitzhak was a sophis­
ticated psychiatric social worker with a particular interest in working 
with delinquent youngsters. Before emigrating to the United States, he 
had worked in the Tel Mond youth corrections facility in Israel. 
Tom Jeffers had his graduate degree in education and had been voted 
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teacher of the year by high school students in the Columbus school 
system. He was later a prime mover in the successful CETA program we 
set up at Ohio State University. I asked him to head our Bureau of 
Educational Services. Though he fit the qualifications, that was not 
uppermost in my mind. I wanted someone who shared similar values 
and could be trusted. Tom was a friend. As it turned out, he probably 
more than anyone in the department kept me straight and saw that 
things were kept in perspective. 
Initially I appointed a long-time employee, George O'Shea, as as­
sistant commissioner for Aftercare, but after a couple of months he 
asked to resign, citing the pressures as more than he wanted to take on. 
He returned to another administrative position. George was well con­
nected in the legislature, and I assumed that as my relations there 
began to deteriorate, he saw me as an albatross around his neck. I was 
eventually able to recruit Joe Leavey, who till then had been a deputy 
in the Division of Child Guardianship, the state's child welfare system. 
I'd first met Joe along with a state legislator, Phil Johnston, after the 
Topsfield town meeting, when they came up to offer support and 
condolences. 
Accountability 
Anyone who's tried to get help from government already knows some­
thing about unresponsive bureaucracy. State human service admin­
istrators are seldom held accountable. Since their clientele comes from 
the lower end of the socioeconomic totem pole, in "human service" 
bureaucrats are at their least responsive. A middle-class citizen trying 
to renew a driver's license may have to wait a couple of hours in a 
Department of Motor Vehicles office; citizens seeking welfare assis­
tance or public mental health services must inure themselves to endless 
lines and day-long waits. The difficulty of getting any humane response 
from government bureaucracies increases exponentially when, in addi­
tion to being poor, the client is delinquent or criminal. In such situa­
tions, accountability even becomes inappropriate. What right does a 
young tough have to demand anything from those assigned to guard or 
treat him? The very idea is absurd. At this point state bureaucrats begin 
talking about responsibility to that unquantifiable entity, the public. As 
the word leaves their lips, bureaucrats' accountability departs from the 
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deliberations and dissolves into career padding and political tuft-hunt-
ing. Unresponsiveness becomes integral to the rehabilitative ideology. 
The system uses its own intransigence to measure the client's patience 
and maturity. 
I do not question the fact that there are dangerous youngsters who 
need to be held against their will, but this sad reality carries its own set 
of problems unrelated to crime and punishment. The unintended by-
product of keeper-captive coupling is a bureaucracy which is by law 
unaccountable to those it holds and, somewhat oddly, purports to 
serve. That would be an unhealthy situation for even the most efficient 
manager. 
If Phillips Exeter Academy, Andover, Choate, or similar respected 
prep schools were filled only with captive students ordered there by 
courts and forbidden to leave under penalty of longer imprisonment, 
the standards of even the best of faculty and administrators would 
shortly go downhill. Though altruism might salvage things for a while, 
it makes a notoriously undependable base for long-term policy. 
I thought I could get over this contradiction. We would respond 
sensitively to each individual youngster while recognizing our public 
responsibility. In the abstract, these goals aren't, contradictory, but in 
the political arena which defines corrections, they quickly become so. 
Control slides toward punishment, treatment turns to threats, and 
decency is eaten away. Society wants its pound of flesh even as it offers 
sympathy. The captive client must be cooperative while suffering our 
ministrations. If our help fails the fault is the inmate's. 
In one of the most important analyses in the criminological liter­
ature, the great American social theorist George Herbert Mead posed 
the dilemma this way: 
It is quite impossible psychologically to hate the sin and love the sinner. 
We are very much given to cheating ourselves in this regard. We assume 
that we can detect, pursue, indict, prosecute, and punish the criminal 
and still retain toward him the attitude of reinstating him in the commu­
nity as soon as he indicates a change in social attitude himself, that we 
can at the same time watch for the definite transgression of the statute to 
catch and overwhelm the offender, and comprehend the situation out of 
which the offense grows. But the two attitudes, that of control of crime by 
the hostile procedure of the law and that of control through comprehen­
sion of social and psychological conditions, cannot be combined. To 
understand is to forgive, and the social procedure seems to deny the very 
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responsibility which the law affirms, and on the other hand the pursuit 
by criminal justice inevitably awakens the hostile attitude in the offender 
and renders the attitude of mutual comprehension practically impossible. 
The social worker in the court is the sentimentalist, and the legalist in the 
social settlement in spite of his learned doctrine is the ignoramus.1 
Attempts to skirt this inherent conflict plagued our reforms from the 
start. Since I believed that whatever we accomplished would be shortly 
undone anyway, I decided to do least harm and make things a bit more 
normal for our clientele while I was able. If along the way I could 
structure the department in such a way as to make it harder for any 
successor to beat a retreat to the old days, so much the better. Mead was 
right. We can't have it both ways. Some, like Roscoe Pound, recognized 
this from the beginning.2 If the implied promise of the juvenile court 
had been realized, all of criminal law would have had to be rethought. 
Not surprisingly, that never happened. Those who devised, set up, and 
ran the juvenile court, and the juvenile corrections systems which fol­
lowed, have turned from these difficult and profound implications. 
I decided to emphasize the stated goals of the legislation: preven­
tion, help, education, and training. They embodied the ambivalence to 
which Mead alluded. No one looking at the reform school system could 
honestly conclude that those goals were what it was about. The system 
was, above all, meant to be a threat—a "deterrent." True reform would 
have to ignore this tacit understanding—the unstated expectation that 
we would dispense punishment and call it treatment. We would do 
good and mollycoddle with proudly bleeding hearts. But of course we 
never did. The fear of an incident, the anger of a judge, the threat of a 
legislator, each brought its own compromise. None of them had much 
point beyond the need to survive a while. 
Staff Training 
Maxwell Jones was on my mind. His was the original therapeutic com­
munity before the term was stolen by the current crop of authoritarian 
gurus. Jones had run successful experiments in patient government in 
Scotland at Dingleton Hospital and in a small institution for the crimi­
nally insane outside London. I had never met him, but now seemed a 
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great opportunity. I would ask his help in turning our brutal facilities 
into therapeutic communities. 
After phoning around half the world, I located Jones in the southwest­
ern United States, where he was visiting. I invited him to conduct a few 
days of seminars and staff training on the grounds of one of our reform 
schools. He was enthusiastic about the possibilities, and arrived in Boston 
a few weeks later to conduct a three-day seminar for DYS staff and admin­
istrators. The sessions were conducted in the auditorium/gym at Shirley. 
Jones began with a lecture about his concept of how inmates should 
have some say in their own destiny, in setting goals, and in sharing 
some power. This was not what staff wanted to hear, though Jones's 
model wasn't all that radical. Only minimal power having to do with 
day-to-day institutional routines was shared. It seemed like a common­
sense model, and I'd seen it work in various psychiatric wards. 
Jones was a skilled clinician who knew the boundaries of shared re­
sponsibility in institutions with captives. His manner was direct as he 
worked with staff and inmates in joint meetings. This commingling of 
people was revolutionary enough. To have a conference of keepers and 
captives where either group could ask questions, object, or participate 
on a nearly equal footing for a few hours created a feeling of ferment 
and change. But things weren't very peaceful, despite Jones's attempts 
to keep them so. 
Many staff in this first plenary session seized on it as a chance to 
voice their opposition as a group to any proposed changes. The in­
mates seemed to view the whole affair with detached and amused 
bewilderment. Occasionally a boy would rise to ask a simple question 
or make a halting comment. They were the best behaved of the lot. 
But large meetings were Jones's forte. Within a few hours, he had the 
participants asking questions and sharing ideas for better-run and 
more humane institutions. Things were going too smoothly. In the 
middle of the discussion, an assistant superintendent stood and an­
nounced that all the boys would now have to leave the auditorium and 
go outside to be counted. He couldn't have timed it better. It threw me 
off balance. I was already viewed as too intrusive, and I didn't want to 
humiliate him in front of the whole department. I made no objection, 
but his move destroyed any fleeting idea a youngster might have had 
that we took all this talk of sharing and involvement seriously. Out they 
marched in single file to be counted while the meeting inside con­
tinued. It broke Jones's stride as well, though he was too polite to object 
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and tried to put a good face on the fast-deteriorating situation. Then 
came the retaliation. 
After lunch the inmates were herded back into the gym. They were 
barely seated when a cottage master ran down the center aisle shouting 
that a boy had just stolen his car. There was another hubbub as staff ran 
from the gym to form up for the chase. The young man was caught 
within half an hour and returned. By now, Jones was getting a feel for 
our department. It was not Dingleton or even an institution for the 
criminally insane. It had its own peculiar set of problems. 
On the second day things settled down. Though some staff made a 
show of walking out—ostensibly because of Jones's earthy language, 
some seemed to be actually enjoying themselves. Then the familiar 
politics emerged. During a relatively involved group interchange, up 
rose George Bourque, a portly legislator from Fitchburg. George had 
his own agenda and a coterie of patronage employees at Shirley. He 
usually cut a fine figure with his white hair and booming voice. Now he 
was waving in the air what looked like a paperback. It was Jerry Rubin's 
Do It!3 Apparently a student tutor had left a copy in the institution's 
library. It provided an opportunity for George to deliver a rousing 
speech about permissiveness and outsiders countenancing revolution. 
No wonder the inmates were in constant revolt; they were being en­
couraged by subversive tracts. His comments ignored the fact that 
virtually none of the inmates bothered to frequent the library, and the 
book he waved had not a single dog-eared page. He found a receptive 
audience among the staff, who loudly applauded and buzzed their 
support. I made the mistake of trying to respond seriously. But Bourque 
had gotten his message across: the legislator as staff protector, me as 
radical stranger. The next day Maxwell Jones left, stripped of the opti­
mism he had shown on his arrival. As I left him at Logan Airport, he 
commented softly that perhaps his model didn't work in all settings. 
We worked at creating a more humane atmosphere in the institu-
tions—treatment programs, coed cottages, camping, and new educa­
tional programs. I hung onto the hope of salvaging the institutions and 
making them Utopian havens of concern and care, a refuge for young 
people who, because of their behavior, had to be exiled. By most mea­
sures we succeeded. When we decided to close the institutions, they 
were among the more decent reform schools in the nation (for whatever 
that's worth). If we had wished to, we could have touted them as 
models for a different kind of Massachusetts Experiment. 
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Finding Allies: The Three Pauls 
Much of my time was spent reconnoitering the department for anyone 
who shared an interest in doing things differently. I had little to offer in 
salaries or promotions, and the rumors that I probably wouldn't last 
very long were persistent. Nevertheless, we were able to put together a 
group of inside supporters who kept things running those first months. 
Paul Dichaut, a former Navy man who'd been on the staff at Shirley 
for over a decade, had been a cottage supervisor and had a reputation 
for brooking no resistance from inmates. He wasn't above occasionally 
knocking a kid off the wall, but I'd also heard that he'd tired of that role 
and supported some of the proposed reforms in the cottages. Herb 
Willman arranged a meeting with Paul one rainy evening at a Howard 
Johnson's a few miles from Shirley. He and I arrived early and went 
inside. Paul drove up later, peered in through the fogged-up windows, 
and saw us sitting inside. He then called from a telephone booth out­
side and paged Herb to make sure that the coast was clear. He didn't 
want any Shirley staff to see him with me. Though Paul agreed to 
support us, I had to act as if I didn't know him when I visited Shirley. I 
eventually made him superintendent, and he presided over the closing 
of the institution. 
One administrator stood apart from the otherwise bland assem-
blage—Paul Leahy, the superintendent of the Worcester detention cen­
ter. Worcester was a breath of air, a coed facility with youngsters exud­
ing a healthy adolescent volubility, reassuring blather, activity, and 
hope. A streetwise social worker and the only M.S.W. in the depart­
ment, Leahy presided calmly and competently. He didn't chase run­
aways; he had no tombs, no silence rules, no head calls. He encouraged 
staff to care, and he flooded his small institution with college student 
volunteers. An unannounced visit was welcome. And it all worked. 
Although Paul was a trained social worker, his effectiveness was almost 
wholly unrelated to his professional training. I could never have relied 
solely on professionalism for the kind of concern and commitment Paul 
gave. The decency of the Worcester institution was a result of his cha­
risma and personal devotion. 
This was brought home to me a few years later when, as part of 
filming an ABC documentary on Massachusetts (never aired), I returned 
to Worcester. Paul was gone, and the place was frightening: a fourteen-
year-old sat in a straight chair facing the wall; the silence was heavy, 
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kids sitting at bare tables glared out angrily; the staff complained that 
not enough young people were locked up; and the hostility was as 
palpable as it had been before Paul Leahy came. Worcester had a pro­
gram called the "Bouncer" program, designed to incarcerate young­
sters who "bounced" out of community-based programs and to give 
them a taste of jail, to show how disgusting detention could be. Its 
rationale was deterrence, the same flawed premise that had sustained 
Massachusetts institutions for a century and a half. Worcester was 
another example of the fragility of caring institutions.4 But Paul was a 
symbol of hope, the only superintendent in the department who (I felt) 
understood what I was about and what I wanted to do. He was re­
spected in the Worcester community and had been able to keep the old 
YSB administrators at bay, running his program unmolested by the 
more conservative bureaucrats in the Boston office. 
When I told him of my concerns, particularly that Shirley was falling 
apart, he offered his help. At Herb's suggestion, I asked Paul to take a 
leave from Worcester and run Shirley. He agreed reluctantly. I in­
formed the Shirley superintendent that Paul would be my represen­
tative on the grounds. Paul arrived just as a front-page story appeared 
in the Worcester Telegram. A large picture of the institution behind 
an inset of the superintendent was topped by a headline suggesting 
that in the past, horrible things had gone on at Shirley. The article was 
the result of interviews I'd done with Eric Best, then a cub reporter 
with the Telegram. Best had done his homework and had put together 
an accurate story, and the Shirley staff blamed me for the negative 
press. 
The morning the article appeared, I got a call from Shirley's assistant 
superintendent telling me that the story had devastated the superin­
tendent. He upbraided me for involving myself with the press and for 
giving the school a bad name after years of public acceptance. I tried to 
reassure him that it was not my intention to make anyone a scapegoat. 
I doubt that he believed me. I had made moves to render the superin­
tendent powerless to run the institution, though I couldn't legally 
vacate his position. 
Paul Leahy arrived at Shirley with some Holy Cross students who 
had worked as volunteers and part-time staff at the Worcester deten­
tion center. He was to have line authority to run the institution. Under­
standably, the superintendent was miffed and refused to talk to Paul. 
Most Shirley staff followed suit. After a meeting with administrative 
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and line staff, Paul emerged with the impression that, at best, he would 
be able to depend on half a dozen staff for support. Within a few days he 
found himself relying on the few college students he'd brought along. 
Staff actively sabotaged his efforts to phase out repressive practices at 
the school. Paul reacted by recruiting present Shirley youngsters whom 
he'd known in Worcester. He formed a team led by seventeen-year-old 
Mike Radon on which he could depend for information and for telling 
him who would have credibility with the inmates on the grounds.5 
Within a few weeks, Shirley was turned upside down. Some staff 
refused to enter the cottages, and Paul had to rely on the inmates to 
keep order and convey information. But the number of escapes sub­
sided, and there were no major outbreaks of violence. We continued to 
develop more group programs in the cottages. But Paul couldn't stay at 
Shirley indefinitely. He was away from the Worcester center too much, 
and he worried that it might deteriorate. I had to look for other ways of 
keeping Shirley under control. 
Paul DeMuro had joined our staff in late 1970 as a consultant. I say 
"joined our staff" with some reservation, since when Paul arrived from 
Ohio we had no position open for him. We had to give him a vacant 
janitor's slot at Shirley. Paul had no experience in working with de­
linquents short of the street-smarts he grew up with in West Phila­
delphia. When I met him at Ohio State, he was working on a Ph.D. 
in English literature. At first I asked Paul to help with planning in 
the central office. He evaluated all the reform schools. As things con­
tinued to simmer at Shirley, I asked if he would mind going out to 
Shirley and running the institution so that Paul Leahy could get back to 
Worcester. 
DeMuro arrived on the Shirley grounds as my second acting super­
intendent (still being paid as a janitor). His first task was getting into 
his office. The superintendent was still on paid vacation, and I in­
formed the other administrators that Paul DeMuro would be the new 
acting superintendent. This did not go over very well. Paul asked for 
the key to the superintendent's office. If there was one, apparently no 
one was about to give it to him, and he was told no one had it. With my 
approval, Paul convinced a friendly maintenance man to drill out the 
lock on the office door. While this was going on, the institutional chap­
lain showed up with a camera, took a picture, and accused Paul of 
breaking and entering. Incidents like these set the mood for the final 
phasedown of Shirley. 
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The Misunderstood Memo 
By Christmas 1970, things had quieted down. Governor Sargent won 
the election, and our bad publicity subsided. We felt secure enough to 
send four hundred youngsters home for the holidays, and only two 
failed to return on time. But something else was contributing to the 
calm, something I hadn't noticed until it was well under way. Inmate 
populations were falling dramatically. At first I thought it was because 
the judges, in disgust over our alleged permissiveness, were sending 
us fewer delinquent youngsters. Boston Juvenile Court Judge Poitrast, 
for example, hadn't made any secret of his feelings. He wanted more 
disciplined institutions which kept youngsters longer. 
Poitrast was on our advisory board and strongly criticized almost 
everything I did. I took his comments about the short length of stay 
young people had in DYS to be sour grapes over my opposition to his 
legislative request to fund his court's acquisition of an abandoned Nike 
missile site in the Blue Hills section of Boston. He wanted to run his 
own institution for recalcitrant youngsters he saw ill served in DYS. But 
Judge Poitrast's objections weren't simply sour grapes. 
Though I'd placed a few individual youngsters in the community, I 
had no policy of early release. But still the populations at the reform 
schools were falling. I concluded that judges had begun waiving kids to 
adult court. Yet waivers weren't rising that much, and when we looked 
at commitments, we found that judges were actually sending us a few 
more young people than in the past. Then why the lower populations 
in the reform schools? Clearly, we were sending inmates home much 
earlier. I decided to stop the practice, since it was a political land mine. 
I sent out a memo meant to stress that youths sent us by the courts 
should be kept longer. To avoid reckless releases of youngsters, I wrote 
that no youth should be considered for parole until after at least three 
months. The implication was that they should stay longer, probably 
nine months or more. I thought staff were probably releasing risky 
inmates early in hopes of creating incidents, and I meant the memo to 
be conservative, but it was interpreted to mean that every youngster 
sent to our reform schools must be paroled within ninety days or less. 
This wasn't my conscious intention. But I fear that my words betrayed 
my unconscious desire, and the staff picked up on the fact. 
And yet, with the exception of Judge Poitrast, no one seemed much 
troubled by the early releases. No judges had written or called me. 
142 / Reforming Reform Schools 
There hadn't been any speeches about them in the legislature. There 
were no press conferences by prosecutors, no political columns, and 
no incidents. It hadn't become an issue. Meanwhile, the reform school 
populations continued to dwindle. I decided to keep my mouth shut. 
When it came time to close the reform schools, they had their lowest 
populations in decades. 
The Changing of the Guard 
At about this time another problem that had been simmering finally 
boiled over. Though the reform schools were quiet, Roslindale was in 
turmoil. Overcrowding had worsened with the placement of girls on 
one floor of the facility, and the staff seemed incapable of handling 
youngsters differently. Nowhere in the department were the traditions 
of the old YSB more entrenched than in the place the kids called Rozzie. 
In early 1971, the escape rate soared. A Boston television station began 
its Sunday night news with the comment that there were certain fixed 
ceremonies in society, among them the changing of the guard at Buck­
ingham Palace and the weekend escapes from Roslindale. As a political 
columnist for the Boston Globe put it, " Sunday nights at the Judge John 
J. Connelly Youth Center in Roslindale, it's every youth for himself. 
While the rest of Roslindale settles down for an evening of TV, the 
inmates at the DYS facility start packing."6 Doors were left open. Staff 
called in sick. In one case, seven youngsters were put into a single-
bunk room and given a crowbar by a staff member. When they weren't 
out the window in an hour, he returned and asked them what was 
taking so long. 
I appointed Frank Masciarelli, an experienced former cottage super­
visor from Lyman, superintendent of Roslindale, but despite his best 
efforts, the staff continued their revolt. The building (originally a re­
form itself) added to the problem, for it was poorly designed, poorly 
heated, had no air conditioning, and even when calm created a siege 
mentality in the inmates. The recreation areas were cramped, the gym 
was dangerous, the outside yard was unusable because boys were for­
ever climbing over or under the security fence, and there was insuffi­
cient space for programming. A 1970 Massachusetts Supreme Court 
ruling had resulted in doubling the population. Kids were sleeping two 
to a single room, in the hallways, and on the gym floor. 
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I looked around for more space. We were already using the gym, 
classrooms, and occasionally the dining hall for sleeping quarters. But 
there were two untouched areas: the chapels—a reasonably spacious 
Protestant chapel and a large Catholic chapel. They were used for 
services for perhaps a dozen youngsters an hour a week. It didn't seem 
right that these areas be left unused where the need was so great. 
I met with Cardinal Medieros, head of the Boston archdiocese, to 
suggest combining the chapels and using the larger one for additional 
program, classroom, or living space. I was familiar with the arrange­
ments in the military, where multipurpose chapels were the rule: Prot­
estants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims, and others all used the same space. I 
had this model in mind when I met Cardinal Medieros. The meeting 
didn't go well. He had no intention of allowing the Catholic chapel to 
be used in any way other than it had been since its opening. With the 
Roslindale chaplain at his side, he noted that the chapel had been 
designated an oratory by the Vatican and was therefore untouchable for 
use in any other fashion. It didn't help matters when I wrote to him that 
it seemed unchristlike to maintain an empty chapel while youngsters 
lived down the hall in inhuman conditions. A few days after I had sent 
my letter, I got a call from the governor's office telling me to drop the 
subject. 
As the overcrowding persisted, staff problems became even more 
ominous. One day a youngster from Revere happened by my office and 
commented that boys were being let out of Roslindale to deliver stolen 
goods for organized crime. After the deliveries, they returned to Ros­
lindale provided with an alibi—"! was in detention/' There were other 
allegations that certain favored boys were being let out to steal specific 
items on order for some staff. I took a statement from one youngster 
about his own (unreported) weekend escape from Roslindale, during 
which he went to a parking lot near Fenway Park and stole a set of high-
tech tires from a car for a unit supervisor. The youngster gave me 
the date, time, description of auto, brand of tires, and staff member's 
name. I reported it to the district attorney's office, but I didn't have the 
impression they were much interested, and I never heard about the 
matter again. 
I chalked that up to the fact that I wasn't much of a favorite with local 
prosecutors. Earlier I had been lumped with cop-killers by the Boston 
police chief because I'd sought Law Enforcement Assistance Admin­
istration (LEAA) funding for a specialized tutorial program at Shirley 
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Industrial School. A couple of years before I arrived, a program using 
the same acronym had been started in one of the adult prisons. One 
of the teachers (a Brandeis University undergraduate) got involved 
with an inmate in a bank robbery, ostensibly for revolutionary rea­
sons. A policeman was killed. The fact that we had Harvard and MIT 
students acting as tutors at Shirley apparently put me among the revo­
lutionaries in the eyes of the police commissioner even though there 
had never been any incidents in our tutorial program. The highly suc­
cessful program, called Step, had been set up by Babette Spiegel, 
a committed teacher and the wife of Boston psychiatrist John Spie­
gel, himself a nationally respected expert on the causes and treatment 
of violence. But the success of the program was beside the political 
point. 
As things worsened at Roslindale, Frank Masciarelli started sus­
pending staff, and I began getting death threats. One bizarre incident 
involved Steve Delancey, a sixteen-year-old Irish boy who, along with 
his sidekick, Joey Bruno, had been in and out of DYS institutions and 
detention centers since his early teens. Late one morning, Steve 
dropped by my office and casually mentioned that someone was going 
to shoot me with a rifle in the next week or two. He said a contract had 
been taken out on me. I laughed, but knowing Steve's occasional 
involvement with adults connected to mob activity, I couldn't totally 
dismiss his comment: "You'd best watch your step, Miller. They're 
gonna kill you." 
After work, I strolled over to the Golden Dome, a dank bar opposite 
the side entrance to the statehouse. One of our staff was at a table with 
some friends. He was the nephew of a reputed head of New England 
organized crime, and he'd been referred for his job by a ranking mem­
ber of the legislature. I joined him for a beer, and in the course of the 
conversation quietly mentioned Steve's comments about my impend­
ing demise. He looked concerned. 
"Do you want me to see if it's real, Doc?" 
I mumbled, "O .K.," somewhat taken aback that he might actually be 
able to find out such information. He excused himself from the table, 
went over to a pay phone in a corner of the bar, and stood there talking 
for at least ten minutes before he came back to the table. 
"I don't think you have to worry, Doc. The guy is a small-time punk 
and can't deliver Would you like to have a driver for a few weeks?" 
"A what?" 
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"A driver, you know—someone to pick you up at the house every 
morning and deliver you safe to work, and take you home at night. I can 
arrange it for you/' 
I thanked him and said I wouldn't need a driver as tactfully as 
possible, since he had clearly made the offer out of genuine concern. 
As the summer of 1971 approached, conditions at Roslindale got 
worse. The building was deteriorating, and we had no funds to up­
grade it. If I had requested money from the legislature to build a new 
detention center, I could have gotten it, since they were always in the 
mood to build. But I thought the place was already overused, and the 
majority of the youngsters didn't need to be in a maximum-security 
building. Besides, if we built a new, larger detention center, it would 
shortly be filled to overflowing. What I needed was alternative place­
ments for most of Roslindale's population. I hadn't gotten far finding 
them, and overcrowding was a daily crisis. For example, every time I 
thought things were under control, I would stop by and be appalled. 
The atmosphere hadn't changed much since the first day I had walked 
in two years before. I had made a major error in talking the Boston 
Legal Assistance Project into deferring a suit over conditions at Roslin­
dale. They had trusted me to change things and didn't want to add to 
my burdens during our continuing crisis. But by now every visit had 
become an adventure, and not the kind that has a happy ending. 
One night Bobby Bolster and I went out to the facility to check on 
things. I passed a staff member in the hallway and, coming upon a 
locked door, turned around to see Bobby holding the red-faced guy up 
against the wall by his neck as he shouted in his face and threatened to 
bust his guts. As I approached, he let him down. "Jerry, the son-of-a-
bitch called you a Nazi." Though I was moved by Bobby's loyalty, it was 
clear that things were desperate at Roslindale. 
The following week, while I was working late in my office, I got a call 
from a supervisor saying he thought Roslindale was again on the verge 
of riot. I called Tom Jeffers and we drove out. The place was sweltering; 
the boys milled shoulder to shoulder in the cramped dayrooms. Tom 
and I waded in, making small talk and trying to defuse the anger. 
Adding to the tension was the fact that a number of the youngsters had 
been brought in by police late in the day and hadn't been fed. Tom 
called a local Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise and ordered a couple 
hundred chicken dinners. Fried chicken was our riot-control technique 
for the night. It worked, but it was hardly a long-term solution. 
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Summer sweated on and Roslindale still had no air conditioning. 
We'd submitted a number of budget requests but had been turned 
down by the House ways and means committee. The idea of making 
things comfortable for delinquents apparently rubbed the members the 
wrong way. While they dawdled, the place got more crowded, smelly, 
and dangerous. We had one slight hope of solving the problem. Two 
years earlier Coughlan had ordered new security windows for the 
whole building. He wanted to upgrade security and decided to install 
the latest in tempered steel, the kind which were being put in the 
Adolescent Remand Center on Rikers Island in New York City. I didn't 
want any more hardware coming into Roslindale, but the windows 
were a jalousie type, allowing for the passage of more air than the old 
slant-hinged type that came with the building. The new windows 
finally arrived, but they were neither escape-proof nor cooling. 
It had occurred to me that if we could put staff in the buildings and 
rooms where the inmates were kept and move inmates to those areas 
where the staff were ensconced, the institutions would perk up consid­
erably. Even the most ancient institutions seemed to manage air condi­
tioning in the administrative offices. I decided to try a variation on this 
theme, submitting a budget request for large window air conditioners 
for the Boston central office. It was quickly approved. The day the 
machines arrived, we hauled them off to Roslindale and installed them 
in the dayrooms. It was illegal, but I doubted that anyone in the legisla­
ture or the auditor's office would care to make it an issue. 
Other problems seemed beyond remedy. None of the bathrooms in 
the institutions had stalls around the toilets, and there were no toilet 
seats. When I asked why inmates had no privacy, the answer was that 
the boys might masturbate. This seemed a curious fear. Reform school 
regimens were so depersonalizing, and the reform school world so 
unreal, that troubled youngsters routinely grounded themselves in 
masturbatory fantasy. But why no toilet seats? For fear a youngster 
might rip a seat off and use it as a weapon. Yet how many youngsters 
had been sent to us by the courts for ripping seats off toilets and 
attacking citizens with them? It was an extremely rare offense. At 
Roslindale, though, the staff believed in it. We had added a new twist to 
the delinquent repertoire, and the fact that a toilet seat attack hadn't 
occurred in the memory of any staff I asked was beside the point. A 
threatening new reality had been created. 
Meanwhile, the Huntington Avenue detention facility was pre­
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maturely deinstitutionalized when a girl locked in isolation managed 
to set fire to her mattress. She got out of the room unharmed, but the 
fire spread into the hallway. The near tragedy gave me a much-needed 
opportunity. I called a few legislators to come out and view the fire. The 
press was all over the place. Two legislators were on the scene within 
twenty minutes. I announced to the television cameras that we were 
lucky to have escaped worse and that we didn't plan ever to use the 
facility again. The legislators nodded their approval, thereby also giv­
ing me the nod to close it. 
In fact, the fire had not been very widespread. Though there was a 
lot of smoke, the flames were confined to a couple of rooms in the 
intake area. Most of the building was untouched, but no one bothered 
to look closely. That afternoon we bused the girls off to Roslindale 
before anyone could suggest we go back in and clean up the mess. The 
damage to the building was later estimated by the fire department at 
$7,500, a small price for closing Huntington Avenue. Though we had 
more than our share of problems integrating them into Roslindale, 
most of the girls eventually went into shelter care and foster arrange­
ments. A smaller number of girls were kept in locked detention. 
Progress at Last 
By fall 1971, runs had subsided and staff had given up on the more 
blatant types of sabotage. Bill, Yitzhak, and Tom had worked hard at 
setting up alternatives for juveniles awaiting trial, and they had ar­
ranged faster placement of young people committed to us by the 
courts. They negotiated contracts with the YMCA for a camping pro­
gram for detainees. By November it looked like we might be past the 
worst. Indeed, the whole department was looking good. The Boston 
Globe summarized things this way: "Gone for the most part are the 
cruelties and regimentation of the past. . . . Hope has been substituted 
for fear and trust for hostility. . . . Since the Spring, Youth Services 
institutions have been relatively calm. Boys and girls occasionally run 
from confinement as they have since the Lyman School first received 
young miscreants in 1848. But runs no longer constitute a scandal/'7 
The populations of Lyman, Shirley, Lancaster, and Oakdale were at an 
all-time low. 
The alternative programs were now having a major effect. Roslin­
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dale's population eventually dropped from a high of 250 to a routine 
thirty-five. It made sense. Halfway into our reforms, an important 
Harvard study looked closely at the reasons for admissions to Roslin­
dale. Why were youngsters kept in this dank institution? The results 
were no surprise. The seriousness of the crime did not determine 
whether a child would be locked up. Granted, if he had killed or raped 
someone, he would probably be there. But there were so few such 
youngsters among the thousands who went through Roslindale that 
their numbers were statistically insignificant. Three critical reasons 
emerged to explain why youth were locked up in Roslindale: (1) the 
juvenile was black; (2) he came from a family poorer than most; and 
(3) there was a bed empty in detention when he was arrested. But the 
Harvard studies leveled an even more damning indictment.8 Young­
sters were the worse for the experience. The greatest single predictor of 
whether a young person would get into further serious trouble was 
whether or not he was detained at Roslindale at an early age. I at first 
assumed that this showed our success at identifying dangerous kids— 
the violent, the predatory, and, consequently, the recidivist delinquent. 
But no such neat confirmation appeared. Youths, particularly if poor or 
black, were detained according to the space available. Detention at 
Roslindale created as much crime as it deterred. 
The Harvard Center for Criminal Justice assigned five researchers to 
study cottage units scattered throughout the reform schools, including 
three cottages at Shirley, two at Lancaster, four at Lyman, and a coed 
program at Topsfield (then called the Northeastern Regional Training 
Center). They spent six weeks each in participant observation, con­
ducting interviews, and administering questionnaires to youth and 
staff. The researchers arranged the cottages along a custody-to-treat-
ment continuum, from traditional reform school custodial cottages to 
treatment-oriented cottages. The results were encouraging. According 
to almost every measure, the new treatment-oriented cottages looked 
better. When youth were asked, "What is this place trying to do for 
you?" 85 percent of the youngsters in treatment cottages indicated they 
were in a "place that helps kids understand the things that got them in 
trouble," compared with a low of 11 percent of the youth in traditional 
custodial cottages. And almost none of the inmates in treatment saw 
the cottage as "a place to punish kids for the things they did wrong," 
compared with as much as 78 percent of the inmates in custodial cot­
tages. Some might question whether this represents progress. Aren't 
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we supposed to punish wrongdoers? What about personal responsi­
bility? What about justice? These are important objections, but they 
weren't my first considerations as we were winding our way out of a 
century of destructive traditions. 
The Harvard researchers also found that whatever view the staff in 
our treatment cottages held of the youth, whether favorable or unfavor­
able, was reciprocated by the youth. The differences in staff attitudes 
between the traditional reform school custodial cottages and the newly 
staffed treatment programs, however, were striking. The researchers 
compared our progress in creating therapeutic settings with that of the 
famous California Silverlake experiment of sociologists Lamar Empey 
and Steven Lubeck a few years earlier.9 They had expected the Sil­
verlake experimental group, a highly successful alternative program 
set up in the community, to be more community-based than either the 
DYS custodial or therapeutic cottages. But the results gave us cause 
to think we had made more progress than we'd hoped. Though our 
therapeutic models were new, we were making every effort to hu­
manize the custodial cottages, which were run primarily by older line 
staff. 
The DYS youngsters considered our cottages and staff much more 
helpful than did their California counterparts. For example, 84 percent 
of the DYS therapeutic group and 79 percent of the DYS custody group 
reported that staff kept them informed about what was happening in 
the cottage, whereas 63 percent of the California Silverlake community 
group and 54 percent of the California institutional group believed they 
were kept informed. Ninety-four percent of DYS youth in therapeutic 
cottages felt they shared in decision making; only 73 percent of those in 
the Silverlake community felt the same. Summarizing their surprising 
results, the Harvard researchers had this to say: 
The youth in DYS described the social climates to which they were 
exposed in ways that we would consider better on three of four dimen­
sions, while the youth in the two California facilities described the social 
climates to which they were exposed in ways that we would consider 
better on one dimension. It is possible that the differences between youth 
responses in the two states were largely a function of the histories of 
reform in the two states, and that the youth were simply making com­
parisons to what the respective systems were like in the past. Differences 
in the histories of reform in the two states would lead to differences in 
standards by which the youth would evaluate the social climates to 
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which they are exposed. On the other hand, the comparison makes sense 
without recourse to the notion of differential standards. . . . 
We noted that the data from DYS in 1970 suggested that DYS had moved 
more quickly to make correctional settings more humane, and then to 
shift the basis of control from custodial to group decision-making. In 
1970, we noted, the shift to group decision-making, in a sense part of the 
move toward more humane settings, was ahead of the development of 
treatment-oriented subcultures. After the summer of 1970 there was 
strong and conspicuous development of positive subcultures in many of 
the settings where the changes in control systems had occurred.10 
We were on the way to humanizing the reform schools. Even the cus­
todial cottages were looking better. But despite the progress, I hadn't 
forgotten my fears. Our reforms were still confined to institutional 
grounds. They were totally vulnerable to the attitudes of the next super­
intendent. The idea of closing all the institutions was still with me. 
The uneasiness I had felt about whether our reforms would survive 
the governor's election campaign was only too firmly reinforced by an 
incident at Lyman. Late on a Sunday afternoon I got a call from a staff 
member asking for advice. A cottage supervisor in some kind of per­
sonal pique had locked two boys in a caged area of the cellar under one 
of the cottages and had gone home with the keys. The caller was wor­
ried that in an emergency he would have no way to free the boys. 
It hit me then with the full force of conviction: our months of train­
ing, meetings, and working with staff and administrators were not 
going to make the difference I wanted. If things could deteriorate so 
quickly and easily at Lyman—an institution run by humane admin-
istrators—then all of our reforms were in jeopardy. The next day I 
discussed my frustration with Tom Jeffers. "They're just going to wait 
us out, Jerry," was his assessment. We decided to close down the whole 
institutional system while there was still time. 
It was a proof of the mettle of Tom, Bill, and Yitzhak that they had 
little trouble abandoning their new babies—the model educational, 
clinical, and therapeutic programs being installed in the institutions. 
The Harvard researchers had to change their strategy, too. They had 
hitherto concentrated on evaluating changes within the reform schools. 
Just as they began to generate some exciting prospects from the new 
institutional programs, I decided to abandon them. They quickly re­
named the model therapeutic cottages "staging" cottages—places that 
prepared inmates for movement into the community. 
IV

The Alternative System

Look for alternatives to punishments, 
not only alternative punishments. 
Nils Christie 

12 Deinstitutiorudizcttim 
I  n the 1960s, under Governor Ronald Reagan, California engaged in 
the nation's first massive deinstitutionalization of patients from state 
mental hospitals. It was one of the few experiments where state hospital 
budgets were actually lowered as patients left the grounds, and its pur­
pose was to demonstrate deinstitutionalization as a money-saving pro­
cedure. But even the conservative governor seemed unable to take on the 
interests which sustain state institutions. Instead, he got the worst of 
both worlds. The dollars "saved" never quite made it to the community, 
and by 1988 California was expanding old mental hospitals and building 
new ones. Between 1984 and 1988 seven new mental hospitals opened.1 
Much the same thing happened to more liberal state administrations 
which had deinstitutionalized mental health patients. Though the pa­
tients left, the monies stayed on the hospital grounds. 
In the late 1970s, as special assistant for community-based programs 
to Pennsylvania's governor, Milton Shapp, I had the matter brought 
home to me in graphic terms. There stood Frank Beal, head of the 
state's human services, with his X-graph outlining progress in the 
deinstitutionalization of state hospitals over a decade. As one moved 
across the graph, the line representing the number of patients in state 
hospitals dropped dramatically, while the line signifying the number of 
employees on state hospital grounds surged to create an X. The graph 
suggested that sometime in the next century 65,000 state employees 
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would be caring for one patient. As bizarre as this sounds, it was not 
entirely unlike what had happened when we closed the Massachusetts 
reform schools. 
A study commissioned by then city councilwoman Carol Bellamy 
showed that, as thousands of patients were dumped from New York 
mental hospitals into flophouses and welfare hotels, the budgets of the 
state institutions increased. To fund community-based alternatives the 
state had to find new sources of revenue. Once again, institutional 
dollars did not follow the inmates to the community. Such dollars carry 
too much political weight to be shifted. 
In this light, the question that dogged our Massachusetts deinstitu­
tionalization, "Where will you put all the inmates?" is deceptively simple 
and begs the more important prior question: "Can you transfer budgets 
from the institution to the alternative programs in proportion to the 
number of inmates leaving the institutional grounds?" This issue is uni­
versally ignored in professional discussions of deinstitutionalization.2 
Only meager resources are made available to inmates sent into the com­
munity, and deinstitutionalization survives only insofar as institutional 
budgets don't suffer. Community-based programs are tied to whatever 
funds inadvertently drop from the institutional table. The institutions 
march on, firmly fixed in the budgetary traditions of state government. 
The test for successful deinstitutionalization is this: every dollar 
attached to an inmate should follow that inmate into the community for 
at least as long as he or she would have been institutionalized. This 
principle requires confronting political alliances which, though they 
have little to do with the stated purposes of an institution in fact sustain 
it. It also involves a reallocation of funds from rural to urban areas. 
Whatever the reasons for funding them, state institutions' continued 
existence is unrelated to any help, rehabilitation, or therapy they osten­
sibly dispense. Politics holds sway. Planning alternatives is much less 
difficult than dealing with the sticky politics of institutions, which 
must be confronted before alternatives can be addressed. But institu­
tional politics is characterized by such Byzantine infighting that the 
average helping professional soon loses either direction or integrity. 
Few professional models for deinstitutionalization have succeeded. 
Those done by the book have been disastrous. 
The deinstitutionalization movement in the United States was put 
together primarily by helping professionals—psychiatrists, psychol­
ogists, and social workers. They were clinically oriented and often 
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ignored the political realities which undergird institutions, and they 
proceeded on the premise that if correct clinical decisions were made 
and proper community organization accomplished, the rest would take 
care of itself. It was a naive assumption; as a result the national de­
institutionalization movement was set on its way in a political vacuum. 
As early as 1976, when it was clear that most mental hospital deinsti­
tutionalization had become an exercise in dumping, the authoritative 
monograph on deinstitutionalization written for the National Institutes 
of Mental Health gave only a brief glance at the politics behind the fiasco. 
Rather, the focus was on such matters as selection of patients for commu­
nity care, treatment course of patients in the community, and community 
resistance to patients, as though these issues were crucial to deinstitu­
tionalization. By 1984, a special task force of the American Psychiatric 
Association was calling deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill "a major 
societal tragedy, creating a new class of society's untouchables, who 
wander the streets without treatment/' Four years later, the editor of the 
task force report had become a leader in the movement for reinstitu-
tionalization—the return of patients to state institutions posited on the 
belief "that the mentally ill have a right to involuntary treatment"— 
surely a milestone in the history of civil rights! Even more recently, we 
have seen our "drug czar" call for a return to orphanages. 
There were exceptions. Analysts from Syracuse University's Center 
for Human Policy, for example, were among the few who recognized 
the central issues associated with deinstitutionalization, pointing to 
such bars to substantive change as economics and professionalism. 
Institutionalization is big business. . . . Many professionals . . .think in 
terms of categories and segregated services. This is the way they have 
been taught to diagnose and prescribe. Thus, they may not have the 
philosophy or the skills needed to meet the requirements of conversion 
(deinstitutionalization). Retraining can provide only a partial remedy; 
professionals do not change easily. . . . There is the brick-and-mortar, 
formal organization of the professions—physical and organizational ele­
ments that stand as defenses against the onslaught of change.3 
Planning for Reorganization 
In February 1971, we announced plans to implement fully the reorga­
nization of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services. Crucial to 
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this was the use of Federal Law Enforcement Assistance Administra­
tion funds. Indications were that, with aggressive work, we could 
obtain about ten million dollars over a four-year period. To get the 
funds, we had to provide a 25 percent match from state resources. This 
involved in kind contributions of state services during the first year and 
about two million dollars of state funds allocated over the remaining 
three years. I outlined our plans to reallocate existing staff and budget, 
rather than requesting large amounts of additional funding. 
We wanted to establish seven regional offices (based on the mental 
health department's regions), citing the need to establish administra­
tive control over parole agents who worked out of their homes without 
supervision or secretarial help. We also committed DYS to a community-
based system of halfway houses. We planned for seven such units in 
1971 and an additional five in 1972. As we stated: 
The mode which we feel the Department can use best for treatment of 
adjudicated delinquents is that of the "community-based correctional 
treatment center/' It consists of small residential units working with 
youth from a given Metropolitan area or community. There would be ap­
proximately eight to ten young people in each treatment unit. The young 
people would know that they would spend three to four months in the 
unit, then the group would be discharged, provided their adjustment 
warranted it. While in the treatment unit, the young people would 
progress through various phases. For example, the first month the group 
would be restricted to the house, second month some movement outside 
the house, third month a curfew, with more relative freedom to be in the 
community. There would be a heavy emphasis placed upon intensive 
group work and psychiatric consultation. To the degree possible, local 
services, schools, job placements, clinics, will be utilized. During their 
stay in the center the group would be responsible for such activities as 
preparing menus and meals within established budget guidelines. In a 
variety of ways, the total program will be in contradistinction to large insti­
tutional models which foster dependency in the students. The model the 
Department is developing will, in fact, force the group to deal with the 
very real day to day type problems that face all of us. As the group 
progresses, time will be spent with the families, schools, etc., to assist the 
young people in moving back into full participation with the community.4 
We also announced other initiatives: to establish several small shel­
tered care facilities to keep the Roslindale detention population down 
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and to fund privately run group homes for seven to eleven year-olds in 
our institutions. We also proposed construction of a small intensive 
security unit on the grounds of a medical school in Worcester to deal 
with grossly disturbed young delinquents. All but the last proposal 
became realities, though we later abandoned the idea of state-operated 
halfway houses in favor of privately run facilities. 
As the first step, we contracted with a psychological consulting 
group for complete assessments of each of the youngsters in our insti­
tutions, with the purpose of developing an alternative program for 
each youth. The approach was traditional and included rehabilitation 
and vocational assessment, psychological testing, psychodiagnostic 
assessment, and neurological testing. Each evaluation took six to seven 
hours. Approximately five hundred youngsters were evaluated for 
possible placement at home or in a community alternative. Though I 
hoped these evaluations would help us avoid gross errors in place­
ment, I didn't have many expectations beyond that, as the intrinsic 
merit of psychiatric and psychological evaluations of delinquents has 
always been questionable. Though the traditional psychological eval­
uations didn't hurt us or slow the deinstitutionalization, I would have 
made a serious mistake in relying solely on them. The tests were rou­
tine at the time and included the Peabody Picture Inventory (IQ esti­
mate), the Geist Vocational test, the Jesness Personality Inventory, the 
Bender-Gestalt (indirect test for neurological dysfunction), figure 
drawing, and comprehensive background interview. 
Our stance was summarized by a legislative investigative commit­
tee: "The Department does not tell the (psychologists) why a child is 
being evaluated. This discretion is maintained so that the testing psy­
chologists will not be prejudiced in their evaluations or recommenda­
tions. This lack of prejudice means that tests will be more comprehen­
sive, and psychologists will not be tempted to 'prove' through testing 
that one certain treatment alternative is best for the child."5 As it turned 
out, the psychologists concluded that no more than a couple dozen of 
the institutionalized youth needed to be confined in strictly secure 
settings. On the basis of my later experiences in Pennsylvania, I now 
believe the recommendation had less to do with the psychological tests 
than with the fact that we'd made the psychologists aware of the wide 
range of alternative treatment and supervisory/monitoring programs 
we planned to fund. My suspicions were confirmed by later research.6 
I saw the evaluations as providing a "cover" and professional gloss. 
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If there were incidents involving the youngsters we had removed from 
institutions, we couldn't be accused of not trying our best to evaluate 
each youngster professionally before placement. Community-based 
programs are unusually vulnerable to the anomalous incident, whereas 
the same harsh judgments are seldom applied to institutions. They are 
guiltless if an alumnus commits a crime after having been duly pun­
ished. But the first youngster in a halfway house, out on parole, or in an 
alternative program who commits a serious crime can seriously damage 
a deinstitutionalization effort. I had prepared myself for the all-too-
possible backlash by compiling a portfolio of statistics and horror sto­
ries about well-known graduates of our reform schools who had served 
lengthy sentences. Should the need arise, I was ready to match every 
violent crime by a deinstitutionalized youngster with a more heinous 
offense by a youth who had done time in a reform school. 
Shortly after I took over DYS, a seventeen-year-old shot a policeman. 
The headlines in the Boston newspapers blared "Youth Kills Police­
man/' The teenager had been released from the IJG after serving three 
years in various DYS institutions. The killing was the kind of tragic 
incident which would normally put a juvenile correctional agency on 
the spot. But though the press articles mentioned that the boy had been 
at the IJG, not much else was said. I braced myself for the inevitable 
telephone calls from reporters and local television stations, the critical 
editorials, the hard questions as to what had gone wrong in our treat­
ment of this young man. But there was only one call, and the reporter 
wanted to know only how long the boy had been with us. He had 
served his full time and was not released early. No one seemed con­
cerned that he was an IJG alumnus. I concluded it was because we'd 
been properly punitive. This adolescent, sent to us for car theft, had 
become an institutional management problem. We had dealt firmly 
with him and given him discipline to rival the stuff of the strongest 
speeches. If this delinquent got in further trouble, the fault must lie 
with him. 
But if this boy had been in an alternative program, even for a few 
days, and then killed a policeman, our department would have been 
held totally responsible. Cries of ''Permissiveness" would have drowned 
out all rational accounts. But the more basic question went unasked. 
How could we have taken in an adolescent in his midteens for car theft 
and after three years in our institutions have sent him out to murder a 
policeman? Hadn't we made him more dangerous? 
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The psychological evaluations gave each youngster the luxury of 
having qualified professionals spend hours thinking over his or her 
case. That was something new for our inmates, and it probably flat­
tered most of them. If nothing else, we might get a placebo or Haw­
thorne effect—the attention being therapeutic in itself. I don't mean to 
imply that thoughtful evaluation isn't necessary to a proper deinstitu­
tionalization strategy. It clearly is. But traditional evaluations are sel­
dom helpful in planning deinstitutionalization. They are even less 
helpful when the inmates are young offenders easily classified in those 
more hurtful categories which fall toward the so-called characterolog­
ical end of psychiatric and psychological nosology.7 
Certain youngsters are at more risk for repeating their delinquen­
cies. If one bases the estimate of risk on a youth's previous record, par­
ticularly offenses characterized by gratuitous violence, that is enough 
legally to justify intensive supervision. But even then the assessment is 
less the decisive factor than the alternatives available to supervise, 
assist, monitor, and negotiate. Unfortunately, when we were ready to 
move kids out of institutions, few diagnostic regimens were fit for the 
kinds of alternatives taking shape in our thinking. 
Then another curious thing happened. As soon as the psychologists 
began showing up at the institutions, incidents began to increase. 
Slow, methodical evaluation wasn't feasible when the very process of 
evaluating youngsters individually hastened the deterioration of the 
institutions. As we judged each youth's suitability for alternatives, we 
were in a race with institutional staff, administrators, and local legisla­
tors who worked just as assiduously to stop us. The longer the evalua­
tions dragged on, the more unstable the institutions would become. We 
went in on a crash basis, working nearly around the clock, interview­
ing kids into the night and over weekends, and placing youngsters 
outside of the institutions as soon as each evaluation was completed. 
By quickening the pace, we kept ahead of the increased intake from the 
courts, and the institutional populations continued to fall. 
Budget Politics 
Having gotten budget approval in both houses of the legislature for our 
first community-based programs, I waited for the final version of the 
budget to come back from conference committee. Early one evening, as 
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I headed across the parking lot behind the statehouse, I saw the chief 
aide to Senator James Kelly, the chairman of the senate ways and means 
committee, walking down Beacon Street carrying a huge sheaf of pa­
pers. I commented on his heavy load. He replied, "It's the new bud­
get/' It had just been approved by the conference committee, and he 
was taking it over to the printer. I said I was pleased to see it, since our 
first community-based budget was in it. He replied, "I don't think it's 
there." I said, "But it must be. Senator Kelly gave me his word." The 
aide laid the bulky tome across the hood of a car and thumbed his way 
to the DYS budget. Seven hundred thousand dollars had vanished. I 
was livid. It meant that when the federal funds gave out, we would 
have serious problems paying our bills for the new group homes. Why 
had the budget item vanished? 
A few weeks before, I'd been asked by a legislator on the conference 
committee to fire an employee who'd been referred by one of his politi­
cal rivals. I hadn't done it, and now I assumed that the legislator had 
taken his revenge by making our community-based budget disappear. 
Senator Kelly's aide took the budget book back across the street, and 
the $700,000 reappeared the next morning, clearly added with a differ­
ent typewriter. Senator Kelly had honored his commitment. Thanks to 
him, we got the group homes which, but for a chance meeting in a 
parking lot, would have been lost for the year. 
Though by now we'd decided we might be able to close all the reform 
schools, we didn't have enough money to do it. I'd gotten some new 
line items through the legislature, but these hadn't yet threatened the 
institutional budgets, to which the legislature remained tied. Indeed, 
in May 1972, after we had closed all but one reform school and had 
placed all the inmates in the community, the legislature still refused to 
allow us to transfer money from the institutional budgets to a commu-
nity-based budget. They fully funded the salaries of those institutional 
staff who remained on the grounds of the empty reform schools. 
Our LEAA funds were short-term and could only buy us time. They 
could provide a financial cushion as we moved the remaining reform 
school inmates out, but there wouldn't be enough funding to cover the 
former inmates for more than a few months—and nothing to handle 
the new intake. During the breathing space provided by federal fund­
ing we'd have to build our alternative system into the state budgetary 
traditions. Short of some windfall in state revenues, there was no way 
to accomplish this through normal channels. To succeed in our deinsti­
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tutionalization, we'd have to take the money from the institutional 
budgets, and that was like a declaration of war. 
The state's fiscal policies, bent on sustaining legislative control over 
jobs, worked against change. The legislature assigned monies to each 
specific budget category—personnel, travel, operations, and so forth. 
The DYS budget was tailored to fit institutional needs. Certain amounts 
were set aside for food, staff, utilities, maintenance, and the other 
specifics necessary to a smoothly running institution. Transferring 
money from one account to another involved an extremely complex 
series of special approvals and waivers. Everyone got an oar in— 
administration and finance, the personnel office, the comptroller's 
office, and various legislative committee members. I had almost no 
power to transfer old funds to new programs. I had no authority to 
transfer any staff person without special approval from a variety of 
statehouse bureaucrats and politicians, many of whom were friends or 
patrons of the very staff members with whom I was trying to deal. 
With LEAA funding I began hiring 03s—the state budget category for 
consultants—to help plot out directions for the department. In doing 
this I managed to avoid both civil service complications and legislative 
interference by hiring individuals first and then creating their roles. If I 
had tried to get legislative approval for a new state-funded staff posi­
tion before the fact, the sharks would have circled for a piece of the kill. 
In that case the new person would probably not be someone I needed 
or wanted. If I didn't hire someone referred by a legislator, it was likely 
to be taken as both an insult and a reason to come after whatever 
reform the new position represented. But through the 03 account I was 
able to hire most of my team. 
We set up a planning unit and I hired Arnold Schucter, a thoughtful 
and aggressive human service planner. Arnold was exactly what we 
needed at the time. I could roll out an idea in the morning, and by late 
the same day he would have it in a formal proposal, with citations from 
the literature. Arnold had his own connections on Beacon Hill, pri­
marily with Al Kramer, an aide to the governor. I always had the 
impression that I was eminently expendable in Arnold's eyes. Indeed, 
he had on occasion told his staff so. I never expected or demanded 
Arnold's loyalty, but at least we were headed in the same direction. 
Late in my administration, Arnold wrote a planning document 
which a postaudit committee happened to find. It gave them the great 
'Aha!" which proved I was on some sort of anarchist mission. They 
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quoted from Arnold's paper, "One of the great challenges to our society 
in the remainder of the 20th century is to dismantle state government 
agency by agency, and distribute the responsibility and financial re­
sources to new mechanisms for the organization and delivery of hu­
man services/'8 It still makes sense to me. 
I used the 03s in a variety of ways. Formal job titles and classifica­
tions meant very little. I wanted to use talents and assign tasks as 
necessary. I had a person in a janitor's position, Paul DeMuro, running 
Shirley, an architect handling public information, and a couple of 
bright Princeton grads doing planning for the department while work­
ing out of CETA positions at minimum wage. Mine was not an approach 
which would endear me to state government. 
But state government responds to certain kinds of pressure, even 
when artificially generated. If I could depopulate the institutions by 
creating sufficient alternatives for those youngsters we moved out, and 
if I could keep them in the community long enough, there was at least a 
chance of tearing something loose from the budgets of the empty 
institutions. This would cripple the institutions. But it would also make 
returning young people from the community to the institutions more 
difficult. It was a risky strategy, but ultimately it worked. I followed an 
axiom I'd learned in the military—it's easier to seek forgiveness than 
permission. That attitude greatly upset a hostile postaudit committee of 
the legislature, which was formed too late to stop us. The committee 
reported: 
It was the preconceived idea of DYS that, once the group home program 
had been instituted with federal funds, state funding could, of necessity, 
be obtained even though approval for the closing of institutions and the 
transition to group home care had never been sought from the Legisla­
ture by DYS. It was the intention of DYS, likewise, that state funds, which 
had been appropriated for personnel at the various departmental institu­
tions, would be used for group home payments once the institutions 
were closed and the services of those employees were terminated. This 
indicated a total unfamiliarity by the DYS hierarchy with the laws of the 
Commonwealth relative to appropriations, personnel, and civil service.9 
It's a good description of what we did. Contrary to the committee's 
conclusion, however, I knew the laws of the commonwealth reasonably 
well. But I'd also been reluctantly educated in the traditional politics of 
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the Massachusetts legislature. Had I done it the way the committee 
wanted, no institutions would have been closed and no alternatives 
begun. 
At first I tried to get approval from the governor's department of 
administration and finance to tap the institutional budgets to fund 
community programs. I thought we could effect savings of a few mil­
lion dollars in operating costs and so wouldn't have to request new 
community-based monies from the legislature. Though I didn't see de­
institutionalization as cheaper, I hoped our proposal would sweeten 
the pot. Instead, it had virtually no effect. There was no interest in 
saving money. There was, however, near panic that I might get discre­
tionary control of the institutional budgets. I should have anticipated 
the negative reaction on the basis of an earlier meeting with house ways 
and means committee members regarding capital outlay, where I had 
returned five million dollars the legislature had previously approved to 
spend for new buildings on institutional grounds. My action had been 
met with disbelief and anger. 
Our strategy of using federal funds to move youngsters into the com­
munity eventually paid off. By keeping the institutions empty, we made 
it politically risky for local legislators to tout continued funding and 
staffing of their favorite institutions. At times I thought we would be 
criticized by the legislature for running fully staffed institutions with 
almost no inmates, but apparently that could have gone on indefinitely. I 
had no authority to transfer staff members. Unless they volunteered for a 
community-based assignment, they could stay at the empty institutions 
as long as they liked, and most did. I've since concluded that a fully 
staffed institution with no inmates can be a rather nice place. Meals are 
served on time, the grass is well cut, the flowerbeds are maintained, the 
floors are buffed, and the bucolic atmosphere is left undisturbed. 
But something had to give. Unless we could claim institutional staffs 
and budgets for alternatives, our community-based strategy would 
founder. If we ran out of funding, I resolved to send youngsters directly 
home rather than return them to institutions. I hoped the legislature 
would give in before I had to do that. We rode the edge of that crisis for 
a few months, from time to time paroling juveniles home within days 
after the courts had sent them to us. 
The problems associated with tapping institutional budgets were 
skirted when Speaker David Bartley put in a substantial additional 
community-based budget for us. Bartley, a decent and practical man, 
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placated the legislature while continuing his strong support for our 
initiatives. But it simply postponed the day of reckoning. 
One of our first attempts to use institutional resources for alternative 
programs came in late summer 1971. We'd found a relatively obscure 
paragraph in our legislation which stated: "When funds are available 
for the purpose the Commissioner of Youth Services may . . . establish, 
on land under the control of the Department of Natural Resources, or 
upon other sites approved by the Commissioner of natural resources, 
forest or farm school camps to which children placed in the care of the 
Department of Youth Services may be sent/'10 The governing phrase 
was "available for the purpose/' We had no specific funding for a new 
forestry camp. If I could attach an alternative program to an existing 
budget, however, I could probably stretch the meaning of the legisla­
tion to cover it. I decided to create an annex to the Shirley Industrial 
School and the Westfield Detention Center, which became the Mid­
dlefield Forestry Camp. Funds to support it came from institutional 
budgets. It provided a short outdoor experience for some of the seven 
to twelve-year-olds from John Augustus Hall. We knew it would have a 
limited lifespan, but it opened new opportunities. 
Our biggest break emerged from a series of stormy negotiations with 
the Department of Administration and Finance. I was reluctantly given 
permission to freeze vacated positions of institutional staff who retired 
or resigned and to transfer the monies attached to the empty slots from 
personnel to purchase-of-care accounts, so that every time an employee 
left, our dollars for community options were increased by the amount of 
his or her salary. Since the annual turnover rate in the department had 
reached nearly 20 percent, and personnel was the largest item in the 
institutional budgets, the new policy had the potential to provide signifi­
cant funding for our fledgling community-based system. 
We identified other sources of federal funding, for example, Title 
IV-A. This legislation wasn't specifically meant for delinquent young­
sters, but rather for services to children of the poor. I saw it as a poten­
tial source of funding for our community-based alternative programs. 
Using the Title IV-A measures, we evaluated the young people in our 
institutions and found that 80 to 90 percent were at or below the pov­
erty level and technically qualified for Title IV-A funding. Although the 
Title IV-A legislation specifically forbade funding children in institu­
tions, as soon as we put our youth in community alternatives, we 
qualified them. It was probably outside the intent of the Congress, but 
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it seemed technically legal. The question whether the state wished to 
use its limited Title IV-A federal funds for our delinquents was another 
matter. It didn't. It wanted to use them for more "deserving" youth 
populations (child welfare and school problems). But we had created a 
situation where the state had little choice, and we got the money. By the 
time the federal government objected a year later, it was too late. We 
were in the community and no longer needed Title IV-A funds. 
State-Run or Privately Run? 
One of our problems was that we had only a limited conception of what 
we needed to replace the institutions. Where would we send the re­
form school alumni? Could most go home? If they did, what other 
services would they need? How would we fund the alternatives? And, 
perhaps the most crucial question of all, Who should run them? 
At first we had only one alternative in mind, the halfway house. I 
chose this model not because I was that conversant with it but because it 
was the alternative which had been touted by the late Robert Kennedy. 
I tried to weave his comments into my speeches around the state and 
into my testimony before legislative committees. I thought the Ken­
nedy support of halfway houses might make our proposals more palat­
able, coming as they did from a native son rather than an outsider. 
The department planned to staff and run its own halfway houses. 
The fact that the houses were state-staffed and state-run might make it 
easier to get them into the community. We'd also be more likely to get 
the support of the legislature if we expanded the number of state 
employees to embrace community programs. We would retrain institu­
tional staff and assign them to state-run halfway houses. It was a naive 
plan, and if we had gone the route of relying on state-staffed and state-
run alternatives, our reforms would have been dead in the water. 
There were certainly alternatives to the halfway house. Joe Leavey 
educated me to one, the group home. Its concept derived from child 
welfare rather than corrections. The idea embodied what I'd been try­
ing to get across about the youngsters in our reform schools—that it 
would be more productive to see them as adolescents in need of caring 
supervision than as delinquents suited for incarceration. 
Group homes presented a whole new set of possibilities. As distinct 
from correctional halfway houses, group homes were developed for 
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dependent and neglected children, and they were privately contracted, 
nonprofit facilities. None was staffed by state employees. As our em­
phasis shifted from state-run halfway houses to privately run group 
homes, purchase of care became our focus. We asked private agencies 
to develop programs for the youngsters in our reform schools and 
detention centers, and we sought out small, noninstitutional, indi­
vidualized programs for the damaged youngsters in our care. This was 
entirely new for a state juvenile correctional agency at the time, at least 
on the scale we envisioned. But we also wanted nonresidential ideas. 
We circulated statewide a request for proposals to create alternative 
residential and nonresidential programs for reform school youth. We 
asked nonprofit agencies to submit proposals along with cost esti­
mates. We didn't specify any single treatment method, since I believed 
that a variety of options would enhance our ability to meet the needs of 
the youngsters, who didn't all come from the same mold. The response 
was overwhelming. We were inundated with proposals from child care 
agencies, universities, art schools, YMCA'S, private and religious char­
ities, psychiatric and drug treatment programs. We welcomed them all. 
If the institutional budgets could have been freed, we would have had 
hundreds of people interested in working with our reform school 
youth. Our request for proposals had opened doors kept closed for a 
century. It was a lesson as appropriate for mental health, retardation, 
children's services, and adult corrections as it was for our department. 
Most states have still not learned it. 
We asked the private agencies to do something other than re-create 
traditional correctional ideology in the community. We wanted the full 
range of youth services which we, as a state youth corrections agency, 
had never given. We would judge performance strictly, but our mea­
sure wouldn't be control or efficient management alone. Rather, we 
would look to the ability of the program to individualize treatment and 
to provide unconditional care for each youngster. Fear of recidivism 
was not what was driving me, because I knew we couldn't do much 
worse than we had. If we failed to lower recidivism, we would at least 
fail showing our best, not our worst. 
As programs took shape, we had serious problems in monitoring 
their performance, but what we lost in adequate management, we gained 
in creativity. It's not that one can't have both good management and cre­
ative programs. Over the past two decades, however, as I have watched 
the creation of many inauthentic and destructive community-based pro­
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grams nationally, I've become convinced that there is an inverse ratio 
between primary emphasis on management and the program quality. I 
think it has to do with the captive status of the clientele. Captive, delin­
quent young people are not easily managed without suffering. 
We found ourselves breaking new ground almost daily. There were 
no mechanisms in Massachusetts government for setting daily rates or 
per diem payments to specific contracted programs. There was no rate 
setting commission (that came later). Though we eventually got the 
Department of Administration and Finance to agree on the funding 
mechanisms, we had to devise our own crude rate-setting procedures 
as we went along. We used a simple formula, dividing the projected 
annual budget by the number of youngsters the program intended to 
serve daily to establish the per diem rate. With large established agen­
cies, we set per diem rates with payment to follow as youths were 
placed. For small new agencies, we used LEAA monies for start-up 
grants. Funds were often insufficient, and our problems were exacer­
bated by a state bureaucracy that didn't always honor its commitments 
to us. The state was also slow in paying its bills, and the same cash-flow 
problems continue to plague state-funded child care and contracted 
mental health agencies in most states today, because community-based 
programs are seldom fixed in state budgetary mechanisms. This is in 
contrast to state institutions, where the money comes in regularly, on 
time, and, given their questionable results, too abundantly. 
Our tardiness in paying bills was a particular hardship on the 
smaller new agencies which, deprived of sufficient start-up funds, 
found themselves with a cash-flow crisis in caring for youngsters they 
had already accepted. Some agencies took out bank loans with our 
letter of intent as collateral. Others teetered on bankruptcy. I was soon 
acting out a monthly charade—blustering around the offices of the 
Department of Administration and Finance, threatening to blast it in 
press conferences, to call in the governor, to resign. The tirades would 
usually free a particular check and stem an agency's crisis for a month 
or so, but it was no way to run an agency. 
As things got more desperate, we resorted to less traditional ways of 
honoring our commitments. Gardner Jackson (whom we'd hired to 
take on the thankless task of keeping our finances straight) and Joe 
Leavey came up with a new strategy The defunct YSB had a board and 
allowance account which occasionally allowed a youngster a few dol­
lars upon release from a reform school. This account remained in place 
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when the new DYS was created. We also had tacit authority to transfer 
other department monies into this account. Though the account had 
seldom been tapped for more than three or four hundred dollars a year, 
we realized it had potential. To help the account realize its potential 
(and keep the agencies afloat), we had kids from group homes come 
into the central office along with staff members. We wrote individual 
board and allowance checks to each youngster who, in our presence, 
would endorse his or her check over to a group home staff person. 
Through this means, payroll was met, food purchased, and electric 
bills paid. It was an unusual procedure, but it worked for those frantic 
weeks while we ran from state office to state office trying to find a 
smoother way to generate checks for the emerging community-based 
system. Within a few weeks, the board and allowance account grew 
from a few hundred dollars to a quarter million. 
We made errors of judgment in deciding which community-based 
programs to fund. Some didn't work out at all; some were incompe­
tent; a few were dishonest. I expected that at least 20 percent of them 
would fail for one reason or another and the contracts would be termi­
nated. Theoretically, this would free the same percentage of our annual 
purchase-of-care budget for other programs and approaches. It would 
make the system more competitive, ensuring that the state's money 
went to the most productive, and it was really a rather conservative 
approach. But we found ourselves supporting programs which were 
on the edge financially and all too often had limited administrative and 
fiscal resources to manage their money. Sometimes they worked out, 
and new agencies, embodying new concepts, were created and thrived. 
An example was the Key program, which started with half a dozen 
youngsters and grew to be a national model, providing quality commu­
nity supervision to hundreds. Other agencies didn't fare so well and 
eventually folded. This was a major criticism of the postaudit commit­
tee, which pursued me after I had left the state. I saw the fact that a 
certain percentage of community-based programs closed down after a 
year or so as a measure of our accountability. 
Staff Resistance 
Recognizing that state institutions exist as much to dole out state jobs 
as to provide care was essential to reducing staff resistance to closing 
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them. Joe Correia, the union representative, became our director of 
personnel. He worked long hours meeting with staff supervisors, cot­
tage parents, and stewards, reassuring them that their jobs were not in 
jeopardy and discussing opportunities for them in the new commu-
nity-based system. In many ways the new system was more attractive. 
It would be safer and more interesting work than sitting in an institu­
tional cottage facing thirty or forty hostile teenage delinquents. But it 
was difficult for most staff to make the transition from the familiar to 
the unknown. Though many institutional staff continued to go to work 
every day (waiting for the inmates to return), as our contracting with 
private agencies grew, staff warmed more to the idea of reassignment 
to alternatives. We arranged for some state employees to work for 
private, nonprofit agencies while retaining civil service status and ben­
efits. Through this mechanism we lowered per diem payments to the 
private agency in proportion to the number of state staff it absorbed. 
But most alternative programs didn't want our staff, preferring to 
screen and hire their own employees. 
At one point we offered employees the option of taking a youngster 
home as their full-time job. They could collect their full salary and retain 
their state benefits. We had only a couple of takers. Our employees 
tended to be older, and the changes we wanted went beyond simply 
learning new management techniques. We wanted staff to become 
advocates, to question their own motives, and to hold themselves 
accountable for services to the youth in their care. Many of our employ­
ees could not have done this even if they had wanted to. 
The Press 
I worked continually to build public support for my program through 
favorable presentation in the press. It was simpler than many might 
think. The key was to make the routine goings-on of reform school life a 
matter of public record and to begin to chip away at the stereotypes 
most citizens had of reform school inmates. I made it department policy 
that any member of the press could have access to any building, room, 
annex, or facility of DYS and could talk with any youngster, provided 
the kid consented. There were no restrictions on visiting hours. Re­
porters would be welcome at any reasonable hour. Lengthy stories 
about our problems and individual kids in our care began to appear in 
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local papers. By opening the doors we were less prone to "attack jour­
nalism/' Facts kept intruding to neutralize other agendas. 
Early in my administration, Adam Yarmolinsky had introduced me 
to Tom Winship, editor of the Boston Globe, and I made it a practice to 
meet periodically with the editors, usually bringing along a couple of 
ex-inmates to answer any questions. When we had incidents—fires, 
escapes, talk of riots, and rumors of rape—-I invited the press to meet 
with those involved. When escapees returned, I asked reporters to sit 
with them and try to find out why they had run and often, who had 
assisted them. Ernie Posey was a good case in point. 
I had been hearing rumors that staff at Roslindale had resumed beat­
ing inmates, so I mentioned it to the superintendent, but he couldn't nail 
down anything specific. Staff denied any problems, as did inmates. The 
rumors were second- and third-hand, usually from kids who had left 
Roslindale and occasionally stopped by the central office to chat. I 
needed some help chasing down the rumors. Ernie Posey, a Harvard 
undergraduate associated with Phillips Brooks House, had stopped by 
my office to volunteer his services. Ernie, who was twenty, looked about 
sixteen. I proposed that he volunteer to be admitted to Roslindale as a 
delinquent and spend a few days there. He agreed. We made up a phony 
admission order and delivered Ernie to Roslindale in handcuffs over a 
holiday weekend. He spent four days there. 
During his short stay, Ernie watched while a staff member held a 
twelve-year-old's head under water in the toilet. A fourteen-year-old 
was dragged by the legs over a urine-soaked floor, his T-shirted chest 
used as a mop. Other boys were beaten, hit about the face, and carried 
off to isolation. Ernie himself was hit in the face for reading a book "in 
an unauthorized area/71 suspended the staff involved for a few days, 
but civil service procedures didn't allow me to do much more than that. 
I also gave Ernie's report to the Boston Globe. It provided much-needed 
information to the general public. 
Probably the greatest benefit we got from welcoming the press was 
the dilution of public stereotypes. Clearly no one wants a thief, an 
armed robber, a mugger, a chronic incorrigible, or an otherwise dis­
turbed delinquent running loose in the community. If our deinstitu­
tionalization was going to work, we had to flesh out the definitions of 
delinquent. We didn't have to distort, hide, or otherwise dissemble 
about the kids' crimes. The public needed to know more, not less, 
about the youngsters in our care. 
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Confidentiality in juvenile justice, more often than not, works against 
the best interests of juveniles and ill informs the public. The idea of 
making juvenile records public is nothing new. Prosecutors and police 
routinely call for juvenile court records to be dragged out before judges 
and juries in adult courts. What's wanted then, of course, is a history of 
offenses. But that's not enough. We insisted that people know more than 
that. If the public was to avoid stereotyping, they needed to know a 
young offender's accomplishments, background, and family disasters. 
They also needed to be made aware of the record of the child welfare and 
education systems and of alternatives previously made available in each 
youngster's life. Unfortunately, this seldom happens. It's easier to tear a 
young offender from his or her moorings, particularly if we're bent on 
punishment. I hoped we could break into this conspiracy of ignorance. 
We would insist that the public see, hear, and know our youngsters. 
It was another variation on Mead's insight that the more one knows 
another, the more difficult it is to be punitive. We would show young­
sters' faces, tell their stories, reveal their secrets (often of their own 
abuse), and lay out the uncomfortable meaning of their lives—all hitherto 
forbidden under the guise of protecting children's rights. The average 
citizen can be unusually forgiving, even of the chronic delinquent, 
when given an opportunity to know the young offender behind the 
narrow legal label. The more we confine young offenders to their legal 
definitions, the more understanding is impoverished and treatment 
warped. In this narrow context, reform schools make sense. They are 
indeed designed for thieves, robbers, and assaulters. Institutionaliza­
tion confirms the label. It's one reason why so few middle-class young­
sters end up in reform schools. 
Judges, police, prosecutors, and probation officers usually realize 
that there is more to the average middle-class delinquent than the crime 
alone suggests, even when it is a heinous crime. Because this teenager 
is more apt to resemble their own brother, son, sister, or daughter, they 
tend not to institutionalize the middle-class offender. History, personal 
accomplishments, school associations, friends, sports interests, health 
problems, and psychological trauma all become intensely relevant. The 
offender's role is stretched enough to give the def iners a personal frame 
of reference. They don't have to be imaginative to be just. The label 
"delinquent" loses some of its hold. 
I usually took youngsters with me wherever I went to speak—on 
television shows, radio talk shows, PTA meetings, Kiwanis, Rotary Lions, 
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League of Women Voters, Unitarian Universalist seminars, and Holy 
Name Society breakfasts. I'd stop by the reform school or detention 
center nearest wherever I was scheduled to speak and pick two or three 
youth at random. I didn't screen youth for their opinions, trusting that, 
given the chance to talk about their situation, they would come through. 
Though I usually brought along a black youngster or two, I also, very 
deliberately, chose one boy or girl who looked as if he or she might be 
from a suburban white high school. It stimulated the compassionate 
juices of the mostly white middle-class audiences, who might other­
wise ignore the possibility that their own children could land in reform 
school. 
Occasionally staff would handpick inmates who were known escape 
risks and have them waiting in the front office to accompany me. Ap­
parently they hoped for an embarrassing incident. 
One of our most ambitious attempts to undo stereotypes came in June 
1971. One of the few decent things at Shirley was the food service pro­
gram. The dining hall chef, Nick Hidriotis, was an unusually committed 
and kind man who took pride in helping boys assigned to his kitchen to 
learn the restaurant trade. Though only a few of these inmates went on to 
use these skills in running restaurants, Nick's kitchen was an island of 
concern in an otherwise empty institutional existence. We decided the 
best service we could do Nick and the program would be to bring them 
into the legislature. But instead of using the occasion to showcase an 
institutional program, we took the opportunity to show off the dozen 
or so boys. The idea grew, and we ended up bringing in approximately 
fifty youngsters from the various institutions for a lobbying day in the 
legislature. 
Nick's boys served a free buffet luncheon in the state house for a 
hundred legislators and four hundred state employees. Each reform 
school boy and girl wore a badge with the name and district of his or her 
state representative. After lunch, they visited their legislators' offices to 
talk about themselves and their situations. It was particularly educa­
tional for those lawmakers who were wont to make speeches about 
hardened young offenders in need of harsher incarceration. For a few 
hours, at least, they shut up. Particularly compelling were the eleven 
and twelve-year-olds from John Augustus Hall. We lost three or four 
kids that day-—the possibilities of the situation were too much for them 
to resist. But they soon came back. The legislative day was a great suc­
cess. 
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Slowing Down 
We had vacated Bridgewater's Institute for Juvenile Guidance in Sep­
tember 1970 with no incidents in the community, no angry speeches in 
the legislature, no marches, no threats, and no staff sabotage. Within 
its own limited terms, it was a success. At the time, the fact that we had 
so few community resources and almost no provision for long-term 
aftercare hadn't been a major consideration. The bulk of the IJG boys 
were approaching their seventeenth birthdays and would shortly be­
come adults by law. They wouldn't be our legal responsibility. At seven­
teen a young offender was no longer subject to DYS unless we chose to 
keep him or her under our supervision until age twenty-one. The old 
YSB had hung on to no more than two or three cases a year, so we took it 
as a given that our responsibility for the inmates would end when they 
turned seventeen. Since most of the IJG boys were well over sixteen, we 
wouldn't have to supervise them in the community for very long. It 
was a narrow, callous view, and it would have been entirely proper to 
institute long-term aftercare past age seventeen. But given that all we 
had for care were reform schools, and they probably did at least as 
much harm as good, there was a valid counterargument for our getting 
out of these adolescents' lives as quickly and completely as possible. 
So, despite the smoothness of the process, the IJG deinstitutionali­
zation was hardly a model. The methods we used to classify the IJG 
inmates were likely to backfire if we used them in closing other institu­
tions. This wasn't because the IJG evaluations weren't as reliable as any, 
even though in most cases they rested on a congeries of unscientific 
impressions and gut reactions. But they were demonstrably unprofes­
sional and would have been hard to defend if one of the youngsters had 
committed a serious crime upon his release. Even though things went 
smoothly, I wasn't sure it had been more than a happy accident. I de­
cided to move more deliberately the next time, through some consensus 
building of employees, administrators, local communities, and legislators. 
The legislature's Joint Committee on Post-Audit and Oversight un­
derstood what I had been up to at the IJG and correctly identified the 
problems associated with our later, consensus-building approach to 
deins titutionalization: 
The closing of the Institute for Juvenile Guidance at Bridgewater in 
September, 1970 provided DYS administration with a future direction in 
which to aim its as yet unsubstantiated rehabilitative goals. . . . 
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Shortly thereafter, the Industrial School for Boys at Shirley was se­
lected as the second target in the dismantling of an institutionalized sys­
tem which had been in operation for over one hundred and twenty 
years. . . . An attempt was made during the first three months of 1971 to 
close Shirley, through the gradual removal of all of its inmates. This at­
tempt was unsuccessful and was accompanied by a large number of es­
capes (68), staff and inmate unrest, several fires of suspicious origin in the 
administration building, and vocal displeasure by the residents of the town 
of Shirley, culminating in a protest meeting in the Governor's office.11 
When we went to a nine-month strategy to remove the youth from 
Shirley slowly, the number of incidents mounted. There was another 
surge of runs and the number of teenagers sent to us by the courts grew 
exponentially. While we were trying to shut the place down, the court 
was trying to pack it fuller than ever. Having planned our community 
programs on the basis of previous years' commitment rates, we were 
soon caught in an unanticipated crisis for lack of alternatives. Later we 
saw the same pattern following the closing of Lyman: court commit­
ments to DYS of thirteen to fifteen-year-old boys (the ages normally 
assigned to Lyman) rose dramatically. Immediate pressure to reopen 
the school was brought to bear on us. We refused and for an uncomfort­
able few weeks sent young people directly home after their commit­
ment to us. In a state which richly merits its reputation for political 
hardball, these changes in commitments were no accident. It recalled a 
comment of the British psychiatrist Ronald Laing, who said that we have 
a word for those who think they are being persecuted when they aren't, 
paranoia. But we have no word for those pathetic souls who are being 
persecuted and refuse to acknowledge it. 
Consensus politics had brought about the reform legislation. A 
strong constituency for the reform of DYS had developed in the waning 
months of the Coughlan administration, and though many of these 
individuals and groups supported my efforts, I was expendable. I'd 
been appointed to implement the legislation they had conceived and 
moved through the legislature. Most, I think, saw reform as a matter of 
slowing the patronage and bringing in qualified professionals. I saw it 
as something more and had taken their legislation further than they 
planned or wished. 
Some groups stuck with me—particularly the Massachusetts Com­
mittee on Children and Youth (MCCY) and the Massachusetts Council 
on Crime and Corrections. Ceil DiCicco, the executive director of 
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MCCY, worked primarily with the legislature. She was one of those 
middle-class women who have been the backbone of reform in chil-
dren's services and prisons. She kept me informed of legislation affect­
ing our department, and she gave early warning of mines laid along the 
statehouse corridors for the likes of me. "Jerry, you didn't pay enough 
attention to Representative " or "Judge hac[ a private meeting 
with the Ways and Means chairman about your budget/' I can't say I 
looked forward to her calls, since they usually meant another round of 
meetings with this or that lawmaker or committee chairman, often 
with understandings regarding jobs for constituents or funding for 
local programs. But little as I enjoyed her calls, they were invaluable. 
Legislation was filed to head off virtually every reform I might envi­
sion, and though periodically the legislature adjourned, it never left 
town. When lawmakers weren't in formal session, they were wander­
ing around making deals directly or through their aides. In fact, the 
efforts of DYS staff with political connections to undermine change 
seemed to peak when the legislature was not in formal session. Of 
course, at those times there was more latitude for private meetings with 
local reps. As soon as the legislature reconvened, I could anticipate 
bills to allow juvenile parole agents to carry guns, unexpected capital 
outlay proposals for new buildings, and the perennial measures to 
allow juvenile judges to set time and sentence youngsters to specific 
reform schools. 
The department's most abiding support came from the League of 
Women Voters. Evelyn Bender, their lobbyist on Beacon Hill, suffered 
me patiently, and she was always there to help bail me out in the 
legislature. I kept her informed of our problems and plans. When we 
had a rush of escapes, I made sure she knew about the sabotage, the 
youngsters, and the stories of what was going on in the system. From 
her, the information percolated throughout Beacon Hill. 
Sam Tyler, head of the Massachusetts Council on Crime and Correc­
tions, was routinely supportive, particularly during the tumultuous 
legislative hearings chaired by Representative Robert McGinn in the 
months before my departure. Sam and John Hough, a young writer, 
had led an early attack on the patronage-laden county training schools. 
When things seemed downright hopeless, I could always walk over to 
their office and regain my perspective as I listened to them joke about 
their latest discovery at some training school: "Jerry, the superinten­
dent has two degrees—one in embalming, and one in massage." 
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But the strongest support came from less neatly definable groups. I 
can't recall turning down a speaking invitation—Lions, Junior Cham­
bers of Commerce, Rotary, Business and Professional Women, Holy 
Name societies, B'nai B'rith, college and high school classes, com­
mencements, radio and television talk shows, and anyplace else where 
someone might listen. Never having run for public office, I can only 
surmise that the experience is much the same for a politician. I found it 
hard to repeat the same things so often in banquet halls, service clubs, 
pizza parlors, gyms, and church basements across the state. Some of 
the encounters were funny. For example, after preparing a formal 
speech for a local men's service club, I arrived to find three middle-
aged gentlemen seated at a Formica table in the front section of a busy 
Italian carry-out. It turned out to be one of the better meetings. The 
realization that I had the good wishes of such disparate groups of 
people helped me during the many crises. 
13 Community-based Alternatives 
Where Are All the Kids? 
"Where are all the kids?" was the first question I had when touring the 
reform schools. It was the last question I heard three and a half years 
later, and it plagued the reforms long after it had been answered. My 
original question was meant as a goad—why were the inmates so invis­
ible in these bucolic surroundings? I knew the answer. They were some­
where inside. If I didn't find them in vocational shops, classrooms, or 
locked in cottages, they would appear in sullen groups of ten or twelve, 
herded two by two along the narrow sidewalks bordering some institu­
tion road, staff trailing a few yards behind, often in cars. But after the 
reform schools were closed, the question took on a different meaning. 
Where were the kids? Were they shipped off to adult prisons or se­
questered in institutions in other states? Perhaps they had only left for 
a while and then had been quietly dragged back and locked up again. 
But no, they were gone. Therefore, the closing must have been done 
recklessly. Any other possibility was inconceivable. 
At first we paroled most inmates home. The fact that I headed the 
state youth parole authority made this relatively easy. But there were 
limits to this strategy. The judges objected, and if a parolee hurt some­
one, the blame would be laid at my door. Besides, many of the kids 
couldn't go home or wouldn't do well there without additional commu­
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nity support services. I wasn't wedded to the idea that every juvenile 
had to return to his or her neighborhood. Some didn't want to go back: 
she too firmly the family scapegoat; he too easily cast by peers as the 
local hood. For others, the best hope lay in the chance for a stable life 
elsewhere. But most would go back to their communities whether or 
not we wanted it, even when they went to uncaring homes and dan­
gerous neighborhoods. We had no convenient Australia, nor was it our 
place to engage in forms of juvenile transportation. 
We had tried new therapeutic models in some cottages, and they 
seemed to be successful in their limited task. There was less violence, 
the kids seemed happier, an atmosphere of normalization created a 
better milieu for treatment and education. But institutional preconcep­
tions governed even the best therapeutic cottages. When we started 
them, we had almost no funds for contracting with community-based 
agencies. We were confined to what was available: institutional build­
ings, institutional staff, and a few outside consultants. At their best, the 
cottages resembled traditional child welfare group homes. At their 
worst, they began to look like some of the more frightening therapeutic 
community models. 
The early agitation in the institutions didn't help matters. Badgering 
by staff and politicians had skewed my judgment. Rather than adopt­
ing the more reasonable programs, I looked first to those which would 
look more structured, less permissive, and better disciplined. I was 
drawn to models which, though presented as wonderfully caring and 
humane, were at their core rigid and authoritarian. My version of the 
Faustian bargain was to gain control at the expense of understanding. 
As our first step in establishing state-operated halfway houses, we 
acquired a state-owned house in the Hyde Park section of Boston, only 
a few blocks down a back road from the Roslindale detention center. 
Hyde Park House stood in seductive contrast to ratty Rozzie, with its 
endless shunting of inmates, occasional violence, and general apathy. 
The neat house had open doors, a comfortable living room, food cook­
ing in the kitchen, and well-behaved boys sitting with their tutors, and 
it was proof we could find institutional staff willing to try new models 
of care. 
Hyde Park House was put together by Pat Tague, a former priest 
who'd been a client in a respected therapeutic community in Rhode 
Island. Like almost everyone else, he had connections in the depart­
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ment and the legislature. His uncle, Mark Burke, was the man who'd 
been my first guide around the statehouse, and who now occupied the 
steward's position at Roslindale. When Pat was referred to me, I checked 
with the director of the Rhode Island program and found out that Pat 
knew their model well, though he'd perhaps left prematurely. The rec­
ommendation was lukewarm, but Pat's interest in starting a therapeutic 
community program, something we very much wanted to do, was 
convincing. His program was our first, and we were able to set it up 
through administrative action alone. I didn't have to wait on the legisla­
ture for funding and contract approvals. Pat enlisted Peter Castignaro, 
a young cottage counselor from Lyman, to join him. The program 
seemed well structured, well planned, and well supervised. It could 
start taking youngsters immediately. 
From the beginning, Hyde Park House fit the bill. We could have our 
cake and eat it, doling out control as therapy and psychological assault 
as discipline. What's more, we could not have been accused of per­
missiveness. (The Hyde Park model is the one in vogue throughout the 
United States today for treating adolescents involved in drugs.) Young­
sters were expected to conform themselves to authority at all times, to 
lay out their problems, to assume responsibility for their own actions, 
and to disown whatever excuses they might have found in their back­
grounds. House government and group therapy sessions were held a 
number of times a day. There were chores to do, individual tutoring, 
and a consultant psychiatrist. Supporters and critics alike were im­
pressed. After we took in the drug-dependent son of a Boston police 
detective, it became a favorite charity of policemen, who helped raise 
funds for programming and recreational equipment. It all sounded 
fine, but the hard edge got brittle as time passed. 
One day I made a swing by the house after another depressing trip to 
Roslindale. My quick stops by had become a ritual of reassurance for 
me, but that one was no such thing. While sitting at the kitchen table 
talking with Pat over a cup of coffee, I glanced into the next room. A 
boy was sitting on a chair with a sign hung around his neck, something 
to the effect that he'd been unwilling to deal with his problems. I was 
embarrassed and sensed that Pat felt the same. I asked the boy why he 
was wearing a sign. His answer was that he was dealing with his 
problems. He approved of his discipline. Though the measures were 
less stringent than in Cottage Nine, his response was uncomfortably 
reminiscent of my encounter with Doug in the tombs. I said nothing. 
180 / The Alternative System 
A week or two later, I got wind that youngsters were occasionally 
sent upstairs to sit in a closet as punishment for not"getting with" the 
program. Again I looked the other way. The staff sensed my ambiv­
alence and stopped using the closet and signs, at least when I was 
around. The sad fact was that I wanted so much to be able to endorse 
this first alternative that I was willing to overlook problems I would 
have pounced on at Shirley or Lyman. I justified the inaction by telling 
myself I didn't sufficiently understand therapeutic community treat­
ment models. After all, I told myself, most of my professional peers were 
already recognizing them as offering the best hope for rehabilitating 
delinquent and drug-involved youngsters. But it was a weak defense. 
Some people didn't much like Hyde Park House. Tom Gallagher of 
the Boston Herald-Traveler was one. Hoping to turn him from writing 
carping columns, I took Tom out for a noontime lunch and conversa­
tion with staff and boys. He came along reluctantly but seemed im­
pressed. As we left, he thanked me and said he intended to do a 
positive article on the place. The next afternoon, he was on the phone 
shouting that the whole visit must have been a setup. I'd tried to con 
him. He couldn't be more specific than to say that the kids had proba­
bly been rehearsed. The place was too impressive. There was no ap­
peasing Tom, and as we talked, our argument deteriorated into name-
calling. I was disappointed, but not too much, since I knew he disliked 
me and what I was doing. I thought his outburst was just the old 
Gallagher reasserting himself. But it was more than that. Tom was right 
about Hyde Park House—although probably for the wrong reasons. 
Similarly, Leslie Stahl, who was then a news reporter for a Boston 
television station, came out to do a feature story. She also seemed 
impressed by the boys, the staff, and the program. But her story on the 
following evening's news was generally critical. I called her and com­
plained that she hadn't given us a fair shake. But she too was right. 
Neither Gallagher nor Stahl could articulate what lay behind the un­
easiness. It seemed to have more to do with the too-perfect demeanor 
of the boys than with the ideology. Ironically, they probably saw Hyde 
Park House as too permissive, too idealistic, not recognizing the dan­
gerousness of the youth, instead of the opposite. To them it didn't seem 
a tough enough substitute for reform school. Hyde Park House con­
tinued to take kids throughout my tenure. Though the harsher aspects 
of the program were eventually modified, it was closed by Joe Leavey, 
who succeeded me as commissioner. 
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The experience with Hyde Park was a testament to the fact that there 
were no ready-made treatment programs for delinquents coming out of 
reform schools. In its own way that was a blessing. We had to make our 
own. Had there been approved models of professional community-
based programs, such as those currently touted by the American Cor­
rectional Association, we would have used them—and effectively un­
done our reforms. Correctional bureaucrats see the reform school as 
integral to a spectrum of services for delinquent youth. Every young­
ster apparently should retain the right to his or her own institution­
alization. The practical effect, had I followed this route in Massachu­
setts, would have been a system of rebuilt reform schools side by side 
with a new cluster of state-staffed mini-institutions called "commu-
nity-based" and scattered throughout the Commonwealth to serve 
newly defined groups of delinquents allegedly in need of restrictive 
residential rehabilitation. Twice the number of youngsters would be 
under state control. 
Treatment: Who Needs It? 
We had decided to get out of institutions before we had thought 
through the alternatives. But the decision didn't seem foolhardy. Our 
reform schools were as great a threat to public safety full as they were 
empty. We wanted to do the least harm. The hard truth is that adult and 
juvenile penal institutions have minimal impact on crime. If most pris­
ons were closed tomorrow, the rise in crime would be negligible. 
Years later, the conservative writer Charles Murray would argue that 
sending a child to reform school has a "suppression effect" on later 
delinquency.1 Though Murray's study was the subject of controversy 
with reference to its methodology, a reanalysis of Murray's data by crimi­
nologists of less rigid conservatism revealed that he had lightly passed 
over the most startling implications of his own data. Youths sent directly 
home did about as well as those incarcerated for a year or more.2 
But conservative analysts like Murray seem forever fated to be de­
tached from the stuff of their studies. Anyone who has felt an institu­
tion, smelled its corridors and cellblocks, heard its din, or spent 
enough time with an inmate to know him or her well cannot come away 
thinking it does anyone much good. The only value it has is its poten­
tial to incapacitate or deter; and virtually all the research, including 
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Murray's, shows institutions to be a small deterrent. Locking up offend­
ers has minimal effect on crime rates. Incapacitation works only when 
it is so massive as to challenge the nature of a democratic society. In 
fact, correctional institutions probably stimulate the very behavior they 
claim to treat. For example, in an exhaustive cohort study of violent 
delinquents, a group of respected Ohio researchers concluded: "Our 
most important single finding emerges from the analysis of the impact 
of the court's disposition on the intervals between future arrests. . . . 
This interval, measured in 'street time' (the actual number of months 
during the intervals between arrests when the offender was free to 
commit an offense), diminished dramatically after each commitment to 
an institution."3 The Rand corporation, which gave us the term inca­
ipacitation, has more recently suggested that correctional institutions 
may produce criminals and that incapacitation as the major tenet of 
crime control is a questionable social policy.4 In a Justice Department 
study, Rand suggested that prisons probably encourage crime among 
their alumni. The word criminogenic was used in describing prisons in 
the first draft. It was excised from the final product at the insistence of 
the government funders of the project, apparently because it flew in the 
face of administration rhetoric on the effectiveness of imprisonment. 
Long before these computer-generated truths came to light, how­
ever, DYS had concluded that it wasn't doing anything particularly risky 
in closing reform schools, even if no alternatives were available. But it 
would have been a gratuitous insult to the courts had we not set up an 
alternative method of control and treatment. Unlike many of my civil 
libertarian friends, however, I didn't believe that the only thing we 
could do for these youngsters was to minimize the damage. At the 
least, community-based treatment could assist these young offenders 
in developing skills needed to negotiate their difficult family and com­
munity environments and to avoid self-destructive miscalculations. 
Twenty-five years ago, the respected American sociologist Erving 
Goffman wrote a seminal article, "On Cooling the Mark Out: Some 
Aspects of Adaptation to Failure."5 In discussing therapy, Goffman 
used the metaphor of a professional con game. The con artist, having 
taken the mark's (victim's) money and disappeared, employs a con­
federate to approach the victim just as he or she recognizes his or her 
predicament—the sudden embarrassing illumination "I've been had." 
The confederate calms the victim down. He suggests, for example, that 
perhaps something has delayed the con man (for whom the victim 
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waits on the street). Perhaps there has been a misunderstanding, a 
misperception, or instructions not clearly understood. The con man's 
confederate emphasizes the futility of the victim's situation, the prob­
lems in reporting such matters to the police, and the potential for 
embarrassment. Meanwhile, the con artist gets out of town. 
Goffman saw the role of the helping professional as similar to that of a 
con artist's confederate. The chronic young offender is likely to have 
been "had" in terms of family abuse, economics, a violence-laden envi­
ronment, and limited opportunities. The therapist diverts attention from 
these issues by redefining the game as, for example, the need for the client 
to assume personal responsibility for his or her own plight, to learn self-
discipline, to set limits, and to try again for mostly unattainable goals. 
As Goffman puts it, "The psychotherapist is in this sense, the society's 
cooler. His job is to pacify and re-orient the disorganized person; his job 
is to send the patient back to an old world or a new one, and to send him 
back in a condition in which he can no longer cause trouble to others or 
can no longer make a fuss. In short, if one takes society, and not the 
person, as the unit, the psychotherapist has the basic task of cooling the 
mark out."6 "Cooling out the mark" is the ruling ideology among those 
who work with delinquent youngsters. I didn't want our alternatives to 
be a variation on that theme; I wanted them to validate each youth's 
personal experience. Though I recognized the need to control the youth's 
crime or violence, I wanted to give due consideration to and respect for 
each one's life history, with the hope that we, the definers, would occa­
sionally reconsider the ways in which we dealt with delinquents. 
In this sense the question of whether our alternatives worked was 
not primary. Solutions in this field are inevitably dangerous. Programs 
which "work" by some standards can cause more problems for the 
larger society than those which "fail" but tell us more about an offender 
and his world. I saw cutting recidivism as a happy side effect of the 
more crucial task of understanding the roots of a particular youngster's 
illegal behavior. 
Although I had spent most of my professional life in psychiatric 
settings and was at home with some of the more traditional psychiatric 
settings for our youngsters, I didn't believe that these approaches were 
particularly effective. However, the better psychiatric programs still 
left patients with some sense of dignity and worth. This was probably 
because the patients who could afford such care were people of means. 
Though the psychoanalytic model was of limited effectiveness in treating 
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delinquents, it still stressed the importance of life history, even if nar­
rowly conceived within orthodox theory.7 
I placed a small number of our most difficult youngsters at the re­
spected McClean Psychiatric Hospital in Belmont, Massachusetts. Most 
of them had been sent to us for murder or other crimes of violence. 
McClean had a tradition of humane, individualized care of the kind that 
the wealthy deviant and mentally ill traditionally demand. At McClean 
one didn't hear the allegations of patient abuse which dogged the state 
hospitals or state facilities for the criminally insane. I always felt it was 
because the relatives who paid the bills for McClean's patients would not 
tolerate a family member being knocked off the wall. If that happened, 
they would remove the patient to another private setting and take the 
family's money with them. My wife was a chief psychiatric nurse at 
McClean, and I was aware that the hospital had a few well-to-do patients 
who had committed horrible crimes but, because of their station, were 
given psychiatric treatment instead of prison. It seemed to me that if any 
of DYS'S charges had to be locked up, it might as well be in a comfortable 
place with an interesting clientele. Even if the treatment were only mini­
mally effective, at least our more serious delinquents would not be so 
mistreated as would be likely in the state institutions. 
Besides, the private mental health system has provided a convenient 
alternative for teenage delinquents of the middle and upper classes for 
a century. And on its own narrow terms, it seemed to work, at least in 
diverting recalcitrant youngsters from a system which usually dragged 
its clientele ever deeper into crime. 
The first two youngsters we sent to McClean had different prob­
lems. One was an openly gay youngster who had been victimized at 
one of our training schools; the other, a fifteen-year-old who had killed 
his grandmother with an ax. They both did well at McClean, and I 
never regretted sending them there. 
But there were occasional problems. A later referral, Nino (a street 
kid from East Boston), gave the doctors at McClean more problems. 
Though he was occasionally unruly and had been diagnosed as near 
psychotic, he was a continual management problem, unwilling to take 
the therapy seriously. One day I got a call from a supervisor at McClean 
who had attended a ward meeting about Nino. They concluded that he 
needed a more structured setting, and they recommended that he be 
transferred to the adult prison at Concord. It struck me as particularly 
out of character that this group of sophisticated helpers would pre­
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scribe an adult prison as the best option for a troublesome teenager. I 
called the director and informed him that should McClean find itself 
unable to treat Nino, we would of course remove him to one of our 
reform schools, which by then were reasonably humane. In such an 
event, however, we would feel compelled to remove the other young­
sters placed at McClean as well (a small number, but providing a not 
insignificant income to the hospital). It must have been the first time in 
its history that McClean had recommended prison as therapy. I figured 
it had to do with Nino's lower socioeconomic class. McClean kept 
Nino, and the issue never came up again. 
Another alternative was the newly chic drug programs, which would 
later become a national ideology. Matt Dumont, head of the state's drug 
programs, had embarked on a project of supporting so-called thera­
peutic communities. These were peer-group, confrontative residential 
programs initially run by ex-addicts and later peopled with profes­
sional social workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists. The idea was 
new at the time, having come to public notice through Lewis Yablon-
sky's well-received book The Violent Gang.8 Yablonsky outlined the Syn­
anon model developed by a young ex-alcoholic, Chuck Dederich. Syn­
anon was the granddaddy of hundreds of programs which sprouted up 
across the country in later years. The Syanon model called for a new, ul­
timately threatening kind of "therapeutic community" based on group 
pressure and self-revelation. It seemed a good enough idea, but it 
eventually led to the kinds of authoritarian enclaves of brainwashing 
and true-believerism which characterize many contemporary drug-
abuse therapeutic communities. A number of these new programs were 
willing to accept delinquent kids coming out of reform schools. We 
even began one of our own, run by an alumnus of one of the private 
programs and other state staff. It was deceptively simple, unusually 
reassuring to administrators, visitors, and politicians, and one of the 
bigger mistakes of my tenure. 
What models did we eventually follow? Our community programs ran 
the gamut from tightly programmed, highly supervised treatment 
models with most services, for example, education, counseling, and 
job training given within the confines of the house, to programs with 
minimal supervision, attendance at local schools, and so on. We con­
tracted with respected and established child-care groups like the New 
186 / The Alternative System 
England Home for Little Wanderers, You Inc. in Worcester, and Dow­
neyside Homes in the Springfield area. Downeyside Homes was headed 
by Father Paul Engel, a local priest who'd pioneered family group homes 
for youngsters caught up in the child welfare system. 
We also contracted with dozens of less traditional groups like Libra 
Inc. (an ex-offenders group), the New England Arts Academy, and 
Genesis II. Some worked; others didn't. The Libra contract gave us 
many problems later, and the house was eventually closed.9 A psychia­
trist and psychologist came to us with a proposal to start Genesis II, a 
group home across the border in Maine, for six or eight youngsters 
with drug problems. After I left the state it evolved into Elan, a contro­
versial drug treatment program for more than three hundred young-
sters—and not the kind of program I felt proud of having any part in 
generating. Many of these programs were begun because we were 
willing to fund the model. Others had existed before but had not dealt 
with delinquent youngsters. But among the dozens of newly found or 
newly created community-based programs, a few turned out to be 
integral to successful deinstitutionalization. 
Subsequent research showed that some programs were highly effec­
tive in lowering recidivism among ex-inmates. They weren't the pro­
grams we had planned at the beginning, nor were they the most pro­
fessional models. The more effective programs often sprang up as a 
makeshift response to a particular youngster's crisis. One such model 
was the Community Advocates Program (CAP), later renamed Key, Inc. 
It was conceived by two university students, and it began as a summer 
alternative for a few youth from the reform schools. 
In summer 1970,1 got a call from Scott Wolfe, a junior at Harvard. He 
knew of my attempts to reform DYS and had talked some fellow under­
graduate students at Phillips Brooks House into fashioning a summer 
program for a few selected youngsters who'd been committed to DYS. 
Scott hoped to offer on-campus tutoring and a cultural enrichment 
program for a few ex-reform school kids from the Cambridge-Somer-
ville area, which borders Harvard. At a time when we had few alter­
natives, the students' interest in helping us out was welcome. We con­
tracted to pay out-of-pocket expenses, though they donated the bulk of 
the resources. The program ran through summer 1970 and ended with 
the opening of fall term. The kids went over to Harvard during the days 
to be tutored, exposed to literature, and taken out on field trips, to rock 
concerts, and to museums. 
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Generally the program went well, though an occasional youngster 
got into minor scrapes with the law or stole money from open wallets 
and purses left on desks by too-trusting students. That alone would 
have ended many a university's involvement— "the ungratefulness of it 
all/' But the Phillips Brooks students saw it as a challenge and looked to 
adjust the program. By now they had come to know their charges well 
and had a better view of what might be needed to keep them out of 
trouble. 
That fall, Scott and his brother, Bill, a sophomore at Clark University, 
came up with a new idea. They proposed a more intensive program in 
which students would work with kids in their homes, be available to 
their charges in the evenings and on weekends, and would be allowed 
to take a youngster into their own apartments or homes if things 
seemed to be getting out of hand in the youngster's own home. They 
would assign university students to work with youngsters one to one, 
each putting in from ten to thirty hours a week with his or her youth. 
The students would be paid a modest hourly wage and would get class 
credit for their efforts. 
I hammered out a loose contract with the Wolfe brothers, who were 
still in the process of creating a nonprofit entity. Within a few weeks 
they were recruiting and training undergraduates from Boston, Worces­
ter, and Cambridge. They began taking kids returning from the reform 
schools. As we ran out of group home slots, CAP became our overflow 
agency, CAP offered something less than a residential group home but 
more than simple parole. Within a few months the Wolfe brothers had 
set up a nonprofit ice cream parlor in East Boston and a pizza-delivery 
service, both run by the youngsters, which catered to university dorms 
at Clark and Holy Cross universities. The receipts went into wages for 
the juveniles. 
CAP also got caught in the middle of our problems in getting the 
Department of Administration and Finance to honor our contracts. 
There still were no uniform ways of setting rates, and the checks 
weren't being generated on time. In order to open the ice cream parlor 
on schedule, the Wolfe brothers used the trust fund their father had set 
up for them. At the opening festivities, Mr. Wolfe approached me and 
asked whether it was likely his sons would be reimbursed by the state 
for the $30,000 they'd already spent. It was the first I had heard of it, 
and I was taken aback at how far out on a limb Scott and Bill had gone. I 
reassured him that the state money soon would be there and apolo­
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gized for the delay. The state's dollars were freed a couple of months 
later. The CAP program proved to be one of the most effective in lower­
ing recidivism among its clientele. As Key, Inc. it grew to be the largest 
nonprofit organization in Massachusetts giving on the street services 
to delinquent youth. Key presently supervises approximately five hun­
dred delinquent Massachusetts youngsters in the community. 
We also used established models of adolescent treatment. The late Al 
Irieschman, a nationally respected child therapist took a number of our 
youngsters into his wonderful Walker Home in Needham. Walker was 
an intense therapeutic community with a Freudian cast. It had stood 
the test of time as a decent and humane program for disturbed and 
abused youngsters and was much in the tradition of Bruno Bettelheim's 
Orthogenic School near the University of Chicago campus.10 
Dare, Inc., in Boston had run a halfway house program for a few 
young delinquents before I came to the state. The director, Jerry 
Wright, was at first supportive of our efforts to create community pro­
grams, but he grew less so as deinstitutionalization progressed. Aside 
from the fact that he thought I let youngsters manipulate me, he was 
particularly perturbed when he realized I was going to close all the 
reform schools. For a number of years he had stood outside and berated 
the YSB for its brutal institutions, but he had also come to depend on the 
threat of reform schools to motivate kids to stay in halfway houses. 
Wright was concerned that, without the backup of reform schools, his 
youngsters might walk out the front door. 
My response was, "So what? Find another way to keep them/' This 
approach upset a number of treatment programs. Threats are the life­
blood of juvenile justice. First comes the threat of institutionalization. 
Then, when a kid gets to the institution, he finds that the whole place is 
held together by harsher threats. If you escape, you must go to the hole. 
In some states, they might transfer you to adult prison with its threats— 
also delivered on—of rape and assault. To what effect? 
Given the average delinquent youngster's life history, for threats to 
work they would have to have consequences so draconian as to betray 
the very nature of help. Things would end up looking like something 
out of the Dark Ages—threat upon threat, violence upon violence, 
payback upon payback—each round escalating. The cumulative effect 
would be staggering. 
By late 1971, it was clear we could close most or all of the institutions. 
It was such a drastic and unthinkable action that the opposition seemed 
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unable to respond in any focused way. Though staff had been relatively 
effective in causing us problems in the legislature while we were trying 
to humanize the reform schools, they had no strategy for fending off 
their closing. Perhaps this was best exemplified by the occurrences one 
night at the Shirley Industrial School. 
We seemed to have made enough progress at the school that I 
thought it an appropriate time to symbolize where we were headed and 
what we rejected. I located a few youths who had been confined for 
long periods in the tombs and Cottage Nine. We gathered them with a 
few staff on the second floor of the now-deserted building. Each boy 
was given a sledgehammer and invited to beat down the cement walls 
of the small isolation chambers. 
As we were about to begin the ritual, one of the staff mentioned that 
a state senator, Joe Ward, was on the grounds addressing a local men's 
club in the school dining hall. I went up and invited Senator Ward to 
join us in the demolition, suggesting that he might want to take a few 
whacks at the walls himself. Press and photographers were present as 
the senator joined in. It was a strange moment, since he opposed the 
closing of Shirley and had spoken out against our earlier attempts to 
change the discipline procedures at the school. To me it was a sign that, 
at least for a while, the momentum was with us as we moved to leave 
the institutions entirely behind. 
I eventually settled on one expectation for the youth leaving our 
institutions: "We are assigning you to a program we hope will best 
meet your needs and keep you out of trouble. But if you don't think it's 
working, call us. We will reconsider matters. We're not here to prove a 
particular program works for you. If you impulsively leave a program, 
let us know. We don't care if you move through a dozen programs a 
year so long as you keep in touch and out of trouble." This was anath­
ema to program administrators. We were letting young toughs manip­
ulate us. But we stuck by our resolution, and it worked. Young people 
called or came into the central office by the dozens to negotiate and 
redefine their community programs. I later found some solace in a 
study done by a Harvard researcher who found that those youngsters 
who picked or found their own placement or program did significantly 
better than those forced to stay in placements they believed were no 
good for them. 
Despite our financial problems and ad hoc administrative tactics, by 
the end of 1972 we had contracts with approximately 175 different 
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private programs. Kids were placed in universities, private prep schools, 
Outward Bound programs, specialized foster care, in a wide range of 
group homes, in their own homes with supportive family services, in 
art schools, in military schools, in therapeutic community drug pro­
grams, and wherever else a program might develop in response to the 
needs of a troubled or troubling teenager for whom we were responsible. 
14 The Myth of "Violent" Teenagers 
W  e had our share of violent youngsters: Al, who axed his grand­
mother; Billy, who raped and killed a seventy-year-old woman; Harry, 
who in a holdup shot his victim in the head for eight bucks; Mark, who 
sexually assaulted and killed a seven-year-old boy. But, horrific as the 
crimes were, their perpetrators were rare in our system, even among 
those sent us for violent crimes. 
Violent juvenile crime was a major concern of the public in Mas­
sachusetts. Not only in the state, but across the nation, violent crime 
had steadily increased during the fifteen years following 1956.1 Rob­
bery, assault, and rape had tripled. As is the case whenever crime 
increases, most of the increase was attributed to an explosion of juve­
nile crime. But did the attribution fit? 
Violent crime in the United States has always been higher than in 
any comparable Western country, and rises and falls in juvenile crime 
usually have followed the same patterns as adult crime. Though there 
has always been a disproportionate amount of crime among young 
males, particularly in the eighteen to twenty-five-year age range—and 
though older juveniles (sixteen and seventeen) commit more crimes 
than younger adolescents, there have never been self-contained dra­
matic increases of violent juvenile crime which did not parallel in­
creases in adult crime. Juvenile crime rates follow adult crime rates, 
only a bit less so.2 Unfortunately, one would be hard pressed to argue 
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this to a public primed to believe that juvenile crime is a runaway horse. 
Think back to the national obsession with New York street gangs and 
the Dracula killings in the 1950s, the Chicago street gangs of the late 
1950s and early 1960s; the Philadelphia gang violence of the 1970s; and 
the Los Angeles juvenile gangs of the 1980s. Certainly, from time to 
time, there are unusual explosions of violent crime. But much of this is 
related to increases in the number of adolescents in the population. It 
isn't always clear at the time what's going on, or whether more juveniles 
are actually involved in violent crime than was previously thought.3 
Though it makes up an extremely small percentage of all violent 
crime committed by juveniles, it is generally agreed that the most relia­
bly reported crime is murder. Homicide rates in the United States 
nearly doubled between 1958 and 1972, from 4.5 homicides per 100,000 
to 8.5 per 100,000. But even this unsettling surge of violence wasn't 
unprecedented. Homicides more than tripled between 1900 and 1914, 
from 2.1 to 73 per 100,000, and reached a high in 1933 of 9.6 murders 
per 100,000. As with adult homicide, the juvenile murder rate was also 
higher in the 1930s and 1940s than in the early 1960s.4 The major rise in 
homicides occurred between 1965 and 1970, followed by a drop be­
tween 1973 and 1975 and a rise in 1980. The national homicide rate for 
1990 exceeded the 1980 rate. 
In June 1988 a national newspaper, USA Today, ran a series of pro and 
con articles on whether the death penalty should be invoked for juve­
niles convicted of murder. In the lead article in favor of the penalty 
entitled "Executing Juveniles Is a Social Necessity," the head of the 
conservative Washington Legal Foundation began, "Nearly 20,000 
murders are committed by juveniles every year, and that number is not 
reflected in the number sentenced to death/'5 The fact that the state­
ment was grossly inaccurate is less compelling than that a widely read 
newspaper apparently didn't question the figure before printing it on 
the editorial page. To be sure, many inaccuracies end up on editorial 
pages, but in this case, the outrageous figure of 20,000 juvenile mur­
ders was taken as unexceptional. 
In 1990, for example, slightly over 23,000 murders and manslaughters 
were reported in the United States. Of the 20,000 persons arrested for 
these crimes, approximately 2,000 were juveniles.6 Even this figure is 
inflated, however, since juveniles tend to get involved in such incidents 
in groups and with peers. A single offense often yields multiple arrests 
of teenagers. In addition, due to police overcharging, charges made at 
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the time of arrest are often lowered later, if not completely dismissed. 
That leaves something like 1,200 juveniles across the United States who 
are tried annually for murder or manslaughter. Of these, probably no 
more than 500 will be convicted of murder in a court of law. This is 2.5 
percent of the figure which appeared, unquestioned, on the editorial 
pages of USA Today. 
This kind of gap between the myth and the reality of juvenile delin­
quency hounded me from the beginning in Massachusetts. Each year 
we received no more than five or six youngsters convicted of murder. 
That number has remained relatively fixed for the past decade. Some 
years there would be as few as three; other years, as many as seven. For 
a while, I thought juvenile murderers were being sent to adult prisons, 
but they weren't. We got virtually all those under seventeen who had 
been convicted of murder. Then I concluded that the small numbers 
might have to do with the fact that juveniles in Massachusetts were 
subject to adult trial at age seventeen. In thirty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction till age eigh-
teen.7 In eight states, including Massachusetts, juvenile court jurisdic­
tion is kept until age seventeen.8 In four states, sixteen-year-olds are 
handled as adults.9 These differences alone didn't explain the small 
numbers of Massachusetts adolescents arrested for murder, for when 
seventeen-year-olds were included in the statistics, they usually ac­
counted for no more than two additional murders per year.10 But homi­
cide is a relatively rare crime. What about the other violent offenses 
juveniles commit? 
About 25 percent of the young offenders sent to us were committed 
for crimes against persons.11 However, when these "crimes against 
persons" were distilled, few actually involved physical violence or 
even the threat of it. Nationally, about 4 percent of the arrests of juve­
niles are for offenses classified as violent. Violence, however, covers a 
wide range of behaviors. For example, a recent crime survey of victims 
indicated that there was no physical injury in 72 percent of offenses 
classified as violent and committed by juveniles. In those violent of­
fenses in which injury did occur, it wasn't serious enough to require 
medical attention in 93 percent of the cases.12 A study of 811 Colum­
bus, Ohio, youths with at least one violent crime on their records 
showed that 73 percent had neither threatened nor inflicted significant 
physical harm during the commission of those offenses. The same 
study followed a cohort of over 50,000 youth from birth to adulthood. 
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Of this group, only twenty-two youngsters committed two or more ag­
gravated offenses in which physical harm was threatened or inflicted.13 
Juveniles seldom use weapons in committing crimes. In M. E. Wolf-
gang's cohort study of Philadelphia boys born in 1945 and living in the 
city between their tenth and eighteenth birthdays, weapons were used 
in only 263 of 9,934 offenses known to police.14 A 1978 New York City 
study showed that weapons were present in only 17 percent of juvenile 
offenses classified as violent.15 A later victim crime survey revealed 
that juvenile offenders used weapons in 27 percent of violent offenses, 
though guns were present in less than 5 percent of those incidents.16 
With the exception of purse-snatching, most truly violent juvenile 
crime is confined to peers, with young males far more likely to be 
victims.17 
I looked assiduously for those few violent youngsters who provided 
the rationale for our reform schools. They were the symbol which justi­
fied the ritual of institutionalization. But despite the fact that they 
provided the political rationale for the whole system, they weren't so 
easily identified, particularly if one knew them and their offenses in 
detail (though I'm told that some of my successors had less trouble 
locating this elusive group). Youngsters defined as violent made up 
about 25 percent of our reform school populations. When the details of 
each case were known, however, less than 5 percent of the juveniles 
had clearly demonstrated personal violence directed at another. Here 
one is subject to the war stories which drive juvenile corrections: the 
tale of the youngster involved in a particularly lungeous and brutal act. 
Such juveniles exist. But while they may provide the stuff of nightly 
television crime news stories, they don't represent the average youth 
in a reform school or detention center, even one for violent offenders. 
Visiting other state youth correctional systems, I felt uncomfortable 
hearing administrators carry on about the new violent breed of delin­
quents filling their institutions. I couldn't understand it. Either we had 
dramatically fewer dangerous youngsters in our system than they did, 
or I was grossly misinformed about those who peopled our institu­
tions. It was neither. As I got to know them better, it was clear that my 
peers in other states knew the inmates in their institutions only dimly. 
They were acquainted with few personally and were uninterested in 
the events and circumstances which surround each offense and which 
are so incompletely, and usually inaccurately, represented by a rap 
sheet. The fact is7 the number of inmates in the average youth correc­
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tions system who have a propensity for personal violence has always 
been extremely small.18 
And all too often, state administrators are flagrantly dishonest. 
While they hop from convention to convention bemoaning the dan­
gerous delinquents in their youth institutions, their states are simul­
taneously binding over or waiving hundreds of nonviolent teenagers to 
adult criminal courts and adult prisons. Maryland routinely waives 
between eight hundred and a thousand youngsters into the adult sys­
tem annually. Virginia, the same. (Recently, in preparing background 
in the case of a juvenile convicted of murder, I learned that, on the day 
of his sentencing, there was only one youngster in the whole Virginia 
juvenile reform school system of approximately one thousand youths 
who had been convicted of murder. The half dozen or so Virginia juve­
niles who commit murder each year must be shuttled into the adult 
prison system.) The pattern of sending large numbers of juveniles to 
adult prisons prevails in most state systems. Yet these same states also 
maintain large reform school systems for (presumably) serious juvenile 
offenders too dangerous to be in the community. 
Those who run the juvenile justice system gain by defining young 
offenders as more violent than facts dictate. It's a kind of no-risk hero­
ism for all concerned—judges, superintendents, institutional staff, 
therapists, police, and probation officers. It encourages the posturing 
and strutting of the I-told-you-so crowd, who make sure that, no matter 
what happens, no one will be accountable. This is the correctional 
equivalent of the old psychiatric diagnosis of "latent schizophrenia," 
now called "borderline personality." If the patient improves, it can be 
chalked up to the therapist's skill at treatment. If, on the other hand, the 
patient deteriorates, the therapist looks even more sophisticated, hav­
ing predicted it all along. In this world it is to no one's advantage to 
destigmatize labels, except for those who are labeled. The process by 
which we label delinquents is more crucial than are its labels. 
I eventually got to know personally the fifty or so most dangerous 
youth in the department. Though some had committed serious violent 
crimes, most were repeat property offenders who consistently placed 
themselves and others in potentially dangerous situations. A few were 
considered dangerous to themselves because of repeated escapes from 
detention facilities or runs from community programs. After we closed 
the institutions for the most violent, the number of dangerous young­
sters in need of secure care, interestingly enough, decreased. We'd 
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been defining juveniles according to the numbers of beds available for 
locking up the dangerous ones. Certainly there is a need for special 
handling of truly violent youth. But these few kids are often hidden in 
piles of lightweight offenders, like needles in haystacks. 
As we closed the reform schools, we set up regional offices through­
out the state to develop community-based options and to take respon­
sibility for placing youngsters in their own communities. But each 
regional director had a few young offenders who were seen as in need 
of secure treatment or care. Aside from McClean Hospital, we had only 
one locked and secure program for juveniles, the Andros program. It 
was a privately run program for putatively violent youngsters. 
Andros was begun in February 1972, through a contract with the 
Human Resources Institute, a private psychiatric group, and the Bos­
ton Mental Health Foundation, another private agency. We housed 
Andros at the Roslindale facility, since its population had fallen to 
fewer than fifty juveniles. The contracts allowed the psychiatric groups 
to hire people of their own choice and to bring in qualified mental 
health consultants. In its first months, it was run by professional social 
workers, psychologists, and psychiatrists under contract with the Hu­
man Resources Institute. 
The Andros program combined psychiatric models and the then-
popular therapeutic community residential programming. ("No sex. 
No violence. No narcotics/') It was designed to handle thirty-six youth. 
During his first thirty days, no youngster was allowed off the grounds. 
Then gradually, through group and individual counseling, he could 
progress to supervised group outings, individual off-grounds trips, 
and unsupervised weekend passes. As he approached his parole date, 
he was required to lead and direct other youths who were lower on 
the achievement scale. There were daily mandatory community group 
counseling and therapy sessions. After morning groups and lunch, the 
residents had a choice of activities, though each had to choose one: 
swimming, basketball, occupational therapy, tutoring, or lectures on 
various subjects. Free time was available for recreation, calling or writ­
ing home, and small-group discussions. Each youngster received a 
cash allowance based on his progress and the geographic location of 
his home to cover expenses for home visits. 
Compared to Cottage Nine and the IJG Andros was a breath of fresh 
air. It was relatively short-term (the average youngster stayed in it no 
more than three to six months), it was active, and it treated its residents 
The Myth of "Violent" Teenagers I 197 
with unusual respect and concern. But Andros also exemplified one of 
the central contradictions in running effective therapeutic programs in 
corrections: unless one plans to institutionalize the clients and maim 
them psychologically, they must be brought into the local community 
as much as possible from the very beginning. That leads to runaways 
and escapes. The idea of a completely secure and therapeutic program 
soon becomes a contradiction in terms. The two aspects don't mix well. 
Despite the fact that Andros was supposed to be our secure program, 
in its initial stages a large number of its clients went over the wall. 
During one early six-month period in which 118 youth had been in 
the program, fifty-seven residents were absent without leave. Of these, 
eleven left the program four or more times. Though some left from the 
theoretically secure building, most ran from group outings or failed to 
return on time from weekend or extended passes. But even among 
these (putatively) most dangerous youth in the state, of the fifty-seven 
who went AWOL fifty-two returned. Thirty-four came back on their 
own, ten were returned by family or police with no new charges, and 
eight were returned with minor new charges. Though it was a gener­
ally humane and professional program, Andros had poor security, so 
the program brought in a new director, Andrew Vacchs, who recruited 
and supervised his own staff—many of them ex-offenders. Andy was a 
driven, highly involved person who worked around the clock handling 
this most difficult population of youngsters.19 After he took over, 
escapes stopped. In one remarkable incident when a youngster did 
escape, Andy's staff were waiting inside his home as he crawled in the 
window. The earlier escapes from the Andros program had never, for 
some reason, become a major issue, nor were there any major incidents 
associated with them. Part of the reason was that staff were not pre­
disposed to run to the phones every time a youngster left. That was one 
of the major problems in the state-run programs, which by tradition, 
predilection, or statute must immediately report every runaway as 
though it were a major crisis—which, unfortunately, it then became. 
Andros was soon filled with youngsters considered too dangerous 
for more open community-based programs. We had no other place to 
put them. The routine response would have been to develop additional 
secure programs, and my successors eventually did so. I took another 
tack. If we define youngsters as dangerous according to the number 
of beds we have for dangerous youngsters, why not set a limit on the 
number of beds? If the theory held, we could limit the number of 
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dangerous or violent youngsters. If we had had a maximum-security 
institution for three hundred, five hundred, or a thousand violent de­
linquents, the necessary number would have been found and labeled. 
We would sift things down to that relatively irreducible group of vio­
lent youngsters who, no matter what the facilities available, would fit 
the definition. As soon as one does this, much of the rationale for 
secure care falls away. 
I set an arbitrary number of thirty-five. In Massachusetts we would 
have slots for no more than thirty-five dangerous youth in secure care. 
I arrived at that figure based on the numbers of juveniles in our system 
who had been sent to us for violent offenses—including murder, rape, 
armed robbery, and aggravated assault—not simply every youth charged 
with such a crime, but only those in which a close reading of the 
circumstances of the offense clearly demonstrated a propensity for 
personal violence toward the victim. It made a big difference. We allo­
cated a few of the thirty-five slots to each region in the state. If the 
secure slots allotted to a specific region were filled, the regional direc­
tor had two options: to negotiate with another region for any empty 
slots they might have or to declare one of the dangerous youngsters 
presently occupying a secure slot as no longer dangerous and in need 
of secure care, releasing him to an alternative. 
The plan sounded risky, but it wasn't. There were no major incidents 
and no apparent increase in violence among other youngsters who 
were supposed to be deterred by the knowledge that their "violent" 
peers were being locked up. What we risked in prematurely releasing a 
potentially dangerous juvenile was more than compensated for in hold­
ing within bounds the pervasive process of overdefining too many 
youngsters as "dangerous" and keeping them in that status—a pro­
cedure having less to do with public safety than with minimizing 
bureaucratic or political risk. 
Secure care is seldom therapeutic, but one can minimize the harm. 
The joining of therapy with coercion is contradictory. Given the behav­
iorally coercive models of treatment in most secure treatment units, I 
took a perverse comfort in the fact that they didn't work. The implica­
tions of being able effectively to force a person to change are as om­
inous as they are helpful. Though I'm convinced that one can run 
small, effective programs for violent and dangerous youngsters—even 
for a while in secure settings—when genuine and lasting changes occur 
they have little to do with coercion. 
15 Side Effects: 
The County Training Schools 
My Dear Mr. Miller, [the letter began] 
You cannot imagine how happy and delighted are the people of 
Massachusetts when they learned this past week that you are about to 
pick up your bags and depart from our beloved State. I can predict that 
there will be dancing in the streets. 
Governor Sargent put a blemish on his record when he first brought 
you here. It is hard to understand how you fooled so many people pos­
ing as a great Administrator for Juvenile Delinquency. Your Youth Ser­
vice Board is in a state of chaos as the result of your way of doing things. 
Instead of closing the training schools, you should have first cleaned up 
the mess that you created, namely your Youth Service Board. Some of 
your employees have been involved in bank robberies, rapings, car 
thievery, and you name what else. 
You squandered millions of taxpayers' dollars when you established 
these half-way houses, and there isn't a Chief of Police of any City or 
Town in the State who is not delighted because of your leaving. 
I have been told that you spent four years in the Maryknoll Semi­
nary, and that you were phased out. If so, why did you not list this item 
amongst your many qualifications? 
I am going to ask Governor Sargent to have the Massachusetts 
National Guard Band serenade you off at Logan airport, the day that 
you depart. 
Very truly yours, 
William J. Donovan 
Essex County Commissioner1 
D y most measures one would have said that we should have left the 
county training schools alone. Our timing could not have been worse. 
We were just getting our own equilibrium as a department after 
months of tumult. Things were considerably more relaxed. Incidents 
were at the lowest point since I had taken over the department, and a 
generally good atmosphere was beginning to prevail in the reform 
schools. Our changes in the reform schools made the problems in the 
199 
200 / The Alternative System 
county schools more glaring. Our kids were bona fide delinquents-
burglars, car thieves, occasional assaulters, addicts, and rip-off artists. 
The county schools held school truants. Complicating matters was the 
fact that, having made our institutions for true delinquents relatively 
stable and decent, we had now decided they were superfluous. 
The county training schools had been around for half a century. They 
were bastions of county patronage and, through state reimbursement 
mechanisms, were tightly woven into the convoluted patterns of the 
legislature. A twelve- or thirteen-year-old boy could find himself locked 
in a county training school, often for years, because of his failure to 
attend a local elementary or junior high school. But the county training 
schools weren't accredited. The true reason for their existence—to pro­
vide patronage jobs for friends and relatives of county commissioners-
was clear from a simple scan of the staff resumes. The superintendent 
of one of the schools had degrees in massage and embalming. The 
superintendent of another came to his position after a stint as a pie 
salesman. What they had in common was having worked in the cam­
paign of a county commissioner or otherwise endeared themselves to a 
local politician or state legislator. 
When the Youth Service Board was created in 1948, it was given the 
duty of annually inspecting the county training schools, a duty that 
came over to our department at the time of the reform legislation. The 
inspections were perfunctory, YSB administrators or staff made only an 
annual courtesy tour, and their inspections yielded little beyond sup­
port for more funding of the schools and recommendations for occa­
sional new programs, building repairs, and staff expansion. After my 
first visit to the Middlesex County Training School, I decided a courtesy 
call would no longer suffice. 
A large percentage of our youngsters were county school alumni 
who had moved on to state reform schools. It would be easy enough to 
find out how they'd fared in the county schools, and I decided it might 
be useful background for our formal visits to the county schools. At 
first I tried to use volunteer students from Harvard Law School to 
interview them. With the help of the head of the law school's Center for 
Criminal Justice, Jim Vorenberg, we recruited a group of student volun­
teers and sent them out to interview DYS boys who had spent time in 
the county schools. 
Based on the few private conversations I'd had with some of these 
boys, I expected the Harvard students to be able to document the 
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scandalous conditions in the county schools. But though there were 
hints of some unsavory practices in the county schools, the boys were 
evasive, and their allegations were vague. The investigative reports 
were arid, devoid of passion, and onerously legalistic. Despite the 
radical rhetoric at Harvard Law in the early seventies, the students 
were uneasy with these mostly white kids from poor and blue-collar 
backgrounds. Things might have gone better if the kids had been black. 
After I had set the Harvard students to work, I appointed a special 
blue-ribbon commission headed by a respected former Republican 
state representative, Mary Newman, to assume the inspection task 
assigned our department by the legislature. I asked the commission to 
visit the schools and to file a report summarizing their findings. We 
provided staff backup. Meanwhile, Sam Tyler and John Hough of the 
Massachusetts Council on Crime and Corrections (MCCC) were un­
covering a trove of patronage, padding, and incompetence. Because 
of their corruption alone the schools deserved to close down. But in 
redoing the interviews with the boys, we uncovered a new series of 
scandals. 
We had expected the corruption, but we were surprised at the 
amount of abuse left unadmitted to the Harvard students. I discussed 
the situation with a staff person who'd recently begun working out of 
the Boston office. She was an unusually attractive young woman who, 
despite her easy manner, was more than a little hard-nosed and taken 
with her role as an investigator. We assigned her to travel around the 
state interviewing former county school boys. 
A few weeks later, she came back with names, dates, persons, 
places—a series of obscene incidents which, as I read them, I knew 
sounded the death knell for the county training schools. Why was this 
young woman able to get information unavailable to the law students? 
Her success at uncovering the scandals in the county schools was partly 
due to a more sensitive interviewing technique, and I fear that part of 
her success was for other reasons, which I preferred to ignore. She was 
an attractive, accepting, and not unseductive young woman who was 
open to hearing the stories and concerns of these teenage boys. The 
implications were obvious. The next question was whether the boys 
had fabricated the stories. We subsequently learned that, though there 
may have been an occasional embellishment, the allegations held up 
remarkably well. She had interviewed the boys individually in our 
reform schools and detention centers or on parole in their own commu­
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nities. She was able to get corroboration—identical incidents told by 
different boys giving names, dates, places, and graphic details. 
The Newman commission filed its report in April 1971, characteriz­
ing the young inmates as "truly children in bondage, with fewer civil 
rights than any other group in the Commonwealth, even including in­
mates in our state prisons/' The language was strong, but the commis­
sion was tastefully civil, skirting the less savory allegations. Chester 
Atkins, then a state legislator, filed legislation to establish alternatives 
for youngsters being sent to the county training schools. The MCCC set 
a goal of 50,000 cards or letters to be sent by citizens to county commis­
sioners in opposition to the continuation of the schools. 
Because of the sacrosanct nature of county patronage, the likelihood 
that the legislature would take on the county schools was small. I had 
attempted to interest the leadership in the issue to no avail. In frustra­
tion, I had all the interviews with the boys—their allegations of being 
handcuffed to poles, forced to do push-ups over an open sewer, having 
to rub their own feces on their faces, and other abuses—reproduced in 
a large report labeled "CONFIDENTIAL" and hand-delivered to the 
governor, the speaker of the House, and the senate president. I at­
tached a note indicating that I would hold a press conference the follow­
ing day, outline the allegations, and call for civil and possibly criminal 
action, should no other action be forthcoming. 
Though I received no response, before the end of the day the speaker 
and the senate president held a joint press conference and announced 
that they were appointing a special committee to look into all children's 
services across the state. Hearings would be held regarding the county 
schools. The politics of the situation was finessed by the speaker, who 
agreed simultaneously to appoint a special committee headed by Rep­
resentative Robert McGinn, a legislator from Hampden County and a 
strong supporter of that county's training school, to investigate our 
department. I went ahead and leaked the county training school report 
to the papers. It undid the relative calm and led to a raucous series of 
hearings and investigations. As the Boston Globe noted in an editorial, 
"Youth Services on the Mat," "No less than four committees of varying 
energy and commitment are studying the Department of Youth Ser­
vices. And a few weeks ago Senate President Kevin Harrington and 
House Speaker David Bartley called for the establishment of a fifth 
group, in the form of a blue-ribbon commission, to study all the state's 
youth services."2 
Side Effects I 203 
As the county schools' hiring practices and programs were brought 
to the light of day the schools became a political liability Reform-
minded legislators, led by Representative Charles Flaherty, had a field 
day. The testimony about how people were hired and what jobs they 
performed at the schools was the stuff of a Jimmy Breslin novel. A 
newcomer to politics, Paul Tsongas, won a county commissioner's seat 
with, among other things, a pledge to close the Middlesex County 
Training School. 
Even under these pressures, though, the schools crumpled very 
slowly. The one in Hampden County hung on the longest. We funded a 
street academy in Springfield, the city that gave the school most of its 
youngsters. In juvenile court, through aggressive advocacy for truants, 
we were able to convince the local judge to sentence them to this new 
alternative program. The county school's population fell, and by the 
time its annual budget came up for approval by the legislature, the 
school had only one student. Predictably, the legislature funded it for 
another year. 
The county training schools were finally closed because we had 
vacated the state reform schools. The fact that Massachusetts no longer 
locked up true delinquents made it impossible to institutionalize ersatz 
ones, but the reverse would not have been true. If the schools for 
truants had been closed first, it would have had no meaning for the 
inmates in the reform schools. By directing our reforms toward the 
more serious delinquents, we guaranteed better care for less serious 
delinquents. But taking on the county training schools brought on a 
new attack from the legislature which didn't end until I left the state. 
16 Backlash 
1 he Massachusetts Experiment is often attributed to a period of crazi­
ness in liberal Massachusetts. No doubt times were different. But they 
were different in other states as well, and none took their delinquent 
youth out of the reform schools. Though Massachusetts had a reputa­
tion as a hyperliberal enclave, when it came to state politics, it could be 
as conservative as any I recall walking up the steps of the statehouse 
while sign-carrying state prison guards marched back and forth de­
manding the ouster of John Boone, the commissioner of corrections. 
"Boone the Coon" was their chant. John, a quiet black man who had 
formerly headed the District of Columbia corrections department, had 
been appointed by Governor Sargent to lead the system in a pro­
gressive direction. He was eventually forced from office, but his pres­
ence exposed another side of "liberal" Massachusetts for all to see. And 
his troubles diverted some attention from ours. 
The backlash against my appointment began with my swearing-in 
and never stopped. When the department wasn't being formally inves­
tigated by the legislature, it was being privately pursued by others in 
hopes of a scandal or at least some missteps. Everyone had something 
to say—juvenile judges, professional groups, administrators, correc­
tional experts in other states, and town selectmen. It was all very 
democratic. Even many parents of reform school youth couldn't stom­
ach the idea that their boy or girl might do better living with another 
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family in specialized care than being stashed in a reform school. It 
revealed too many of the ambivalences which the rituals of institu­
tionalization cover so well. Some of these people even lobbied for a 
return to "humane" institutions. I should have caught a glimpse of 
things to come when a consultant child psychiatrist with the depart­
ment requested that I reopen the isolation rooms at one of the reform 
schools in order to motivate a recalcitrant boy for treatment. 
Similar issues emerged around a number of community treatment 
programs for youngsters with drug dependency and addiction. These 
programs had a policy that, if a client failed to cooperate, he or she 
could be dumped out onto the streets or sent back to reform school. I 
refused to allow this in the drug treatment programs, and some pro­
grams made accommodations. We stopped using the rest. 
For the first two years, the political opposition never quite got their 
act together. If they had, we would have been stopped. Though we 
were often disorganized nearly to chaos, our critics were in even worse 
shape, largely because so many staff were politically appointed. Jobs 
were the issue, and it was every man for himself. In one sense the 
legislative investigations were a continuation of the commotion which 
had brought down the old YSB. Though the rhetoric then had to do with 
halting abuse, the reality was that Coughlan didn't have enough vacant 
staff positions to keep the legislature at bay. Many staff had outlasted 
the tenure of their original sponsors. Another five hundred or so new 
positions for distribution would probably have saved the YSB. Creating 
the new department hadn't lessened the pressure for patronage jobs as 
much as many had hoped. If anything, it increased it. 
The real purpose of legislative investigative committees was usually 
unrelated to their stated one. I concerned myself less with published 
mandates than with the relationships members had with institutional 
and administrative staff, state employees' unions, contractors, local 
judges, and prosecutors. It took more than a little fancy footwork by 
Speaker Bartley to support our reforms while simultaneously respond­
ing to legislators keen on bringing back the old days. He effectively 
controlled committees through the shrewd choice of a chairman or 
vice chairman. Only toward the end of my tenure did things get out 
of hand. By then, even the speaker was ready to throw in the towel, 
though with some regret. 
Four months after my arrival, Bartley appointed a seven-member 
special committee to investigate conditions at Shirley. It came in re­
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sponse to complaints by local legislators and centered on our problems 
in halting escapes. In the first months of 1970, escapes from Shirley 
grew almost tenfold, from 19 to 180. The speaker picked a friendly 
representative, Jack McGlynn, to head the probe. He calmed the com­
mittee members by using my reassurances that no jobs would be 
touched during the reforms. 
Simultaneous with the filing of the committee report came word that 
Attorney General Robert Quinn was going to investigate our purchase 
of the Topsfield facility. Bartley then joined in with a request to pursue 
an investigation. The Joint Senate-House Committee on State Admin­
istration was asked to make a thorough evaluation of the DYS. The 
speaker again appointed Jack McGlynn cochairman. The committee 
contained a number of lawmakers who would later go on to greater 
political prominence: George Keverian, Jack Backman, David Locke, 
and Clifford Marshall. As I looked over the membership I didn't see 
many potential supporters. But McGlynn controlled the agenda from 
the committee's first day. And Ken Trevett, who had been Jack Back-
man's legislative aide, was chosen as the committee's staff person. Ken 
spent hours with us acquainting himself with our problems, goals, and 
hopes. He also summarized the committee's visits and meetings, and 
compiled the final report. 
Keeping the committee friendly took an occasional favor of the kind 
that I would publicly deplore but privately come to know as the sub­
stance of Massachusetts politics. Periodically I would be asked whether 
we might hire this or that person in order to keep a particular commit­
tee member supportive. Other things being equal, I'd usually make 
some kind of arrangement. The committee held hearings and visited 
facilities for a year. Their final report was a ringing endorsement of the 
reforms, and it was released to coincide with a particularly vicious 
attack from another group of legislators. 
Some investigations seemed ideologically motivated: an opportu­
nity to wave the "law-and-order" flag. But they often turned out to be 
politics as usual. A major investigation was led by Senator Francis X. 
McCann of Cambridge, in his role as chairman of the legislature's Spe­
cial Commission on the Causes of Violence and Crime. I was a member 
of the same commission, though in these circumstances I was not pres­
ent in my role as member. The focus of the investigation was going to 
be my department. McCann had strong support from the new senate 
president, Kevin Harrington. Though McCann hoped to run the com­
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mission like a legislative committee, his control was less than total. Paul 
Quirk, head of the state association of child-care workers, delivered a 
petition to the speaker—signed by six hundred workers in fifty commu-
nity-based children's agencies—supporting me. The Boston Globe called 
for a check to find out whether other statutory members of the commis­
sion attended meetings—these included persons skilled in penology, 
sociology, and psychiatry. Most of these statutory members had ne­
glected attending the previously infrequent meetings. But with the 
publicity, they began showing up. 
I always had the impression that the dour McCann probably did his 
best work after hours. He had an inside track to most of my critics in the 
department, and his hearings gave them a public platform. McCann 
subpoenaed them, put them under oath, and asked the questions 
they'd rehearsed in prior private meetings. The practice of using sub­
poenas had an additional purpose—menace. Periodically a portly man 
would appear at my office door or travel to my house thirty miles 
outside Boston to serve a subpoena demanding my attendance at a 
hearing in a room one hundred yards from my office. I called McCann 
and told him a subpoena wouldn't be necessary; a simple call or memo 
would suffice. My suggestion fell on deaf ears. Subpoenas continued 
to flow. The process also generated income for patronage subpoena 
servers, who collected a fee (plus travel and expenses) for each service. 
One afternoon McCann invited me over to his office in the Senate, 
and he spread out before me drawings for a large youth prison—a 
detailed architectural plan on which someone had clearly spent a fair 
amount of money. It was a reformatory—buildings, security systems, 
fencing, and all the accoutrements conjured up by the formulas of 
modern corrections—an early version of what later came to be known 
as the "new generation" prison. No doubt it would come with a large 
influx of newly hired uniformed staff. If I had pledged support for such 
a facility, the investigation would have been halted. The new facility 
would almost certainly have moved quickly through the senate with 
the necessary millions of dollars attached. I deferred a decision. 
McCann's hearings never developed a clearer focus than was given 
by allegations of permissiveness, hiring unqualified staff, or ignoring 
established procedures in starting new programs. The hearings drifted 
off with no clear conclusion. I figured McCann had decided to drop the 
matter. But I was wrong. He had been testing the waters, and he would 
return a year later to throw out his nets as senate chairman of the Joint 
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Committee on Post-Audit and Oversight. A committee staff member 
told me they planned to have me in jail by the time they finished. 
Investigations were clearly a way of life, so I tried to keep myself in a 
state of mind that would hide my frustration at exercises less and less 
concerned with improving the effectiveness of the department. I had 
some basic belief in progress. If we did our best and our programs 
seemed to work, others would support us. But the reality was nothing 
like that. I got some sense of the poisoned atmosphere one noontime as 
I walked down Tremont Street in downtown Boston. From across the 
street came a yell, "Miller, we're gonna flush you down the toilet/' I 
didn't recognize the balding, middle-aged man shouting at me. I asked 
the staff person walking with me if he knew who the man was. He was a 
Boston city councilman—someone I'd never met, nor, it seemed, would 
care to. But there he was, on a crowded downtown street, yelling 
wildly for all to hear. But Boston pols aren't stupid, so there mustn't 
have been much political loss of face in such gratuitous insult. 
Even routine legislative business contributed to the noxious atmo­
sphere. Take the House ways and means committee chairman, Joe 
Early, who, though conservative on law-and-order issues, didn't use 
his authority in a hurtful way or expect trades with every budget concil­
iation. No, he left the dirty business to the vice chairman, George 
Sacco, a legislator from Maiden. 
For George, no passage came without its toll. Though he had friends 
in the department and occasionally referred individuals for hiring, it 
was mostly a matter of style. Hiring a person he referred didn't much 
placate him, since he might change his mind a month or two later and 
demand I fire the same person because of some arcane political twist in 
his district. I finally decided my best course was to avoid contact, since 
it seemed to draw me into things I didn't handle particularly well. But 
such ostrichlike behavior ill fitted a department head. I developed an 
appreciation for Coughlan's dilemma, having caught myself up in the 
very things I had offhandedly condemned a couple of years before. I 
got some sense of how strongly George felt when, a couple of years 
after I'd left Massachusetts, I returned to Boston to attend a conference. 
I picked up What's in Town magazine, and there, winding its way 
through the restaurant ads and showgirl pics, was a long article by 
Sacco denouncing me and the deinstitutionalization of delinquent 
youth in Massachusetts. 
The most severe backlash came in response to our taking on the 
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county training schools. The investigating committee was headed by 
Representative Robert J. McGinn, who had been the prime supporter of 
the Hampden County school. The McGinn hearings almost brought 
down the reforms. Emotions on both sides got so out of hand that for a 
time it seemed as if there were no way out. Committee members had 
shown up at Westfield and had confronted a number of the young staff 
and consultants I'd hired to institute new educational and treatment 
programs, calling one of them an "uppity black bastard/' Ironically, 
Westfield was one of our better facilities, with a variety of exciting new 
educational programs brought in by young graduate students from the 
University of Massachusetts. Many sported the long hair, bell-bottoms, 
and other informal attire of the day. On the basis of reports I'd received 
from Larry Dye, a graduate student at the University of Massachusetts 
who had started the new Westfield programs, the hearings seemed 
likely to run out of control. The students were generally cooperative 
and polite, but the committee members smelled blood. 
Formal hearings were held in Boston, and at first the press didn't 
cover them. I was relieved, since they were among the most vitriolic 
I'd seen. Tommy Sheehan, the politically well-connected department 
counsel, offered to set up a meeting with McGinn to set a quieter, more 
amiable tone. We arranged to meet one afternoon in a carry-out shop 
near the capitol. The meeting seemed to go well. Though we disagreed 
on some things, we agreed that we shared many of the same goals. 
Predictably, even this meeting showed up in the Herald the next day— 
where we were described as smoking a peace pipe. I found the article 
interesting not for its content but for the fact that the details had been 
so accurately leaked. Peace, however, was not to be. 
Though McGinn's committee had authority to study the Westfield 
center, he soon cut a wider swath, subpoenaing students, consultants, 
wives, girlfriends, children, parents, and acquaintances. Accusations 
of loose living and free love were routine. At one point the committee 
demanded that a University of Massachusetts student who was living 
with his girlfriend produce a marriage license. Old line employees 
obliged the committee with rumors, allegations, and tidbits of possible 
scandal. One of the chief informers to the committee was a former 
Roslindale employee I had suspended for waking certain youth at 
6:00 A.M., making them duck walk up and down the hallways, and then 
beating them up. 
Early one afternoon, Bill Madaus called me from the statehouse and 
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told me he thought I should come over. A DYS parole agent was testifying 
before McGinn's committee. I was less perturbed by this than by the fact 
that the agent was from the other side of the state, nowhere near Westfield, 
the purported focus of the investigation. This hanging jury committee 
was aggressively widening its mandate to take on the whole department. 
I hurried over and stood in the back of the hearing room as the parole 
agent read from a boy's DYS file, which lay open on the table in front of 
him. The room was ringed with reporters and television cameras; the 
committee had prepared well for the show. The parole agent droned on 
about a teenager on his caseload, calling him "one of the major dealers 
in heroin on the South Shore." I handed a note to a McGinn aide asking 
if I might be allowed to respond. A few moments later he came back 
and told me I wouldn't be allowed to testify. 
I couldn't contain myself. I shouted that the committee had no man­
date to elicit testimony unrelated to the Westfield center. McGinn yelled 
out, "I'm being intimidated by the commissioner of youth services." 
I replied that the committee members were "racist and bigoted—a 
bunch of frauds." 
"Leave this hearing!" was McGinn's loud retort. 
"The days of McCarthyism are gone!" I shouted back. 
"Leave! leave!" screamed McGinn, this time joined by Represen­
tative James Grimaldi of Springfield. 
The sergeant at arms was ordered to eject me. As I was being hustled 
out of the hearing room, McGinn appeared to collapse. He pulled him­
self together and left the room, saying he felt ill. There was concern that 
he was suffering from a recurrence of a heart condition. When a com­
mittee member suggested that the session be terminated, Ed Budelman, 
a young University of Massachusetts psychologist I'd hired to head resi­
dential care, shouted from the back of the hearing room, "What's the 
matter, did the cameras leave?" It was not one of our finer moments. 
The statehouse physician examined McGinn and said he hadn't suf­
fered a heart attack but had been "emotionally disturbed." He gave him 
a mild sedative. When McGinn returned from the doctor's office, he 
told waiting reporters, "I'll bury Miller if it's the last thing I do. He's a 
nut. He belongs in an insane asylum." I wasn't in much better shape. 
As I hurried away from the hearing room, David Nyhan, the statehouse 
reporter for the Boston Globe, came up. He looked worried and asked if I 
knew McGinn might have had a heart attack. I blurted out, "Good!" By 
the time I'd walked the block and a half to my office, the viciousness of 
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the afternoon's events hit me. My comment to Nyhan was unforgiv­
able. The center wasn't holding. Before that day, even when things 
seemed most bleak, I'd been able to retreat for a while—long enough to 
regain my reason. Now I'd lost that and taken a bad turn. I'd also put 
Speaker Bartley in an untenable position by insulting the legislature. 
He had to back McGinn. 
But the committee was a loose cannon, and that was a problem for 
the speaker. He'd appointed it. The governor's office called me at home 
to tell me that the governor continued to support me and that I needn't 
back away. It was lucky that the flap had occurred late in the week, as 
most legislators had gone home and wouldn't be back until Monday. 
No immediate action could be taken on the House floor. 
The speaker, while publicly demanding that I make an apology to 
the legislature, sent word to me through his aide, John Eller, that a 
coalition of reformers and human service professionals had approached 
him to propose my immediate ouster. They would testify that, though 
I might have accomplished some things, I'd gone much too far, too 
fast. They were unwilling to come out publicly on their own, however. 
Indeed, the person who contacted the speaker for the group had led the 
search committee which selected me as commissioner. Eller told me 
Bartley's response would probably hinge on whatever public support I 
could muster by the following Monday. I spent the weekend calling 
individuals and leaders of citizens' groups I'd spoken to over the pre­
vious three years, asking them to contact the speaker's office. 
Meanwhile, McGinn moved in the legislature for formal power to 
conduct a statewide investigation of the department. But by the time 
the motion was on the floor for a vote, things were cooling down. The 
Boston Globe published an editorial highly critical of the McGinn hear­
ings, the governor made his support clear, and the League of Women 
Voters stood fast in its support. 
Simultaneously, Jack McGlynn rushed to release the long-awaited 
reort of the Joint Committee on State Administration. Though it had 
been completed a couple of months earlier, it hadn't been put in final 
form. It was readied hurriedly and released the day before the House 
was to vote on McGinn's motion. The committee report endorsed the 
phaseout of the reform schools and praised the community alternatives 
as "more humane, less expensive care for juvenile delinquents." 
The speaker kept the McGinn committee's mandate confined to 
investigating Westfield. McGinn apologized on the House floor for 
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saying I belonged in a nut house. The following day, I publicly apolo­
gized for disrupting the hearings and calling the members bigoted. I 
suggested tempers had gotten out of hand and invited McGinn to meet 
again. I thanked the speaker for his help during the crisis, noting that 
McGinn had what he wanted—the right to investigate Westfield, while 
I had what I wanted—no expansion of the committee's mandate. 
The truce lasted about three weeks before the hearings again deteri­
orated. After an hour or so of angry exchanges, McGinn said that the 
committee had gathered enough information to seek indictments against 
me. He announced that he was forwarding the matter to the attorney 
general or a grand jury. McGinn's vice chairman, James Grimaldi, 
added, "Somewhere along the line, Mr. Miller, you will get chopped up. 
Residents don't want halfway houses in their areas." 
The hearings moved to focus on the Project Joe program at the Uni­
versity of Massachusetts, the nonprofit organization which had placed 
the last hundred youngsters from Lyman. The project was headed by 
Larry Dye, who was clearly a target of opportunity. Despite the fact that 
he was finishing a Ph.D. at the University of Massachusetts, he made 
no secret of his having been an inmate in the California Youth Author­
ity. I explained that working through private, nonprofit agencies gave 
us more flexibility in allocating staff and spending funds for individual 
youngsters. McGinn replied that we could have done the same thing 
with state employees. I snapped, "If we went through the state, we 
would have to get jobs for your friends and relatives." Civility had once 
again fled from the hearings. 
Then it became clear that McGinn was being fed information from 
my own office. In one particular case, I had discussed an internal 
memo which listed specific kids whose placements had not worked 
out. A couple of their names had been misspelled because of typos by a 
secretary in my office. McGinn requested information on the very 
same youngsters, misspelling their names the identical way. I hired a 
Boston attorney, Michael Keating, to represent me at the hearings. 
Staff reappeared like ghosts of Christmas past. Father Bergeron, the 
former chaplain at Shirley, showed up at the hearings to urge the gover­
nor to remove me "for the good of the youth he is supposed to be 
serving." He went on to criticize the idea of creating small community 
settings for reform school youth, and what he saw as letting the young­
sters themselves decide if they were ready for parole. 
Meanwhile, the House ways and means committee refused to ap­
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prove the federally financed salaries of our newly created regional 
directors. Suffolk County (Boston) District Attorney Garrett Byrne, 
whom I'd never met or spoken with in three years, made public a letter 
he had written to me, but which I hadn't received, demanding stricter 
supervision of youths in the department. He called for a long-term 
juvenile detention center. 
After half a year's uproar, the McGinn committee brought forth a 
twenty-three-page report. The indictments had fizzled, and the report 
sang a familiar plaint—we were too permissive with delinquents. The 
committee alleged a serious lack of discipline and supervision: "Chil­
dren practically run some institutions. Children with serious criminal 
records are being placed back on the streets/' The matter of the county 
training schools—the motivation for the investigation—was hardly 
mentioned. But, despite the flimsiness of the report, the hearings had 
hurt us badly, and the ordeal convinced me that my days in Mas­
sachusetts were numbered. My wife and I both liked the state and had 
hoped to stay, eventually living somewhere along the North Shore. But 
now I knew it would be impossible. Besides, in those final months, 
she'd been getting obscene telephone calls; their content established 
that they came from someone in my office. 
A month or so later, I was asked by New York's mayor, John Lindsay, 
to come down and discuss possibilities in the city's corrections system. 
I had spent a day at the new Adolescent Remand Center on Rikers 
Island. It hadn't yet been filled with young offenders, and Lindsay had 
invited experts from around the country to advise him how to make the 
place productive. I suggested he tear it down. If organized crime or a 
cabal of subversives had sat around a table and plotted how to create 
crime and mayhem on the streets of New York, they would have come 
up with the programs and architecture of the Adolescent Remand Cen­
ter. The huge facility could only alienate, embitter, and contribute to 
the deterioration of youth in the city. 
Lindsay was a compelling and engaging person. I thoroughly en­
joyed the meeting. He offered me a position on his staff to work as his 
liaison with the corrections department. It would have been a consider­
able increase in salary over my $25,000 position in Massachusetts. But 
it came with no line authority. Although Lindsay said I could, in fact, 
call most of the shots in corrections from the mayor's office, he had no 
plans to make changes in the top positions in the department. I decided 
against joining his staff. 
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I was also called to Washington to meet with Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare Elliott Richardson to discuss my heading the 
Office of Youth Development and Delinquency Prevention, but his 
offer was set aside when President Nixon appointed him attorney 
general. 
In late November 1972,1 was approached by a representative of the 
new governor-elect of Illinois, Dan Walker, and asked to join his cabi­
net. I didn't really want to leave Massachusetts and turned him down 
twice. Peter Goldmark heard of the Illinois offer, called me over, and 
asked me to stay. He said the governor agreed. I was as flattered as I 
had been at our first meeting three and a half years before. I half­
heartedly suggested that I'd stay if the governor would appoint Boston 
Juvenile Court Judge Frank Poitrast to Superior Court—not so much a 
promotion as a way to get him out of my hair. The governor wasn't able 
to do it. I was told it was because such an appointment was reserved for 
others closer in spirit to the administration. I understood this and 
realized I'd set an impossible condition. But I knew I wouldn't survive 
long into the next year in Massachusetts. It was only a matter of time. 
With the demise of the McGinn committee, Senator McCann was start­
ing up a considerably larger, better funded postaudit committee to 
investigate DYS. Its cochairman was Gerald Lombard, the legislator 
with the defunct Shirley school in his district. It was time to go. In 
January 19731 accepted the Illinois job. 
Aftershocks 
In 1970 the National Conference of State Training School Superinten­
dents had quietly hired a former reform school superintendent, Frank 
Man well, to look into the closings of the Massachusetts schools. He had 
filed three separate reports, all critical. Apparently, no action was to be 
taken on the report until I had left office. Six months after I left Mas­
sachusetts, it was reported that participants in the fiftieth annual meet­
ing of the National Conference of Superintendents of Training Schools 
and Reformatories (NCSTS) had voted fifty-eight to two to censure me 
for my role in closing schools in Massachusetts. 
By then I was a pariah among most fellow state juvenile corrections 
administrators. I had committed the unforgivable sin of agreeing to be 
an expert witness for San Francisco's Youth Law Center and the Men­
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tal Health Law Project in their suit against the Texas Youth Council-
Morales vs. Turman. I'd spent a week or so touring Texas reform 
schools, where I saw kids beaten, tied, locked in isolation, forced to run 
till they dropped, hauling dirt from one pile to another and back again, 
gassed and maced while locked in closetlike cells, and chased by blood­
hounds and shotgun-toting guards. Texas members of the NCSTS had 
retaliated by voting in favor of my censure. 
A few weeks after the NCSTS meeting, I was invited to be a panelist at 
the New Orleans meeting of the National Council on Crime and Delin­
quency (NCCD)—to debate representatives of the NCSTS and defend the 
Massachusetts deinstitutionalization. The ballroom was packed with 
close to four hundred corrections experts. At a table in the front sat a 
middle-aged woman facing a huge reel-to-reel tape deck. I thought she 
was probably from National Public Radio, there to record the debate. 
But the machine was motionless, and the operator sat silent during 
the presentations of my copanelists. As I rose to respond, she flipped 
switches and donned earphones. I was flattered. I shouldn't have 
been. She was there to record my remarks for Texas Attorney General 
Mark White, who was defending the state in Morales vs. Turman. 
I took the opportunity to vent my feelings about the so-called Man-
well Report, criticizing "those who root around and sneak around, 
sleuths with the sick mission of disparaging anything humane in treat­
ing delinquent youngsters/' My language matched the disgust I'd 
experienced while touring the Texas institutions. I suggested that those 
trying to undo what we had accomplished in Massachusetts would 
soon find their own repressive reform schools overwhelmed by the 
movement we'd started. It was a naive and grandiose statement. No 
way would what we did in Massachusetts be allowed to happen in most 
other states. 
Seated next to me on the platform was a member of the censuring 
board of the NCSTS. He denied there'd been a censure and delivered a 
prepared speech about Don Quixotes on impractical missions, charac­
terizing those in NCSTS as the Sancho Panzas of juvenile justice, putting 
things right step by step. I replied with a reference to Dante's Inferno: 
'Abandon hope, all ye who enter here." From the audience came a 
cacophony of applause, catcalls, and boos. 
Senator McCann's and Representative Lombard's postaudit report 
didn't appear for another year. True to tradition, committee members 
leaked tidbits during the months before its final publication. The phones 
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were particularly active between members of the committee and Illi­
nois politicians. An article appeared in Boston Magazine entitled, "Bos­
ton Smoke for a Chicago Fire," laying out the machinations between 
members of the postaudit committee and members of the Illinois legis­
lature. But after $300,000 was spent for five staff members to investi­
gate what we had done, the postaudit pretty much drew a blank. The 
language was strong, and the criticism of my style was well taken. 
There were indeed many administrative problems. We had opened 
community programs and moved youngsters while skirting the usual 
administrative mechanisms of government. Funding for many of the 
community-based programs had fallen short. Staffing of new pro­
grams was often ad hoc. Specific programs were started without pre­
vious legislative approval. And now, others had to pick up many of the 
pieces. But we'd set a new system in place—one which wouldn't be 
easily undone—and the committee knew it. 
In the end, the postaudit report amounted to little more than a 
temper tantrum. Senator McCann summarized his feelings, "The con­
dition of the division is the result of Miller's scatterbrained proposi­
tions. His concept that we didn't need institutions had no rhyme or 
reason." Cochairman Lombard said, "Miller closed the institutions and 
the young offenders are roaming the streets." 
I worried that people might jump on a bandwagon to reopen the 
reform schools. Superior Court Chief Justice Walter H. McLaughlin, 
brother of the former Boston police commissioner with whom I'd had 
an altercation, called DYS a shambles. "There's no sound place for 
detention. . . . They laugh at the judges because they know there is no 
place where we can put them. You cannot threaten the youngster with 
depriving him of his freedom. They don't fear punishment." And per­
haps most disappointingly, my staff, having ridden out my tenure, 
swung over to what appeared to be a new winning side. By 1974, Herb 
Willman, then director of administration, who'd been so helpful much 
of the time, risen to Director of Administration, told the Boston Herald, 
"The department went through a pretty horrendous three years under 
Miller." But succeeding commissioners straightened up most of the ad­
ministrative problems I'd created. Joe Leavey took most of the flak and 
got very little credit, but he managed to keep things in equilibrium while 
he reestablished relationships with the legislature and the judiciary. 
The last major assault on the reforms came in the late 1970s, under 
the conservative governor Ed King. He entered office supporting the 
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death penalty and calling for harsher handling of juvenile offenders. 
King created a Governor's Task Force on Juvenile Crime made up pri­
marily of police, judges, and prosecutors, and with Harvard's James Q. 
Wilson as the resident ideologue. The task force held hearings through­
out the state, eliciting testimony from selected local officials, police, 
and judges, all of it aimed at building a case for harsher and more 
stringent handling of juveniles. It recommended more use of locked 
facilities, longer sentences, and more ease in trying youngsters four­
teen and older as adults. But it was too late. The money had left the 
institutional grounds. Youth corrections was largely in the hands of 
private, nonprofit agencies who delivered services to the youth. The 
old system couldn't be resurrected without grave political consequences. 
17 Results: After Almost All 
Is Said and Done 
W h a  t did we accomplish? Was the state any safer after our reforms 
than before? How many returned to DYS or went into adult jails and 
prisons? What was the impact on youth crime rates? These questions 
have remained central. 
Recidivism 
The concern with recidivism was curious for a field not particularly 
given to claiming accountability for the high failure rates of its alumni. 
But there was an internal consistency to the questions. It was the logic 
of the pilot project. If the Massachusetts reforms prove successful, 
other states will emulate them. It sounds reasonable, but it had little 
relevance in the byzantine world of corrections. Whether a pilot project 
succeeds or fails has almost no influence on policy. Images and postur­
ing are stronger cards. Sadly, the ghost of a Willie Horton or the pack­
aging of Scared Straight boot camps is what matters. 
In evaluating juvenile correctional programs across the nation in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, Robert Vinter's University of Michigan re­
searchers found a disturbing pattern. Although they saw many promis­
ing programs on early site visits, by the time the research teams got 
around to a second or third visit, many of these programs had van­
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ished. Not only did they have no effect on the larger youth corrections 
system, they were methodically starved out of existence through such 
mechanisms as time-limited funding. Less effective models (primarily 
institutional) remained firmly fixed in state bureaucracies and budgets. 
Pilot programs were irrelevant as a reform strategy. 
But closing all of a state's reform schools was too total to be dismissed 
as a pilot program. Though it continued to be described as an experiment 
by most correctional administrators, so long as it survived, it couldn't be 
easily ignored. In this light, sound research was crucial, if only to estab­
lish a written record of the reforms before their inevitable demise. 
Despite the fact that some of the most famous studies in the literature 
on delinquent behavior derived their samples from youngsters under 
the YSB,1 the agency knew very little about how its alumni fared after 
release from institutions. From time to time some visiting graduate 
student would do a recidivism study, but the methodology tended to be 
flawed and the findings contradictory. The research and statistics arm 
of the department also tried to keep occasional recidivism figures. But 
again the findings were incomplete. 
When I first met the superintendent of the Shirley Industrial School, 
he presented me with a study touting a 5 percent recidivism rate 
among released boys. Ninety-five percent success seemed impressive, 
but a closer look undid the rosy conclusions. The Shirley researchers 
had counted only those boys returned to that institution as recidivists. 
Since Shirley held the oldest boys in the department, most were re­
leased shortly before or upon reaching legal adulthood. Later charges 
were likely to show up only in adult court, with recidivists placed on 
adult probation or sent to adult prisons or jails. The offenders weren't 
returned to Shirley; therefore, they weren't counted. 
Lyman had less reassuring figures. An in-house study found that 
the longer a boy stayed at Lyman, the less likely he was to make it on 
the street. The earlier he was released, the better his chances of success. 
This dovetailed with a later, more sophisticated study of Lyman alumni 
by the respected psychologist William McCord. McCord and his asso­
ciates compared matched samples of Lyman alumni with boys released 
from a therapeutically oriented private residential program. Predict­
ably, the Lyman boys repeated their crimes at a demonstrably higher 
rate. McCord's findings as to long-term patterns of delinquency among 
the two samples were particularly enlightening, and anticipated later 
research findings in Massachusetts.2 
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Though there were then, as now, questions as to whether it is possi­
ble to rehabilitate young offenders, there was, in fact, credible research 
suggesting that appropriate alternatives could cut recidivism. The Uni­
versity of Southern California sociologist LaMar Empey3 had docu­
mented an appreciable drop in repeat offenses among delinquent 
youth placed in community care. Empey's findings came with no 
magic bullets. The majority of youth still reoffended within a year, but 
they offended less often and less seriously than before intervention. 
The idea that an effective delinquency treatment program should 
allow some flexibility for a youngster who was, in fact, winding down 
his or her career of illegal behavior seemed unacceptable. Routine 
incarceration at least incapacitated the young offenders for a while, 
and, during that lock-up time, stopped all delinquent acts on the street. 
But the practice could be likened to rehospitalizing a pneumonia sufferer 
at the first sign of a cough. It's a costly and dangerous overreaction. 
The Harvard Studies 
Early research by Harvard's Center for Criminal Justice had concen­
trated on the politics of change, inmate attitudes, staff perceptions, and 
the quality of care in the treatment cottages we'd set up in some of the 
institutions. Though the recidivism rates of these institutionalized 
youngsters were also studied, it was three years before anything defin­
itive could be said, and recidivism was not the primary consideration in 
the studies. 
When we moved unexpectedly to close the institutions in 1972, the 
Harvard researchers shifted their focus to recidivism; that is, to DYS 
alumni placed on probation after reappearance in court, recommitted 
to DYS, or incarcerated in county jails or state prisons. The subsequent 
studies would have been even richer if the researchers had maintained 
their original emphasis on the quality of care being provided in our 
programs. In fact, the quality and the integrity of treatment programs 
became the determinants of whether recidivism increased or decreased 
among youngsters in community alternatives. 
Though enough time had passed to follow the recidivism rates of a 
control group of 1969 reform school youth, results on the experimental 
group of youth we'd placed in alternatives in 1972 and 1973 were slow 
in coming. Periodically I would call Lloyd Ohlin or Bob Coates and ask 
Results I 221 
what the data were showing. 'Things seem to be going in the right 
direction" was the usual reply. I took this to mean that the youth in 
alternatives were getting into less trouble than those from the reform 
schools. 
The first solid figures didn't appear until 1975, more than a year after 
I'd left Massachusetts to head the Illinois Department of Children and 
Youth Services. As a courtesy, the Harvard Center sent me an initial 
draft of their findings. A few pages into the complicated material, I 
slumped back in my chair. Recidivism hadn't gone down. Statewide, it 
had increased slightly, particularly among girls. At best, our four years' 
effort had been a washout. 
I mulled over the depressing news for a couple of days before calling 
Lloyd. Though I didn't expect much encouragement, I wanted some 
clarification of the sometimes confusing figures, graphs, and tables. 
Lloyd's response surprised me. The results hadn't seemed to discour­
age him. I concluded he probably didn't care much which way things 
turned out. Researchers have to be objective, and it was unfair to 
expect otherwise. As he discussed the draft paper, however, I realized 
that my first reading had been too pessimistic. Lloyd felt that the study 
provided significant support for our reforms. 
The crucial finding had to do with the differences in recidivism 
between regions in the state. The slight statewide rise in recidivism 
rates was attributed to a national pattern of rising crime rates in 1972­
73, the years from which the sample of youth in alternative programs 
was drawn. When crime rates increase, so does recidivism. In addi­
tion, we'd diverted a large number of younger offenders to the Depart­
ment of Welfare's Division of Child Guidance during those same years, 
leaving us with older youth convicted of more serious offenses—a 
group more prone to recidivism. Of more consequence to the Harvard 
researchers were the modest, but solid, drops in recidivism in certain 
regions of the state. An intriguing pattern had emerged which ap­
peared to be tied to our regionalization efforts. The report put it: 
There were seven administrative regions in the reformed system. Re­
gions II and VII were the regions that pursued the reforms most 
aggressively. This was evident in efforts to provide a large number of 
diverse program options, so the special needs of each youth could be 
more nearly met. Region V, on the other hand, hardly changed at all from 
the traditional approach before the reforms. The results are dramatic. 
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Regions II and VII are the only two regions where recidivism went down, 
and Region V shows an exceptionally large increase. The decrease in 
Region VII is on both criteria. The increase in Region V is also on both 
criteria.4 
The conclusion was relatively simple. Recidivism dropped where: 
(1) the regional offices developed a diversity of programs from which 
to draw in dealing with each individual youngster; and (2) the alter­
native programs had therapeutic integrity joined with strong "commu­
nity linkages." 
Success in lowering recidivism depended upon the quality and the 
diversity of the alternatives. Where programs broke their institutional 
tether, recidivism went down. When alternatives fostered isolation or 
duplicated institutional regimens in the community, the youth did 
poorly. To my chagrin, Bob Coates suggested we'd been too faint­
hearted in implementing our reforms. We hadn't gone far enough. As 
the Harvard report said, "For the state as a whole, it is clear that the 
reforms did not go nearly far enough . . . we saw that there was an 
alarming amount of variability in the program scores on social climate, 
extent of community linkages, and quality of community linkages."5 
The conclusion hardly seemed to justify the extensive research ef­
fort. A diversity of good alternative programs lowers recidivism. A 
narrow choice of poor programs does not. Though we hadn't done as 
well as we should have, the fault was in the implementation rather than 
the concept. Recidivism dropped where we did things right. If all the 
regions of the state could create enough quality options, most of our 
delinquent youth would make it in the community. And the researchers 
had looked at youngsters drawn from a sample at the very beginning of 
the deinstitutionalization, when we were most vulnerable and still 
building the alternative system. If backsliding could be held in reason­
able check, the deinstitutionalization stood a chance of success. 
In succeeding years, despite political pressure to return to the insti­
tutions, DYS continued its community-based emphasis. Even the ad­
ministration of the right-wing governor Ed King was unable to return 
kids to reform schools. The reasons had less to do with any commit­
ment to alternatives than with new political alignments, which had 
been created by funding a wide variety of private, nonprofit agencies. 
Once these agencies had the money, they weren't about to give it up 
easily. Many were too powerful for the legislature to challenge. The 
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money couldn't be taken back. Reopening the institutions would re­
quire DYS to double its budget, running the community-based pro­
grams side by side with reopened or new institutions. The state was in 
no condition to absorb this kind of fiscal shock, and as a result, the new 
system was left alone. 
Later Patterns 
As the community programs stabilized, more signs reinforced the early 
conclusions of Ohlin, Coates, and Miller. Between 1978 and 1988, there 
was a dramatic drop in the number of youth appearing in Massa­
chusetts juvenile courts. Arraignments fell 34 percent, from 28,000 to 
18,000. At first the drop was attributed to the passing of the baby boom, 
which meant that there were fewer teenagers around. But the percent­
age drop in arraignments was nearly three times that in number of 
juveniles. The juvenile population fell only 12 percent during the same 
period, from 718,599 to 627,487. 
Juvenile arrests statewide also decreased at a faster rate than did the 
juvenile population, and the number of youth waived for trial in adult 
court fell to an all-time low. In 1989, while states like Maryland and 
Virginia each tried up to a thousand youngsters in adult courts, and 
Florida waived nearly four thousand youth to adult court, Massachu­
setts tried a total of twelve youth in adult court.6 This demonstrated 
another important fact. Massachusetts was handling its most serious 
young offenders in a primarily community-based system. And the sys­
tem appeared to represent minimal risk to public safety. As NCCD 
research revealed, in any given year, youths under DYS jurisdiction 
represented approximately one percent of all arrests in the state. Ac­
cording to the NCCD, "Few of the offenses committed by DYS youth 
involved violence (less than ten percent)—the majority of their crimes 
are minor property offenses/' Massachusetts ranked forty-sixth of the 
fifty states in reported juvenile crime. Things weren't going all that 
badly in the state which locked up the fewest teenagers of any in the 
nation. 
One of the most interesting phenomena emerged in the Massa­
chusetts state prisons. The percentage of adult inmates who were 
alumni of juvenile corrections fell from 35 percent in 1969 to 18 percent 
by 1985, although the number of youth under commitment to DYS 
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remained at about two thousand on any given day during the same 
period. The drop in alumni entering state prisons couldn't be attrib­
uted to fewer youngsters' being in the system. But whereas in 1969 
virtually all the DYS alumni in state prisons came from reform schools, 
after 1973 only a minority had spent time in "secure care." The same 
kinds of youth were being handled differently. It seemed reasonable to 
conclude that Massachusetts might be breaking into the familiar sub­
culture of delinquency which characterizes a certain segment of harder-
core youth in states still wedded to reform schools. Though this sup­
position awaits a controlled study, the available figures are encouraging. 
In late 1989, the NCCD completed a three-year follow-up of 875 Mas­
sachusetts youths who left DYS in 1984-857 The findings closely paral­
leled the conclusions of the Harvard researchers. Three years after their 
first community placement, approximately 12 percent of the DYS youth 
had been recommitted to the department (usually for continued super­
vision in the community), 10 percent were incarcerated in county jails, 
and 2 percent were sent to state prison. Seventy-six percent were still 
maintaining themselves in the community, free of DYS supervision. 
This relatively low rate of recidivism approximated the rate found by 
the Harvard researchers in the most successful regions of the state 
in 1974. It suggests that, as the community-based system diversified 
and grew, it dealt more successfully with youth who would otherwise 
have been institutionalized. As the NCCD study noted, "The overall re-
arraignment rate for the 1985 DYS group equalled the regions with the 
lowest recidivism rates in the earlier Harvard study. This finding sug­
gests that recidivism rates have improved as DYS came closer to its 
stated goals of reform—a rich diversity of community-based services 
permitting youth normal experiences in school, work and family set-
tings."8 
What about rearrests and reappearances in juvenile courts? Neither, 
in itself, is an adequate measure. Arrests of youth from certain socio­
economic classes and races is a pretty random event. Elliott and others 
found, for example, that approximately one-third of all youth residing 
within a Southwestern urban juvenile court's jurisdiction were referred 
to the juvenile court for a delinquency or status offense before their 
eighteenth birthday. Forty-seven percent of all males and 21 percent of 
all females had juvenile court careers.9 Wolfgang, in his Philadelphia 
cohort of youth, found that as many as one-third of all black youth were 
arrested at some time in their teen years. One study of young black 
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males in California suggested that seven out of ten would be arrested at 
sometime. 
Half the DYS youngsters in Massachusetts were rearrested at some 
time during the NCCD'S three-year follow-up. This rate, however, was 
lower than rearrest rates in comparable states in which reform schools 
remained the backbone of state youth corrections. In California, for 
example, 70 percent of youth released from state reform schools were 
rearrested within twelve months, with over 60 percent being re-incar-
cerated within thirty-six months. In contrast, of Massachusetts youth in 
community-based programs who were subsequently rearrested, only 
24 percent were recommitted to DYS or incarcerated in adult prisons 
within three years. The NCCD study further suggested that rearrests in 
Massachusetts were for less serious incidents than those of youth in 
California. 
Looking at it conservatively, one can see that deinstitutionalization 
posed no measurable threat to public safety, as things were no worse 
than in states that relied on incarceration. More positively, the re­
formed Massachusetts system contributed to a safer community. Mas­
sachusetts had shifted the bulk of state institutional budgets to private, 
nonprofit agencies. New treatment and supervision models had sprung 
up across the state. Destructive correctional programs were termi­
nated; something that is still unheard of in corrections nationally. But 
most important, a major state's youth corrections system and, at least 
for a while, the public's perception of the youngsters relegated to it, 
were altered. 
The problems didn't disappear with the reforms. Every year legisla­
tion is filed to bring back the reform schools. I have little doubt that one 
day it will succeed—probably in the wake of a publicity campaign over 
a tragic incident. Youngsters will continue to do things around which 
politicians can vie to prove their "toughness"—to send more juveniles 
to adult court; to deny the department power to place its charges in the 
community; to demand more stringent handling of delinquents. Policy 
is impervious to facts where television bites reign supreme. 
In response to these kinds of spastic pressures, the current Mas­
sachusetts DYS has done many things I would not want to claim. Too 
many young people are in "secure care."10 No youngsters wander the 
halls of the central office conversing with and otherwise annoying 
administrators. As the department has become professionalized, the 
hurtful side effects which inevitably accompany certain behavioral and 
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medical models when they are practiced on delinquents have re-
emerged—the reintroduction of isolation rooms in some of the small 
secure settings (this time to "set limits'') and the use of psychotropic 
drugs to control recalcitrant youngsters—as ways to avoid having to 
deal with the sources of their "unreasonable" demands. 
In keeping with the style of Governor Michael Dukakis, the DYS 
substituted smooth management for advocacy. Though in the short 
term sounder management was necessary, it now seems perilously 
close to becoming the raison d'etre of the department. 
In pursuit of fiscal control, the department has cut back on the 
number and variety of alternatives. Whereas I preferred to risk looser 
control by encouraging smaller, often financially unstable programs to 
apply for state funding, my successors have moved to ever-larger con­
tracts with fewer but admittedly more stable agencies. The rationale is 
that a few large agencies can provide the same range of services as a 
mixture of less established and more innovative small agencies. In­
deed, this strategy has settled things down considerably and will con­
tinue to work for a while. But ultimately it will prove to be an error. 
Competition will be driven away, and the large private agencies will 
become vested interests. This is a mixed blessing. Large, politically 
powerful private agencies are at least a counterbalance to state employ­
ees' unions and to legislators endlessly on the prowl for the kinds of 
patronage and influence which traditional institutions provide. 
It was inevitable that things would move in this fashion. The re­
forms had to be integrated into the routines of state bureaucracy. I 
couldn't have done that. I had alienated too many in state government 
to expect their support in stabilizing matters. To the credit of succeed­
ing administrations that has now happened, but at a price. Some time 
not far off someone will have to shake up the reformed system as 
roughly as we did the institutional system. But for a while we estab­
lished a new model which dealt individually, and usually sensitively, 
with a category of youngsters unaccustomed to such concern. We also 
demonstrated that, if well implemented, the new model could work 
better than what it replaced. Sadly, its survival will not be based on 
results, but will be a matter of chance, of happenstance, of politics and 
mood. 
V

Ponderings on Criminals

and Criminologists


18 Of Psychopaths and Allopaths 
Having commanded Adam to bestow 
Names upon all the creatures, God withdrew 
To empyrean palaces of blue 
That warm and windless morning long ago. 
And seemed to take no notice of the vexed 
Look on the young man's face as he took thought 
Of all the miracles the Lord had wrought, 
Now to be labelled, dubbed, yclept, indexed. 
Before an addled mind and puddled brow, 
The feathered nation and the finny prey 
Passed by; there went biped and quadruped. 
Adam looked forth with bottomless dismay 
Into the tragic eyes of his first cow, 
And shyly ventured, "Thou shalt be called 'Fred'." 
Anthony Hecht 
lSlearly every correctional reform uses diagnosis as its first step. If we 
can name what's wrong, goes the myth, we can treat it. But labeling is 
also crucial to culling the good from the bad; the wicked from the elect; 
and, ultimately, "them" from "us." The progressive Maryland Juvenile 
Services Administration Department began its reform in the late sixties 
by creating the Maryland Children's Center as a model classification 
and diagnostic facility. Every child committed by the courts across the 
state was sent there for classification. But the diagnostic program 
failed, and the classification facility was closed. It was an old story. 
Despite the new diagnostic regimen, the treatment for youngsters con­
tinued to be either institutionalization or referral to an overburdened 
probation system. In such a narrow world of options, individual diag­
noses were superfluous. 
In Massachusetts, diagnosis had come to be so irrelevant that a 
disgruntled psychiatrist wrote "Mary had a little lamb" seventy-five 
times in his diagnostic study of a youngster, and no one noticed. 
"Cookbook" dicta were the rule, and youngsters ended up classified 
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according to the needs of the system—age, sex, size, and manageabil­
ity. It was a classic example of treatment (or lack of it) driving diagnosis. 
Let me give another. 
A few years after I left Massachusetts, I joined Governor Milton 
Shapp's staff in Pennsylvania. Shortly after I arrived, sixteen-year-old 
Bobby Nestor hanged himself in the adult prison at Camp Hill. He had 
been sent there through a quirk in Pennsylvania law which allowed 
juvenile courts to sentence juveniles to adult prison without benefit of 
adult trial. There were four hundred of them at Camp Hill, most con­
fined to cells twenty-three hours a day. The rationale was "dangerous­
ness/' Boys sent to Camp Hill were diagnosed as antisocial and sodo­
pathic and classified as too difficult and dangerous to be handled in the 
state reform schools. 
Bobby had come to Camp Hill by a circuitous route. His parents had 
found some marijuana in the pocket of his jacket and called the police, 
who advised that he be arrested and detained for a few days to frighten 
him. While in juvenile detention, he met an older teenager, and they 
escaped together, stealing a car along the way. They were quickly 
caught, and because of the new charge and his incorrigibility, the court 
ordered Bobby to the Camp Hill prison, describing it to the parents as a 
special school. The boyish-looking sixteen-year-old was immediately 
subjected to sexual pressure from older inmates, culminating in his 
rape and suicide. (There were unresolved questions as to whether he 
had been murdered.) News of his death appeared in a nearly hidden 
notice on the inside pages of the Harrisburg Patriot as just another 
inmate suicide. When I heard of Bobby's death, I drove across the river 
from the state capital to Camp Hill. After a records search and a series 
of interviews with other youngsters and staff, we put together a report 
on the events leading up to this boy's tragic death and took it to the 
governor. He'd been concerned about the juveniles at Camp Hill for 
most of his tenure, but his staff had been unable to find a way to deal 
with the problem. It took Bobby's death to provide the impetus for 
removing juveniles from the Camp Hill prison. 
Juveniles had been routinely sent to Camp Hill for years, usually to 
serve an average of three years. But previous efforts to get juveniles out 
of Camp Hill always hinged on a classification and on diagnostic pro­
cedure. A year before Bobby Nestor died, Governor Shapp assembled 
a group of experts to devise a way to get juveniles out of Camp Hill. 
These probation officers, youth workers, judges, psychologists, psy­
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chiatrists, and social workers reclassified the inmates. Based on this 
classification, they recommended that three hundred inmates be trans­
ferred to a special locked institution on the grounds of a state hospital 
for treatment. The panel also proposed that most of the remaining 
hundred boys be placed in state reform schools. About a dozen inmates 
were diagnosed as being fit for return to the community on parole. 
Ninety-five percent of the juveniles in Camp Hill were classified as 
needing maximum or medium security institutionalization. The plan 
had yet to be implemented. 
Following Bobby's death, I proposed to the governor that we look at 
the problem again. Politics were a first consideration, and I prevailed 
on him to pressure the attorney general, who at the time was appointed 
by the governor, to declare the practice of juvenile courts' sending 
youngsters to Camp Hill unconstitutional. After a series of meetings 
with a reluctant attorney general and accusations by his aides of bring­
ing undue, if not frankly dishonest, pressure on him, I got a favorable 
opinion. 
But before we could go back to the juvenile courts with alternative 
sentencing proposals for each youngster, another classification or diag­
nostic process would be necessary. I selected a group of professionals 
not unlike those who had assembled the year before—psychiatrists, 
psychologists, social workers, family therapists, educators, probation 
officers, and correctional counselors. These experts, some with nation­
al reputations, did not need or want interference. Obviously we could 
not instruct them how to diagnose the youthful inmates. One might 
expect that their conclusions would have been similar to those of the 
previous group, but this time something quite different happened. 
Before we brought in these new diagnosticians, we paid them to 
attend a series of orientation meetings designed to acquaint them with 
programs we were considering for the Camp Hill juveniles if they were 
released. The full spectrum of real and possible options was described, 
from Outward Bound and wilderness camping programs to group 
homes; from halfway houses to hiring advocates for youths; from foster 
care to specialized monitoring, where the monitor would be paid a full 
salary to look after an individual youth; from vocational and educa­
tional programs to residential and nonresidential drug treatment pro­
grams; from house arrest to small residential treatment programs for 
emotionally disturbed youngsters; from day treatment to small, locked, 
secure programs for juveniles who were at risk of committing violence. 
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In addition, these professional clinicians were assured that no youth 
would be moved from Camp Hill prison unless he could be placed in 
the precise program recommended. Whereas earlier diagnosticians 
had been left only the choice to institutionalize or to parole, the new 
group had a wide range of options to consider. The outcome differed 
dramatically. 
The new diagnoses of the Camp Hill youths were nearly the oppo­
site of those formulated by the earlier group of experts. Ninety percent 
(360 boys) of the Camp Hill inmates were seen as fit for some form of 
community placement. Only 10 percent (40 youth) were diagnosed as 
so dangerous as to be in need of being locked up. Once provided an 
array of options between extremes, the experts had diagnosed the 
inmates in a thoughtful, graduated manner. They felt at less risk if they 
recommended something other than prison. The conclusion was ob­
vious. The treatment options in the mind of the diagnostician deter­
mined the diagnosis of the person being evaluated. This is the reverse 
of what we commonly assume happens in diagnosis and classification 
of offenders. We assume that we measure the delinquent against medi­
cal, psychological, and sociological criteria and prescribe treatment 
accordingly. In fact, the theory-diagnosis-treatment flow runs back­
ward. The diagnostician looks first to the means available for handling 
the client, then labels the client, and finally justifies the label with 
psychiatric or sociological theory. Diagnosis virtually never determines 
treatment; treatment dictates diagnosis. The task of the diagnostician is 
to validate the means of handling already available. The implications 
are overwhelming. It seems that if we are to make progress in under­
standing and controlling delinquents, the treatment options must be 
guaranteed before any diagnosis is made. Unless this is clearly under­
stood, diagnostic and classification procedures will only mislead us 
and label youngsters to fit organizational needs. When clinicians rou­
tinely label a youth "antisocial, in need of institutionalization," they 
are more likely to betray their lack of imagination concerning less 
restrictive options than any particular insight into the young offender's 
character. 
Other professions understand these relationships better. British 
architect Michael Forsyth comments that, just as composers are greatly 
influenced in what they write by the places in which their works will be 
played, so architects of buildings for music are heavily influenced in 
what they design by their own visions of the musical purposes the 
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buildings will serve.1 This is precisely the relationship of psychiatric 
and social work professionals to the correctional institutions in which 
they work and for which they design classification and treatment mod­
els. In the diagnosis of delinquents we are closer to the conceptions of 
contemporary architects than to those of behavioral scientists. As in 
the view of the American architect Louis Sullivan, form must follow 
function. Theory and, by implication, diagnosis, follows its embodi­
ment in service. But the service is as much determined by bricks, 
concrete, and local politics as it is by scientific fact. "Form follows 
function" can be translated to "theory follows practice," which turns 
diagnosis on its head. A 1983 study of classification of delinquents 
came to a similar conclusion: "The less resources, the more punish­
ment was seen as beneficial for the youth/'2 When the person making 
the diagnosis is aware of a variety of alternative or noninstitutional 
options for treatment and handling, he or she gives less extreme, less 
rigid, and less restrictive diagnoses. Wanting this, diagnosis becomes 
more judgmental and punitive. 
Sorting Sociopaths 
Diagnosing offenders is too often a political action. Liberals prefer 
diagnosis to treatment. They are willing to observe and prescribe—so 
long as they need not touch. Whatever contact is necessary is reserved 
for hired guns—helping professionals—who do it only on their own 
terms, carrying their attenuated view of the problem back to their 
employers. Contrariwise, conservatives are poor, even shallow in their 
diagnoses. But their elitist ideology allows them the certainty to be 
quick with global prescriptions which seem to make common sense. 
These characteristics make liberals impotent and conservatives dan­
gerous. In both instances, personal responsibility is diffused to the 
point of irrelevance. I would rather forgo a sophisticated (albeit valid) 
psychiatric diagnosis for a delinquent given by a clinician who takes no 
responsibility for implementing the treatment—if in its place, I can 
have an assessment, "He needs a job" from someone willing to find 
him one and take him to it each day. 
Diagnosing the errant is a time-honored pursuit. From the medieval 
monks' Malleus Maleficarum (Witches' hammer) to the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-III) of the American Psychiatric Association; 
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from the "possessed" youngster of the seventeenth century to the 
"rabble" of the eighteenth; from the "moral imbecile" of the late nine­
teenth century to the "constitutional psychopathic inferior" of the 
early twentieth century; from the "psychopath" of the 1940s to the 
"sociopath" of the late 1950s, the search for diagnosis continues. With 
the growth of professionalism, the number of labels has multiplied 
exponentially. Psychology, education, psychiatry, social work, medi­
cine, anthropology, and sociology, each brings its own set of nosologies. 
From the "reaction to adolescence" to the "compulsive delinquent"; 
from the "dyslexic" delinquent to the delinquent "reacting to depres­
sion"; from the "unsocialized aggressive" delinquent to the "socialized 
aggressive" delinquent; from the "bored" delinquent (by reason of 
high IQ), to the "bored" delinquent (by reason of low IQ); from the 
delinquent working through unresolved oedipal problems to the delin­
quent as a product of child abuse; from the antisocial delinquent to the 
drug-addicted delinquent; from the delinquent in the chaotic family 
situation to the delinquent subject to "superego lacunae" deficits in 
family socialization; from the delinquent "unresponsive to verbal con­
ditioning" to the incipient "sociopath" unresponsive to electric shock; 
from the "criminogenic" family to the "born criminal," the theories and 
labels proliferate. The search has been futile both in predicting delin­
quent behavior and in shaping public policy for effective treatment, 
despite our admittedly greater knowledge of delinquent patterns, fam­
ily constellations, and community environments. In a familiar reprise, 
we are once again hearing the classifications of earlier ages: "evil," 
"malicious," and "genetically influenced" youth. In this sense, there is 
truth in Chapman's characterization of the helping professions as "latter­
day Lombrosos whose social function is to provide the scientific expla­
nations required by the culture."3 
The British anthropologist Edmund Leach characterized this pro­
cess as a procedure whereby we bolster the maintenance of the existing 
order against threats which might arise from its own internal contradic­
tions. Labeling reassures us that the fault lies in the warped offender 
and takes everyone else off the hook. Moreover, it enables the profes­
sional diagnostician to enter the scene or withdraw at will, wearing 
success like a halo and placing failure around the neck of the client like 
4a noose.
In spite of all this, a particular diagnosis is not necessarily invalid in 
its own terms. Though it may reflect particular interests and biases, it 
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often touches upon important elements in the makeup and behavior of 
a delinquent youngster. The issue, however, is one of the relevance of 
the diagnosis. Diagnosis of young offenders cannot be conceptualized 
outside the demands of a frequently irrational juvenile corrections sys­
tem. Labeling is not aimed primarily at understanding the offender 
or his or her situation. It must serve the purposes of smooth manage­
ment while leaving unchallenged the public stereotypes of the delin­
quent. Diagnosis is too often antithetical to the interests of a particular 
youngster. 
Here follow the characteristics of the psychopath as outlined in the 
classic study by psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley: 
1. Superficial charm and good "intelligence." 
2. Absence of delusions and other signs of irrational "thinking." 
3. Absence of ''nervousness" or psychoneurotic manifestations. 
4. Unreliability. 
5. Untruthfulness and insincerity. 
6. Lack of remorse or shame. 
7. Inadequately motivated antisocial behavior. 
8. Poor judgment and failure to learn by experience. 
9. Pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love. 
10. General poverty in major affective reactions. 
11. Specific loss of insight. 
12. Unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations. 
13. Fantastic and uninviting behavior, with drink and sometimes 
without. 
14. Suicide rarely carried out. 
15. Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated. 
16. Failure to follow any life plan.5 
Now consider this as a list of survival skills in the average American 
prison or reform school. You had best be charming, free from delu­
sions, show no sign of nervousness, be untruthful when conditions 
warrant, watch out for sincerity, mask remorse, occasionally fight, 
exhibit poverty of affect, be unresponsive in interpersonal relations, 
avoid suicide, hide love, have an impersonal sex life, and, given the 
vicissitudes of your situation, eschew anything resembling a life plan. 
If the family therapist and anthropologist Jay Haley was correct when he 
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described state mental hospitals as hothouses for schizophrenia, surely 
correctional institutions nurture psychopathy in the same fashion. 
Other professionals take a different tack. Referring to the newer 
term sociopath as outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Men­
tal Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association, Alan Stone, Pro­
fessor of Law and Psychiatry at Harvard University, has this to say: 
The invidious aspect of the testimony about sociopaths and their future 
dangerousness has to do with the racial and social implications of the 
diagnosis of sociopath as defined by DSM-III rather than with the ethics 
and expertise of the particular psychiatrists. The diagnostic criteria for 
antisocial personality in DSM-III might apply to . .  . many black men 
who have grown up in inner cities. Those criteria include the following 
characteristics when manifest before age fifteen: 1) truancy, 2) delin­
quency, 3) running away from home, 4) thefts, 5) vandalism, 6) school 
grades below expected, and 7) repeated sexual intercourse in a casual 
relationship. The existence of only three of these factors is sufficient to 
establish the disorder in this age group. 
Over age eighteen, manifestations include 1) inability to sustain con­
sistent work behavior, 2) lack of ability to function as a responsible 
parent, 3) failure to accept social norms, e.g. holding an illegal occupa­
tion (pimping, prostitution, fencing, selling drugs), 4) inability to main­
tain enduring attachment to a sexual partner, 5) failure to honor financial 
obligations, 6) failure to plan ahead, 7) disregard for truth, and 8) reck­
lessness. If there is a pattern of at least four such manifestations the 
diagnosis of sociopath is to be made. 
Whatever scientific value the diagnosis of sociopath may have, there 
can be little question that the urban poor and racial minorities will be 
swept into this diagnostic category. DSM-III may well introduce . . . 
racism.6 
Given the bias of the tradition, it would probably be better to avoid 
psychiatric, psychological, and social work labels. But they persist, 
whether grounded in science, common sense, prejudice, or myth. Ulti­
mately, they have meaning only in a world which demands them, 
creates them, and carries out the actions which flow from them—a 
world of political posturing and militant ignorance, not a world which 
respects either effectiveness or humane impulse. 
The fact that labels attached to captives by correctional bureaucracies 
derive neither from scientific fact nor cohesive theory seems to have no 
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impact. Contemporary commentators even revel in flying from such 
considerations. A curious comment of the conservative writer James Q. 
Wilson exemplifies this attitude. "When confronted with the assertion, 
'Crime and drug addictions can only be dealt with by attacking their 
root causes/ I am sometimes inclined, when in a testy mood, to rejoin: 
'stupidity can only be dealt with by attacking its root causes/ "7 Such 
an attitude saves us the messiness of knowing too much about delin­
quents, their families, their lives, their opportunities, their backgrounds, 
or their experiences. Another's life experience can be rather easily dis­
missed as irrelevant. But critics like Wilson need not worry. Root causes 
are low on the national agenda. Our efforts are directed at validating 
what we are already set to do, since we are more concerned with 
fueling the engines which drive bureaucracies than with issues of crime 
and punishment, treatment and deterrence. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that, when dealing with the 
delinquent poor, diagnosticians have untoward power to make their 
definitions stick. From Lombroso to Wilson and Herrnstein, this has 
been a primary task of forensic psychiatric diagnosis.8 One interesting 
exception has been the feminist analysis of women offenders. For the 
most part it stresses common experiences between women offenders 
and nonoffenders.9 
And what of those who understand delinquency and crime as the 
quintessential human condition in the context of original sin and evil? 
If this view is granted, the predisposition to evil lies as much in the 
heart of the definers as the defined. The complex problems which 
accompany a delinquent's brush with the law are too easily dismissed, 
the offender too easily fit to a Procrustean bed, limbs hacked or stretched 
according to national mood or political demands. It seems to me that 
the greater responsibility rests with those who have the greater power. 
Those who have risen in the meritocracy have a greater duty to be 
merciful than those at the bottom and, therefore, are more responsible 
for their inability to be so. A look at the average prison or reform school 
population suggests that too much original sin has been heaped on the 
heads of the poor and of minorities. 
I sent an early version of the manuscript for this book to a friend on the 
faculty at Yale. With kind words, he suggested his publisher. The editor 
called me a few days later and asked that I send along the manuscript. It 
sounded as if it might be of interest to them. After a couple of weeks, 
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the editor telephoned me. She said that she liked much of the book but 
felt it needed another kind of publisher, probably one with a wider 
market than the primarily academic audience to which her company 
catered. Then she added a comment that rocked me a bit: "You may 
have some difficulty with this book, though. It's too compassionate for 
the times/' I took this to mean I was out of touch. At best, the experi­
ences and views I had outlined belonged to another era. At worst, they 
were wrongheaded and naive. 
One seldom sees oneself as particularly naive. I'm certainly no 
Rousseauian given to positing an innate goodness of man. I hadn't 
intended my writing as a commentary on the human condition. At 
times I have been only too aware of the question of the evil in the 
doings of my fellow human beings, particularly in the past decade, as I 
have returned to my clinical roots and worked with a wide variety of 
violent young offenders. 
The teenager who killed his father, stepmother, and ten and eleven-
year-old brothers, who now sits on death row in a Southern state; the 
young man who raped, sodomized, and tortured two young women 
(with fishhooks through their breasts), while their bound and gagged 
husbands were forced to watch; the myopic fourteen-year-old school­
boy who shot his mother in the head and, while the life slowly drained 
from her, went dutifully to his English, math, and social studies classes, 
returning home to check on her death agonies as she crawled from 
bedroom to bathroom and back again, and finally expired in a runway 
of coagulated blood late in the second afternoon after the shooting; the 
young woman, now on death row, convicted (probably unjustly) of 
having set her house on fire and killed her two infant sons in order to 
collect a $10,000 insurance policy; the fifteen-year-old who killed his 
mother and eight-year-old half-brother ostensibly because he had been 
told he would have to leave home if he got bad grades—all these are 
individuals I came to know as I tried to make sense of their actions 
while keeping alive some faint hope for their future. 
And occasionally the impossible happens—a young man who, hav­
ing killed his father, is sent to us for treatment. He must deal with the 
complicated meaning of his violent act, never to be undone, and in the 
process he must weather the suicidal ghosts which haunt his wrestling. 
This exercise would have been denied him had he once been sentenced. 
Not infrequently, as I've wound my way through the unspeakable 
acts and tried vainly to unwind a sense-dulled youth, I've felt the too 
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palpable evil which hovers over and finally chokes a life so twisted that 
it can find affirmation only in bringing pain to another. But acknowl­
edging an evil act and knowing the capacity for evil in a human being 
are not the same as labeling a person evil. That is much too simple and 
is the most naive of conclusions; it is an unforgivable sin which by its 
nature closes the door on redemption. My purpose has not been to 
excise human responsibility, overlook the demands of justice, or deny 
personal accountability. I have tried to nurture hope. 
I think of the hundred-pound teenager who killed two others and 
now awaits sentencing as an adult—a piece of fresh meat to inmates 
who, outside prison, wouldn't consider abusing him sexually—and I 
try to find ways to delay his sentence, cajoling and manipulating with a 
faith grounded in the incompetence of the system, gaining time while 
fashioning some alternative for the court to consider, and winning a 
melancholy prize—he is sent to a caring treatment facility until he can 
grow big enough to survive assault in the twenty years of prison which 
will follow his rehabilitation. I thought of all these things when I re­
called the editor's comment that all this was "too compassionate for the 
times"—and I'm not sure what that means. 
19 In Search of Aliens 
A man can understand astronomy only by being an astronomer; he can 
understand entomology only by being an entomologist (or, perhaps, an 
insect); but he can understand a great deal of anthropology merely by 
being a man. That same suppression of sympathies, that same waving 
away of intuitions or guesswork, which makes a man preternaturally 
clever in dealing with the stomach of a spider, will make him preter­
naturally stupid in dealing with the heart of man. 
G. K. Chesterton 
I  n the early years of the Reagan Administration, an old friend, an 
eminent criminologist, telephoned me. He had recently attended a 
meeting of well-known and respected experts. The impresario of the 
event was management professor James Q. Wilson, guru of supply-
side criminology. The researchers had been brought together to discuss 
violent crime and its prediction and by inference to mold social policy 
with regard to this difficult problem. The meeting was held at the 
National Academy of Science in Washington, though it had no particu­
lar relationship to the academy. The meeting room was reserved by 
Justice Department sponsors. This was a harbinger of the now-familiar 
practice of the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Institute of 
Justice—that of routinely putting a "spin" on convocations, research 
findings, and policy studies, imputing credibility to those that fit cur­
rent ideology and disregarding or discarding the ones that don't. 
But those were the halcyon days of conservatism in the saddle at last, 
when it was national policy to believe we had finally turned from the 
bleeding-heart and mollycoddling theories and practices of the past 
and entered a new, more disciplined approach to law and order. We 
were within reach of exposing the criminal mind by clinically weeding 
out the psychopaths and sociopaths from among us; incapacitating the 
criminal body through predictive models based in large part on whether 
our correctional system had gotten its hands on the offender at an 
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earlier age; purging the criminal soul through a curious secular pur­
itanism called "just deserts"; and excising the "wicked" through elec­
trocution, firing squads, and gas chambers, occasionally feeding our 
fascination for death with antiseptic lethal injections given in a quasi-
medical ritual. 
My friend, not a cynical man, was depressed. On the plane home he 
had mulled over the Washington meeting. As he put it, "It was as 
though there were no history to the field." Important studies, theories, 
and research findings from the past were not known, were selectively 
ignored, or were cast aside. Everyone seemed to be starting from 
scratch in this brave new world. 
Here it was, academic criminology caught in the very cycle which 
had characterized the practice of corrections for the past century. It was 
a vision of criminologists as neglectful of their own traditions and 
history as corrections professionals who ignore their own past prac­
tices. As far as corrections goes, this is understandable. The history of 
corrections is not a history of which to be particularly proud—a canon 
of failed variations on a theme of pain and suffering. Twenty years' 
experience as a corrections professional usually amounts to one year's 
experience twenty times over. Research and theory are judged on the 
basis of their potential as more management and control techniques. 
Ideas, debate, and creativity are mostly foreign. In the organization 
which claims to represent American corrections professionals, the 
American Correctional Association, it is gauche to discuss such things 
as the death penalty, since 80 percent of the membership supports it. 
Instead, the focus is on how to manage the execution of an inmate 
professionally—how to do it efficiently, how to cool the body, how to 
stuff the rectum of the condemned with cotton, how to kill successfully. 
Who would wish to dwell on a history like that? But criminologists are 
another matter. They have every reason to heed their own history and 
traditions. Surely they should see themselves as providing something 
beyond technologies for management and control. 
Those conservative researchers who found themselves in the ascen­
dant in Edwin Meese's ideology-driven Justice Department seemed 
optimistic, if not giddy, at the prospects their handiwork presented for 
the administration's agenda on crime and corrections. But beneath the 
optimism moved a familiar cynicism, though not the cynicism of the 
dogged researcher inured to personal disappointment at unpromising 
results, poor replicability, or misuses of his or her theories. No, the 
242 / Pondering on Criminals and Criminobgists 
cynicism which gripped those called to the front of the class by the 
ideologues who dispensed federal funds was grounded in something 
else entirely. 
The administration in Washington had made it acceptable to pro­
claim openly a heretofore well-kept secret among both academic crimi­
nologists and corrections practitioners. All were now encouraged to 
trumpet an old theme loudly: offenders, adult and juvenile, are indeed 
different from the rest of us, and those differences are what matter 
most. Though the same theme had been the pedal point to most crimi­
nal justice research and theory even during the so-called heyday of 
rehabilitation, it had now become a full-blown dirge to which liberals 
and conservatives dutifully trudged. 
The "we-them" dichotomy has always been at the heart of American 
corrections. Its classification systems confirm it. Its institutional tradi­
tions set it in concrete. Woe betide him who dares, even ever so faintly, 
to blur this elemental distinction. But this obsessed dualism has not 
come on the scene in just the last few years. It was there from the 
beginnings of such great liberal experiments as the juvenile justice 
system. 
A few years ago I came across a 1917 report of the Cook County Civil 
Service Commission about the Juvenile Detention Home. After noting 
that neither the plans nor the ideals of the originators of the detention 
home were being fulfilled, and after calling the facility more a jail than a 
home, the commission recommended the removal of dependent and 
minor delinquents. 
But in an aside which strikes to the heart of the matter, the report 
said: "For the remaining children,—the immoral girls, the incorrigible 
and unruly boys and girls, the present Juvenile Detention Home and 
the present custodial care are none too severe/' "In Detroit," the report 
added "individual separation rooms are installed for and occupied by 
the incorrigibles who deserve complete isolation, which we also recom-
mend/'1 Among those contributing to the report were such twentieth-
century reformers as Jane Addams of Chicago, Julia Lathrop of Detroit, 
and William Healy of Boston. Such distinctions are upheld even by the 
"do-gooders." 
Why is this? How can we prescribe for others what we would not 
consider for our own? I presume that we feel a continuing need to 
confirm our own identity and security by telling us who we are not. 
Durkheim pointed to this when he said that, if we were a society of 
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saints, we would probably invent new rules someone would be obliged 
to break so that the rest of us could relax, secure in the judgment that 
there are deviant outsiders at the gates.2 
But why do academics and researchers rush down the same mean 
streets? One might excuse a Lombroso or an E. A. Hooton his elitism 
or racism as symptomatic of another time in history.3 But such justifica­
tions are more elusive in contemporary criminology. I learned long ago 
that these diagnoses are more than anything else social prescriptions. I 
judge labels by the treatments they demand, and current preoccupa­
tions with issues like the criminal personality, the criminal mind, and 
the career criminal are more ominous than hopeful. 
Though we all tend to separate ourselves from those who offend us 
or offend against us—and though it may take an extraordinary, perhaps 
even spiritual, effort to see beyond these distinctions—it is clear that in 
recent years many in academic criminology have given up that effort. 
As the theories have grown more "realistic" and the methodology more 
complicated, criminologists have grown more detached and discon­
nected from the stuff of their studies—offenders, their families, their 
children, their neighborhoods, their lives. As a result, our prisons and 
reform schools are filled with fabricated aliens made yet more alien by 
those who should know better, but who insufficiently understand the 
subjects of their research beyond narrow methodological parameters 
or highly controlled settings which demean and impoverish human 
experience. 
There continues to be a plethora of studies of offenders, but most are 
quite different from those of the not-so-distant past. Something impor­
tant is being lost. What was the lifeblood of academic criminology is 
leaving its veins. Researchers have found an escape in the detachment 
their techniques offer. Their findings are increasingly narrow, eliciting 
interest primarily from those in politics or government who search for 
smooth management of brutal systems. 
As a result, current academic criminology has contributed greatly to 
the further deterioration of the corrections system, causing (or at least 
not hindering) overcrowding, programless prisons, more executions, 
incapacitation of much of the young black male population at one time 
or another, and abuse and neglect of historic proportions. Of course, 
these conditions have always plagued the intellectually arid and mor­
ally bereft field of corrections; but in the past there was at least some 
distant recognition that what was being done was not right. 
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These days, corrections practitioners sin boldly, with little compunc­
tion, as they go about their destructive tasks: So what if we warehouse 
people? Nothing works. So what if we drag juveniles and adults to the 
electric chair? It's a form of social poetry. So what if we lock up so many 
blacks, Hispanics and poor white trash? It's in their genes or their 
elongated third toe. So what if those rehabilitative programs we do 
allow are the psychological equivalent of aggravated assault? Compas­
sion has no place in modern correctional management. Give us more 
razor wire, more prisons, more buildings, more staff, more uniforms, 
more Mace, more modern holes, more managers; and, if you do send 
us any helpers, make sure they are the psychojusters of an H. G. Wells 
fantasy—"experts" who do their business without disturbing or ques­
tioning anything we might do. A decade of models of deterrence, 
incapacitation grids, mandatory sentences, justice models, and "noth­
ing works" cynicism has found an increasingly warmer home among 
corrections professionals. The disposition has been there for a century, 
and now, a banner of scientific validation is being hung from the prison 
flagpole. 
The interesting econometric models which have been of limited use 
in predicting economic behavior or molding sound fiscal policy are 
apparently expected to produce something better in our pursuit of law 
and order through a mainframe. Maybe such models do hold promise, 
but too heavy a reliance on them in dealing with populations of indi­
viduals who are captives has grave implications for the future. 
Subjects who fit ideologically driven research models well are in 
relatively short supply, but captive subjects can be sorted, defined, and 
sifted with relative ease. As the Reagan Justice Department success­
fully demonstrated, well-controlled research can shift a policy focus or 
maim the very realities we study. 
Not long ago, criminologists valued personal contact, participant 
observation, interchange, and argument with those they studied. I 
think of what has been lost with the disappearance of the giants of the 
Chicago School—Clifford Shaw, W. I. Thomas, George Herbert Mead-
great researchers, theoreticians, and philosophers who, in their stud­
ies, contributed something to the evolution of human values. They 
knew the persons they studied—in settlement houses, in their neigh­
borhoods, in the prisons, and on the streets. Their research enriched 
society. Thorsten Sellin, Nils Christie, Michel Foucault, Lloyd Ohlin, 
Donald Cressey, Simon Dinitz, Bill Chambliss, and Erving Goffman 
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never lost touch with persons, faces, stories, and lives in their pursuit 
of theory. 
As we run thousands of adult and juvenile offenders and inmates 
through statistical models with little regard for how individuals might 
suffer in the game, we have little recognition that what we are doing is 
undoubtedly poor science as well. The stuff of this field, as with most, 
if not all, human activity, should be messy, frequently unpredictable, 
usually difficult, and always exasperating. It should cause us to ques­
tion ourselves continually about what we do, our society, our values, 
and our goals. Beware of anyone who comes with a "solution." Finality 
in this field is inevitably ominous. 
Criminologists cannot engage in " cut-outs"—a process spelled out 
by Michael Lesy in his series of essays, Forbidden Zone. In this profes­
sional correctional practice used in executing a prisoner, "Procedures 
are so fragmented that no single person remains responsible. . .  . By 
the time a death sentence is carried out, it's impossible to accuse any 
particular person of anything/'4 
Criminologists must be connected to the people they study, and 
must assume at least some personal responsibility for the policy impli­
cations of their theories and findings. I am sure there are many re­
searchers and practitioners who would not share my views about what 
might be a better approach to handling adult or juvenile offenders. 
That's all right. But unless they are willing to be held as personally 
responsible for their model and their suggestions as I have been held 
for my actions, I cannot take them seriously. 
I've attended funerals and met with the families of victims of young­
sters in the care of the state agencies I have run, and I have wondered 
whether, if we had been more stringent, the tragedy would have oc­
curred. I have also stood with and supported those troubled and trou­
bling juveniles we returned to the streets as a result of my policy de­
cision to close reform schools. It wasn't particularly easy or pleasant— 
the slander, sarcasm, cynicism, death threats, and all those other fac­
tors added up to what the American psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan 
used to call a lack of consensual validation (a precursor of paranoia). 
But having experienced both the isolation and the paranoia, I don't 
think that others who have influenced the field far more than I should 
get a free ride. 
Those whose models tell the Supreme Court the death penalty is a 
deterrent have every right to that view. I presume they will defend their 
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views in the scholarly literature. When their research becomes the 
rationale for executions, however, it seems to me that they should go 
immediately to a death row. They should know well the person who 
will next be executed—meet his family, his parents, his children—come 
to understand him well, and then attend the execution and watch as his 
hands clench and his head smokes and his soul departs. That is human 
responsibility. 
Those who compile computerized sentencing grids, adding five 
years here or ten years there with the touch of a button or the mark of a 
pencil, might spend some time in the prisons of the systems they have 
prescribed—not in the warden's office or on the guided tour, but sitting 
in a cellblock among strangers and hostile staff, or stripped nude in the 
hole. They might spend a week, or a month, and they might contem­
plate what a year, or ten years, means. Those who so glibly construct 
hurtful and defeating labels—"psychopath/' "sociopath," "criminal 
personality," all diagnoses which ensure neglect, hostility, mishan­
dling, and brutality—might first thoroughly know and respect another's 
life history. It takes unusual arrogance to dismiss a fellow human 
being's lost journey as irrelevant. It takes a pathological compulsive­
ness to disregard personal experience in pursuit of categories. 
What I miss most in contemporary criminology is human passion-
frustrating, pigheaded, wrongheaded, but always compelling and au­
thentic. Mistakes will be made, but sins of passion are more easily 
forgiven than sins of the intellect. As Jacques Barzun put it in his 
marvelous book A Stroll with William James, "The mind works to serve 
wants, ideas are the product of desire. James did not discover this 
truth; Plato admitted it with regret; Hume asserted it with vehemence: 
'The mind is and ought to be the slave of the passions.' But it was James 
who showed that desire, taking the form of interest, pursues not sim­
ply practical ends but also theoretical and aesthetic." 
As psychiatrists and psychologists forsake insight and understand­
ing in pursuit of insurance reimbursement-generated nosologies, and 
as sociologists pursue models fit for federal funding requirements, 
someone must say something about the individual. Otherwise, we will 
be our own undoing. 
Having been raised in a Catholic tradition long since forsaken, I 
recall St. Thomas Aquinas, one of the great thinkers and grand theo­
rists of Western civilization, who, on his deathbed, surrounded by his 
fellow monks, was reminded of his many written works. He responded 
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that finally, his work was no more than straw. Finally, it is one's wres­
tling with life that matters. 
As I finished writing this postscript, which was originally delivered 
in accepting an award from the American Society of Criminology, the 
latest issue of The Criminologist, the official newsletter of the society, 
arrived. In it was a moving obituary of the eminent American crimi­
nologist Don Cressey by Lloyd Ohlin. Lloyd recalled an interview John 
Laub had with Cressey. Asked about his dreams for the future, Cressey 
replied, "I dream of writing a criminal code for the U.S. . .  . that 
doesn't have any punishment in it . .  . a book telling how to run a 
society on the basis of a reward system. Although I know I can't do it, I 
know that sociologists as a gang can do it. Skinner had provided a 
frame. 'Beyond the punitive society/ clearly must be the goal of the 
next generation of sociologists and criminologists/'5 
And there, side-by-side with this blessedly out-of-sync aspiration of 
a pioneer in American criminology, was an almost full-page notice from 
the National Institute of Justice, outlining its 1988 Research Program 
Plan priorities—"Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offen­
ders; Public Safety and Security; Punishment and Control of Offen­
ders; Offender Classification and Prediction of Criminal Behavior; Vio­
lent Criminal Behavior; Forensic and Criminal Justice Technology; and 
Criminal Careers and the Control of Crime." 
Aldous Huxley, in his book Ends and Means, written in those dark 
days just before World War II began, noted that advance in civilization 
has not been characterized by progress in justice, but rather by prog­
ress in charity.6 In criminology today, "charity" has become a dirty 
word. It is time for criminologists to recognize the other responsibilities 
inherent in their efforts, to lift their work to the level of a truly human 
act. 
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